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FOREWORD
Nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation no longer
enjoy the broad support they once did during the Cold War.
Academics and security experts now question the ability of
either to cope or check nuclear rogue states or terrorists.
On the one hand, America’s closest allies—e.g., Japan and
South Korea—believe American nuclear security guarantees are critical to their survival. If the United States is unwilling to provide Tokyo or Seoul with the assurance they
believe they need, would it then not make sense for them to
acquire nuclear forces of their own? On the other hand, with
more nuclear-armed states and an increased willingness to
use them, how likely is it that nuclear deterrence will work?
This volume investigates these questions. In it, six experts offer a variety of perspectives to catalyze debate. The
result is a rich debate that goes well beyond current scholarship to challenge the very basis of prevailing nonproliferation and security policies.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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INTRODUCTION: IS NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION STILL A PROBLEM?
In 1966, Leonard Beaton, a journalist and strategic
scholar, published a short book that asked: Must the
bomb spread?1 Mr. Beaton’s query reflected the profound alarm with which proliferation was viewed
shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Today that
alarm is all but absent; now, not only is proliferation
increasingly viewed as a given (more of a fact than a
problem), but some security experts actually see advantages in nuclear weapons spreading or, at least,
little harm.
Cultivation of this latter view took time—nearly a
half century—and considerable scholarship. In 1981,
Kenneth Waltz popularized French and American
finite deterrence thinking of the late-1950s by asking
whether or not nuclear weapons in more hands might
be better. His answer was yes. As nuclear weapons
spread, he argued, adversaries would view war as
being self-defeating, and peace would become more
certain.2
Although this view gained a certain following,
some pushed back, emphasizing the real limits of
nuclear safety and security. Drawing on official documents, Scott Sagan in the early-1990s detailed many
nuclear accidents and close calls that the U.S. military
had with its nuclear arsenal. He and others also focused on the risks of illicit and unauthorized use, and
the chance that one side or another might misread
the warning signals of a possible nuclear attack and
respond when they should not.3
After the events of September 11, 2001, the question of whether terrorists might go nuclear—a worry
studied in the early-1970s—regained urgency.4 This
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concern, though, immediately raised yet another issue: Was nuclear deterrence, which the world’s superpowers had relied upon so much during the Cold
War, relevant any longer for dealing with nucleararmed rogue states and terrorists?5 Once joined with
enthusiasm for going to zero nuclear weapons, this
question gave rise to the notion that nuclear weapons
were only marginally useful to deter the most likely
forms of nuclear and nonnuclear aggression (thus,
highlighting how dubious the possession or acquisition of nuclear weapons might be). The more radical
nuclear abolitionists went even further. For them, the
bomb either did not deter or hardly deterred at all.6
With this later perspective, it was but a small step to
conclude that nuclear proliferation was neither good
nor bad, but inconsequential.
But is it? Certainly, since 1966, the bomb has
spread. Besides the United States, Russia, the United
Kingdom, France, and China; Israel, India, Pakistan,
and North Korea have all acquired nuclear weapons.
In addition, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Iraq, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, and Iran all tried but did not
get the bomb. So far, so good. However, more proliferation in the Far and Middle East is possible (e.g., Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, Taiwan, South
Korea, and Japan).
Meanwhile, support for nuclear use is on the rise.
Russia and Pakistan now favor the first use of nuclear
weapons either to deter or to de-escalate future conventional conflicts. This has prompted India and China to review their nuclear use policies. What might
happen if any of these states fired their weapons in
anger and some military advantage was thereby secured? At least one respected military thinker argues
that this would likely unleash a torrent of nuclear proliferation and far worse.7
xiv

For all of these reasons, nuclear deterrence no longer enjoys the almost religious support it once did.
However, perhaps that loss of faith is misplaced. After all, America’s key allies—e.g., Japan and South
Korea—still believe that U.S. nuclear guarantees are
critical to their survival. If they believe this and the
United States is unwilling to provide Tokyo or Seoul
with the nuclear assurance they desire, would it then
not make sense for them to acquire nuclear forces of
their own? This question is the basis of Republican
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s ruminations
about the inevitability and possible value of Japan and
South Korea going nuclear and UK Foreign Minister
Boris Johnson’s speculation that we would be better
served if Iran acquired nuclear weapons.8
With more nuclear-armed states, and even one
or two states more willing to use them, though, how
likely is it that nuclear deterrence and no first use will
prevail? Is the sum of all fears—a nuclear apocalypse
of the sort Mr. Beaton once wrote about—again in
prospect? Getting the answers to these questions, or at
least raising them, is this volume’s purpose. In it, six
experts offer a variety of perspectives sure to catalyze
further debate.
In the book’s first chapter, Harvey Sapolsky, the
former director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Security Studies Program, makes a
case that preventing nuclear proliferation, especially
with nuclear security guarantees to our closest allies—
Japan, South Korea, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—is unnecessary, provocative, and
costly. Nuclear deterrence and forensics, he argues,
will work; and letting our allies go nuclear would be
a safer, cheaper course than trying to prevent others
from acquiring nuclear weapons and maintaining U.S.
basing forces overseas.
xv

Seth Carus, who served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Vice President, is
now a resident at the National Defense University’s
(NDU) Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as a distinguished fellow. He argues
that such optimistic views are too academic. Those
that serve in government, he notes, essentially ignore
such arguments and with cause. Instead, he observes,
senior policymakers worry about the destructiveness
of nuclear weapons and the fragility of nuclear deterrence between various states. They are also eager to
maintain U.S. power against emerging nuclear states,
and to avoid the crisis instabilities further nuclear proliferation would prompt.
John Mueller, the author of Atomic Obsession, views
these concerns as dangerous alarmism. Rather than
arguing that nuclear proliferation is a positive development, Mueller makes the case that so far, nuclear
proliferation has been far more benign than predicted
and should be viewed as being largely inconsequential. In contrast, promoting nuclear nonproliferation,
he argues, has produced war (e.g., Iraq), encouraged
extortion (e.g., by North Korea), risked further wars
(e.g., Iran), and deprived the world of the full benefits
of civilian nuclear power.
This then brings us to former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Victor Gilinsky’s chapter, “Should
We Let It All Go?” Gilinsky concedes there is much
to like about John Mueller’s argument. He spotlights
Mueller’s questioning of the value of nuclear weapons
threats or use, his critique of politicians and analysts
who have been alarmist about nuclear terrorism, and
his challenging of America’s vacuous demands and
threats regarding Iran’s nuclear program.
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Gilinsky, however, insists that in arguing that
proliferation hardly matters at all—that up to now its
effects have been benign, and that efforts to restrain
proliferation have done far more harm than good—
Mueller goes too far. The bomb has had a significant
impact on history; there certainly have been some
close nuclear calls (e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis). It
is also the case that few, if any, of the bomb’s possessors have been all that eager to give their weapons up.
As for the harm nonproliferation has done, Gilinsky
points out that such arguments mistakenly assume
America’s nonproliferation policies have had real
teeth. It certainly is wrong, Gilinsky argues, to believe
that nonproliferation was why we invaded Iraq. Gilinsky’s conclusion: It would be unwise to relax whatever nuclear controls we still have and smarter still to
strengthen them.
However, is the prospect for nuclear use real? Matthew Kroenig and Rebecca Davis Gibbons of Georgetown University argue that the answer is yes. In their
chapter, the authors not only review the history of
possible nuclear use during the Cold War, but they
also lay out why and how Russia, China, North Korea,
Israel, India, Pakistan, and the United States might
nonetheless use these weapons first.
This, of course, begs the question as to what the
consequences might be. Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann of
Texas A&M University spells them out. They include
igniting a catalytic war capable of dragging the nuclear superpowers in, creating massive destabilizing
refugee crises, prompting international demands for
regime change, encouraging the substitution of repressive rule for open forms of self-government, and
the erosion of international norms against nuclear
proliferation and use.
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None of these consequences are inevitable, but
they are likely enough to encourage all states to avoid
first use if they can. Their further spread might conceivably be beneficial, but the potential regret if their
spread makes matters worse is easily large enough to
recommend a less playful conclusion.
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CHAPTER 1
GETTING PAST NONPROLIFERATION
Harvey M. Sapolsky
The nuclear nonproliferation regime has lost its
benefits, modest though they may have been, for the
United States. In the post-Cold War era, friends who
happily shun the possession of nuclear weapons along
with most of the other expensive attributes of military self-defense prefer instead our too freely offered
nuclear security guarantees, which burden the United
States. We offer these guarantees, known as extended
deterrence, to discourage them from acquiring nuclear
weapons of their own. I fear, however, we have more
to fear as a nation from the costs of extended deterrence—the costs for providing conventional defenses
for friends, which is, in fact, the essence of our security
guarantees—than from the need to deter additional
nuclear-armed enemies, which is the potential result
of the end of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
when it was implemented in 1970, surely had important benefits for the Soviet Union and China because
most of the states that might have acquired nuclear
weapons during the Cold War—West Germany and
Japan in particular, but Sweden, Australia, and others as well—would have targeted their weapons on
the Soviet Union and China. The United Kingdom and
France, fading powers that they were, probably liked
the special status the NPT offered, and, if only for historical reasons, the fact that West Germany would not
become a nuclear power. For the United States, the
NPT deflected domestic attention away from the war
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in Vietnam with the hope of détente with the Soviet
Union, its necessary partner in the then promising
quest to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.1
The United States likely also wanted to avoid
having West Germany, in particular, independently
nuclear-armed if that meant needlessly provoking the
Soviet Union. West Germany and Japan had by the
mid-1960s recovered significantly from World War II
and were seeking normal nation status. Germany was
becoming an economic powerhouse, and Japan was
not far behind. Nuclear-armed, they certainly would
have been seen as more frightening to the nations they
had so recently occupied during World War II. The
NPT provided the easy way to avoid a mid-Cold War
crisis. There would be no West German or Japanese
bomb.
There was also a post-Cold War NPT benefit for
the United States.2 The collapse of the Soviet Union
cleared the way for Pax Americana, the brief period
of American triumphalism in which the United States
became the unelected and uncompensated global
sheriff involved in suppressing, by force if necessary,
all sorts of international disputes, civil wars, and criminal behavior. The NPT was a facilitator for this volunteer work because only nations with nuclear weapons stood free from the sheriff’s writ. Those without
nuclear weapons were at risk of a visit from the law
in the form of the American military. The several unhappy experiences of the boldly defined Global War
on Terror has lately tempered the United States’ interest in being the global sheriff and with it the special
benefit to the United States of the NPT.3 It is now the
costs of nonproliferation that loom large; specifically,
the need to provide a nuclear shield in addition to the
conventional defenses for those who have foresworn
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their own nuclear weapons. And because that shield
is potentially dangerous to offer and to trust, it is buttressed by forward deployed conventional defenses
that are quite robust, to avoid the need to escalate to
the use of nuclear weapons if the shield is tested.
PAYING FOR NONPROLIFERATION
The costs of the treaty did not seem great to the
existing nuclear powers at the time of its implementation. The NPT did require that they pledge their intent
to work toward their own disarmament, though with
no stated measure of sincerity or progress. Nuclear
arms have in fact been reduced—thousands of American and Russian warheads have been taken out of
service and dismantled—but this was a result of the
wind down of the Cold War and the resulting desire
to reap the benefits of reduced defense spending. The
treaty also explicitly protected the nuclear weapon
states’ commercial nuclear opportunities by assuring
all nations access to nonmilitary nuclear technologies.
It is through this doorway that nuclear materials flow
globally and, some fear, proliferators step through
claiming their peaceful desire for environmentally
friendly nuclear energy and the understandable hope
of medical treatment and research.4
Beyond the usual Soviet menace, Warsaw Pact
members needed no special inducements to sign the
NPT. The Soviet Union, after all, provided them with
nuclear deterrence of a sort, whether they wanted it or
not. They had no option for acquiring nuclear weapons on their own. The Pact nations were the frontier
buffer for the Soviet state, a tank’s drive from the fearsome North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enemy, and were treated as such. In contrast, the United
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States’ European NATO allies were fully aware that
a big ocean lay between them and their protector.
They sought constant reassurance that the United
States would not abandon them in the face of nuclear
threats. Acquiring nuclear weapons on their own was
indeed an option for the allies. Right up to the NPT,
various schemes were considered, including a NATO
nuclear force and the basing of dual-keyed U.S. tactical nuclear weapons around Europe to head this off.
As an inducement for Europeans to accept the NPT,
the United States—while retaining operational control
over the weapons—allowed West Germany, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey to modify certain
aircraft to be capable of carrying U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons based in their countries. Strangely, this practice continues today, though on a reduced scale.5
In fact, extended deterrence was not a major issue
for the United States during the Cold War.6 The United States believed that a Soviet-dominated Eurasia,
like an Axis Power-dominated Eurasia—the threat of
World War II—was an intolerable danger to its own
viability and required challenge. U.S. forces were forward deployed in Europe because its allies, devastated by World War II, were unable to provide an effective barrier to potential Soviet expansion into Western
Europe. The United States saw the Communist side as
having a numerical, conventional warfare advantage
and wanted any confrontation to be sobered by the
danger of nuclear escalation. Our forces were there as
a tripwire to guarantee that a challenge at the boundary of NATO or the borders of our Asian allies would,
by threatening U.S. forces directly, possibly provoke a
nuclear strike by the United States.
The Korean War seemed to American leaders like
both the opening round of an all-out war with the
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Soviet Union and a diversion to take the focus off the
main front in Europe. The Korean contest, though soon
stalemated, was replaced by another in Vietnam that
eventually also involved the United States. Asia during the Cold War featured the opposite of Europe—no
direct confrontations of nuclear powers, weak alliance
structures, and very intense land wars. However, like
the case in Europe, the United States freely offered up
extended nuclear deterrence guarantees for all who
wanted them among its major friends in Asia.7
Much has changed since the enactment of the NPT.
The United States’ allies in Europe and Asia are now
among the richest nations in the world. Japan has the
world’s third-largest economy, while the now united
Germany has the fourth and is the leading economy in
the European Union. The main threats to our security
are attacks on American soil by non-state entities, none
of which possess nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union
has collapsed into a smaller, less important, less powerful Russia. China is now a major American trading
partner and growing rapidly, but is mainly focused on
the domestic stability impacts of that growth and not
on international expansion. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan confirm the difficulty in America acting as
the sheriff in distant lands where effective, representative, non-corrupt local governments are unknown and
seemingly impossible to create.8 The need for forward
deployment of U.S. forces has greatly diminished.
OVEREXTENDED
Absurdly, extended deterrence remains a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. The United States still
promises to exchange Washington for Berlin and San
Francisco for Tokyo. And even more absurdly, the
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nuclear guarantee now extends to former Warsaw
Pact states and former Soviet republics that have
become NATO members, making their borders the
West’s frontier. In Asia, North Korea, having withdrawn from the NPT, has acquired nuclear weapons;9
and China, now more militarily powerful and politically assertive, is pressing claims for islands administered by other nations, including our friends.10 It is
now Boston for Riga and Seattle for Seoul that is at
risk. The cries for reassurance on the part of allies are
more persistent given how implausible the promise is
now to provide nuclear deterrence for allies.
In order to never have to contemplate such a deal,
the United States provides its allies with conventional
defenses. We guard Eastern Europe from a Russia still
fuming about its lost empire and East Asia from the
growing power of China. Our allies are fully capable
of affording their own defenses, but provide neither
sufficient conventional defenses nor their own nuclear
shield. Worse, our allies tempt our fate by being cavalier about their relations with their status-sensitive,
nuclear-armed neighbors. The European Union plays
footsie with Ukraine, once Russia’s breadbasket and
still home to many Russians; meanwhile, Japan and
others have their coast guards sail dangerously close
to Chinese vessels in jockeying over rocky outcrops.
Extended deterrence is no longer nuclear deterrence at a distance, but rather a conventional defense
of our allies’ borders. We do not see our forward deployed forces as a tripwire for nuclear escalation as
they were viewed during the Cold War. Instead, they
are intended to have the capability of winning the conventional fight so as to either deter it from occurring or
keep it from escalating to the nuclear level. The means
for gaining conventional warfare dominance has been
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the precision revolution, which is the development of
systems that can precisely detect, target, and destroy
opposing forces—in great numbers if necessary—with
little or no collateral damage, most particularly no civilian casualties.11 Nuclear weapons were essentially
compensation for the inability of conventional bombing, even conducted on a massive scale, to destroy enemy capabilities because of its inaccuracies. Close was
good enough with nuclear weapons. Now precision
weapons are, in essence, the way to avoid the massive
and indiscriminate destruction of nuclear weapons.
They represent warfare coming full circle. First small
bombs, then bigger and bigger bombs, until their destructive capability is so enormous that the target cannot be missed, and now back to small bombs, but ones
so precise that the target is certain to be destroyed.
Nevertheless, weapons technology diffuses, nuclear or conventional. The sensors, guidance, networks,
and missile systems that lie at the heart of the precision
weapons revolution are spreading to potential opponents across the globe.12 The cost of protecting towns
bordering Russia or islands near China is extraordinarily high and is certain to increase as their militaries
modernize, acquiring more and more precision weapons. Trying to be the dominant conventional military
at the border of big power opponents, but thousands
of miles from our own shores, is a formula for creating a huge military and ultimate bankruptcy. Our best
policy, as it was in the world wars, is to put great distance between enemy forces and our own forces until
enemy forces are heavily eroded, preferably through
contact with our allies or other opponents. Such a policy today would encourage allies to both stiffen their
conventional forces and acquire nuclear weapons.
One comes with the other.
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The so-called pivot to Asia is to provide reassurance to our Asia allies who worry about our ability
to meet the challenge of a rising China.13 They fear
that we will abandon them as we are pushed aside
in the Western Pacific by the increasing might of an
ever-richer China, one that has a long memory about
its supposed humiliations at the hand of colonizers
and empire builders, including Japan and the United
States. They wonder whether or not we will fulfill
pledges to save them from Chinese intimidation, including increased Chinese efforts to assert claims over
waters known to be rich in fishing, and likely oil as
well. All of this is taking place within the first island
chain, the half ring of island nations that border China
on its coastal frontier and that could help block its access to the open seas—and thus the global resources
needed for its continuing economic growth.14
The Asian pivot has so far brought with it only
modest troop deployments and the repositioning
of minor air and naval assets. Marines will be rotating through a training facility in Australia. American forces will have increased access to bases in the
Philippines. Additional forces are being assigned to
Guam. But the real challenge lies in operating within
the first island chain, which is subject to China’s ever
increasing anti-access/area-denial capabilities—accurate cruise and tactical ballistic missiles, sophisticated
mines, integrated air defense systems—that greatly
threaten any serious attempts to protect allies from
Chinese moves to assert territorial claims.15
Meeting the Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/
AD) challenge has become an obsession with elements
of the American military, particularly the Air Force
and the Navy, which are eager for new missions to
champion after their relative fade post-9/11 when we
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fought less technologically sophisticated enemies. It
is possible to imagine the combination of advanced
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, long-range conventional strike weapons, stealthy
aircraft, submarines, anti-radiation missiles, agile missile defenses, and robust command and control systems that U.S. forces could mount that would permit
survivable military operations close to the Chinese
shore.16 Doctrine for such capabilities is being devised
under the rubric “air-sea battle,” as are alternatives
such as blockades and other submarine-centric efforts.17 Supportive weapons system developments are
underway. No estimate has been released, but the cost
of meeting the Chinese A2/AD challenge will surely
be hundreds of billions of dollars.18
Russia’s grab of Crimea highlights a related challenge—defending Eastern Europe.19 Of course, Russia
is not the Soviet Union in terms of its inherent military
power. Its population is smaller, its industrial focus
less martial, and its military equipment less expeditionary, modern, and ready. Nevertheless, at its frontier, Russia is a formidable force, fully capable of defeating any opposition from its neighbors. Russian air
defenses are cutting-edge, and Russia possesses significant armor and special operations forces. Nucleararmed and seeking to reclaim regional dominance,
Russia is quite intimidating close up and happy to
remind its neighbors that it is not to be trifled with by
them.20 We too must be careful about Russia, if only
because we need Russian assistance in many parts of
the globe.21
Extended deterrence makes these military problems—the containment of potentially expansionary
nations—not the burden of allies in their regions, but
America’s.22 Free riding allies, wealthy though they
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may be, make little effort to protect themselves. Their
defense budgets and militaries continue to decline.
NATO’s 2 percent budgetary goal, the percentage
of gross domestic product to be devoted to defense,
goes unmet.23 Asian air and naval forces are slow to
modernize. Their contributions to offset the costs of
stationing U.S. forces forward nowhere near cover
the true expenses—the training, equipping, and rotating of combat ready units. Worse, they tempt our fate
by pushing at the edge. The European Union entices
Ukraine to pull away from Russian influence while
the ships of our Asian allies maneuver against Chinese ships near disputed islands. The question always
is: What will we do to help them? The obligations are
hardly ever reciprocal to any extent.
It is not just America’s military that is at risk, but
also the American economy. Acquired through the
underfunding of past wars and the inefficiencies of
a patchwork social safety net, the national debt has
reached the 18 trillion dollar mark. It is certain to increase due to rising health care costs and the retirement of the generation that was born after World War
II. Interest on the debt is projected to soon exceed our
current inflated defense expenditures.24 Because we invest so heavily in providing what is essentially free security to others, we lack the fine roads, the high-speed
trains, and shiny airports of our European and Asian
allies. Protecting the borders of these allies from the
threat of intrusion by their militarily capable neighbors, as extended deterrence policy requires us to do,
is a financial burden that prevents those investments
and a trimming of the national debt. Neglected infrastructure and a mounting debt are significant threats
to America’s future prosperity.25
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MORE WARS TO FIGHT AND LIES TO TELL
The NPT has stopped neither wars nor, and more
to its intended purpose, the spread of nuclear weapons. There are now nine nuclear powers instead of five
as India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea have joined
the club, though not formally. Nations fearing for their
survival against powerful enemies think about acquiring nuclear weapons. With the NPT, their efforts have
to be clandestine and determined, but for relatively
rich and technologically sophisticated nations, it is a
path that can be taken. India faces a nuclear-armed
China allied with its rival Pakistan. Israel is surrounded by hostile Muslim nations increasingly swayed by
jihadist ideology. Pakistan has the bigger, more powerful India to worry about. And North Korea fears the
United States.
Nuclear-armed nations are often at war, but not
with each other. Nuclear weapons sober regional tensions by giving great caution to aggressive actions.
The dangers of escalation restrain the inclination to
use even low levels of military force in disputes with
nuclear-armed opponents. War is full of surprises,
which makes it too dangerous for nuclear powers to
fight one another. One miscalculation about likely
opponent reactions could be one too many in any
encounter.
Ironically, nuclear nonproliferation efforts can be
both confrontational and violent. Although not under
the NPT banner, Israel bombed nuclear reactor sites in
Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile nations. The United
States invaded Iraq in 2003 claiming the enforcement
of United Nations resolutions banning Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). And
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today both Iran and North Korea labor under severe
trade sanctions because of their development, and in
North Korea’s case acquisition, of nuclear weapons.
Iran lives on the brink of war because Israel and the
United States have said that neither will tolerate Iran
becoming a nuclear weapons power.26 If negotiations
and sanctions fail to persuade Iran to limit its ambitions and accept intrusive inspections, attacks on Iran
seem likely, and as Iran has pledged retaliation, an
expanded war as well.27
The hard treatment is only for some. Israel, India,
and Pakistan never signed the NPT. Because Israel’s
nuclear weapon status is unacknowledged, it is not
subject to much discussion or any penalty. India and
Pakistan did incur the wrath of the United States in
the form of some unwelcomed sanctions and undelivered aid, but these penalties were lifted when their cooperation was needed in other matters. North Korea
is an NPT signatory who renounced the treaty, but the
animosity against it predates any North Korean interest in nuclear weapons.
The NPT creates two kinds of sovereignty: that
possessed by states permitted to have nuclear weapons (the original five) and that possessed by all others, which are not permitted to have nuclear weapons.
The embarrassing arrogance of it all is compensated
by the treaty promise of the permitted nuclear powers to work toward nuclear disarmament. In an era of
increased interest in equality, the pledge seems inadequate at best. How can there be nearly 200 sovereign
nations and only five virtuous enough to be allowed
to have the bomb? Thus, there is a growing interest in
the so-called zero option, the claim expressed by various heads of state (including U.S. President Barack
Obama) that the goal for the permitted nuclear pow-

12

ers is the elimination of all nuclear weapons.28 Given
that the knowledge needed to build nuclear weapons
cannot be destroyed, and given the trust needed in
the owner of the last weapon to be destroyed when
all others have none, it is a goal likely never to be met
and seems disingenuous in its offering. Anyone concerned about the likelihood of zero happening should
be reassured to learn that all the weapon-possessing
nations are in the process of upgrading their weapons
and/or the platforms needed for the delivery of their
weapons.29 Moreover, one may wonder how Israel or
North Korea will be persuaded to take the zero pledge.
PRO PROLIFERATION
With the treaty abandoned, not many nations will
seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Most do not live in
a tough neighborhood, have the technological base
needed to carry out the task, wish to devote the resources to the cause, or welcome the responsibility of
protecting them from accident, theft, and/or preemptive attack from worried neighbors. Ukraine may well
regret giving up the Soviet weapons based on its territory to Russia, but the invasion risk and dollar cost
of moving to acquire them afresh may be too much.
Some in Libya probably regret giving up their program, as having retained it would have kept the Qaddafis in power. The Libya of today is in no condition
to revive it.
The lesson is that if you face a serious threat from
a nuclear power on your own and have sufficient resources, you best go nuclear quickly and quietly.30
Canada likely would not because it receives free extended deterrence in perpetuity by virtue of sharing a continent with the United States. Without the
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United States providing the nuclear umbrella, however, Germany and Japan likely will go nuclear. Their
now largely self-imposed and budgetary convenient
exemption from any serious military obligations, including their own defense, will surely evaporate without extended deterrence. South Korea and Australia
would also likely acquire nuclear weapons. South
Korea has twice the population of the North and 25
times its wealth, but still claims it is not ready to manage its own defense against the nuclear-armed but impoverished North. It prefers the United States carry
that burden. And Australia, living well in a region of
populous and expanding nations, will recognize how
far it actually is from the United States.
The fear, of course, is that without the NPT barrier,
not just friendly nations in Europe or Asia but also
hostile, unstable, and/or terrorist-supporting regimes
in the Middle East will go nuclear. A nuclear weapon in their hands is more frightening than a nuclear
weapon in Russian and Chinese hands. How long will
a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia survive as a kingdom?
Wouldn’t Iran give some to Hezbollah or Qatar and a
couple to Hamas?
Deterrence and forensics work.31 Nations that
threaten the United States will discover that they face
a most formidable and tenacious opponent. Post-NPT
nuclear weapons will remain difficult to obtain, costly
to protect, and very, very risky to gift, lend, or trade.
The extreme caution that applies to attacks on nuclear
powers applies also to those who would hand nuclear
weapons to their terrorist enemies, as the links are sure
to be revealed. Often the terrorists are as much a threat
to others as they are to the United States. The weapon
that they steal from you may be used against you, so
there is strong incentive to protect nuclear weapons
from theft and against handing them to others.
14

OBSTACLES TO RELINQUISHING THE BURDEN
The biggest obstacle to getting beyond the NPT is
the fear of terrorists using a stolen or otherwise nefariously obtained nuclear weapon to blackmail or destroy civilization. Many a blockbuster novel, movie,
and television program has this theme as its plot.32 We
have learned to live with Russians and Chinese, even
those who are threatening, but not terrorists. Terrorists, we believe, have no bounds. We all are taught
the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Just think
what terrorists will do with them. There is an industry
that stokes these fears, aided by reports of dropped or
inadequately guarded weapons. If there were 15 or 20
nuclear-armed nations instead of 5 or 10, the opportunities for disaster would surely increase.
Given that the United States has the most extensive experience with nuclear weapon accidents and
safeguards, we should widely share that knowledge.33
Every new nuclear power, upon the revelation of its
new status, should be offered a package of our hardwon ideas for safely maintaining, handling, and
guarding nuclear weapons and any relevant training
that it might require. A somewhat similar initiative
helped protect Russian nuclear weapons in the period
of semi-chaos that occurred after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Not all new nuclear powers would trust
the friendly act, but all would recognize the importance others place on their custodial skills.
The American military is another obstacle to giving up the NPT. The American military adheres to a
doctrine of forward deployment that is largely supported by the conventional warfare requirements of
an extended deterrence foreign policy. Its command
structure is based on joint regionally focused com-
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mands that manage deployed forces and that take as
their mission the tempering of regional conflicts via
partnerships and direct action to avoid the risks of escalation. Much of its force levels are justified on the
basis of regional conventional deterrence. Without
other nations to protect at their boundaries, the United
States would have a much smaller military.
The NPT has a civilian domestic lobby as well—
the network of anti-nuclear weapons foundations,
public interest groups, university programs, and proliferation monitoring agencies. The normal political
divisions do not apply to nonproliferation advocates.
They are on the left, right, and center. They are heard
inside government and out. They are establishmentarian and radical. In addition, they have the public
forum to themselves. There is no counter lobby that
advocates the spread of nuclear weapons. There are
no marches in the United States for the proliferation
of nuclear weapons.34
Although all the components of the nonproliferation lobby could not possibly agree on this formulation
of their advocacy, nonproliferation is an advocacy for
American hegemony in the Western world defined to
include our Asian allies. The United States provides
extended deterrence for all. It is the grand protector.
Britain and France are extras, at best an afterthought.
Because the United States takes the nuclear risk, it assumes to be the manager of global security, guarding
the borders of all. The U.S. Navy tells us that it is the
global force for good. The U.S. Air Force boasts that
it has global reach; and the U.S. Army is stationed in
Europe, the Middle East, Japan, and Korea, which is
about as global as an army can get.35
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LEARNING TO LET OTHERS LOVE THE BOMB
The NPT was made for the Cold War world in
which there were two clearly defined sides and a possibility that every conflict could potentially lead to a
nuclear exchange between them. It was right, then, to
seek to limit the number of nuclear weapons states to
avoid alliance complications. Some conflicts, however,
existed independently of the Cold War. It is not that
they were unaffected by the Cold War or did not have
an effect of their own on it, but rather that they would
have existed whether there was a Cold War or not.
The Arab-Israeli conflict is one; the tension between
India and Pakistan is another. It is not surprising that
participants in these conflicts refused to sign the NPT
and were the first to defy the intent of the treaty. When
your survival is at stake, nuclear weapons have a special appeal.36
North Korea broke with the nonproliferation regime after the Cold War was over when its main protectors, China and Russia, no longer cared much about
its fate. In addition, its main antagonist, the United
States, was at the time very much distracted by the two
wars in which it was fighting elsewhere in the world.
North Korea’s motives for seeking nuclear weapons
may have been mixed, but the announcement that it
developed such a weapon no doubt gave it a lot of
attention, some protection, and a bit of self-respect.
Since the end of the Cold War neither Russia, as
the successor state to the Soviet Union, nor the United
States believes that it is in mortal danger from an unexpected strike from the other. Their nuclear forces
stand on constant alert, and there is a concern by
both to maintain a survivable second-strike capability, but their respective societal lives no longer hang
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solely on a nuclear thread. There are many disputes
between them, but none comes close to raising nuclear
alarms. As the strains on alert forces indicate, service
in nuclear forces for the major powers is a backwater
of boredom and career hibernation.
In contrast, the United States’ Cold War friends
have a number of contentious issues with Russia and
China. None of these issues yet rises to the level of
mortal danger, but the relations of American allies
with both countries are definitely more frayed and
volatile than those of the United States. American
forces’ presence near China or in Eastern Europe is for
the reassurance of allies and not for the United States’
own security. Similarly, South Korea and Japan want
the United States to maintain its bases in their countries to protect them from their often hostile and always unpredictable North Korean neighbor. It is the
North Korean bomb that worries them.37
No other nuclear power offers allies extended
deterrence—not Russia, not France, not the United
Kingdom, not Israel, and not India. The Chinese bomb
protects China alone. Similarly, the Pakistani and the
North Korean bombs guard only one country: their
own. Nuclear deterrence, at its core, is a self-help program and never a charitable one.38
America’s offer of extended deterrence is thus a
very strange policy, sustainable only by a willingness
to be involved deeply in the security of distant nations, many of which have no obligation or capacity
to reciprocate in any meaningful way.39 No wonder
American allies constantly seek reassurance of our interest in their defense.40 It is to them, surely, an unbelievable policy both because of the risks it imposes on
us and because of the huge subsidy it provides them
in the form of the forward deployment of well-trained
and equipped U.S. conventional forces.
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It is also an unaffordable and outdated policy.
Without the menace of the Soviet Union, the United
States is militarily secure. Our Cold War allies are rich
and can well afford their own defenses. We have no
need to station significant forces in Europe or Asia.
Instead, we have problems at home to tend to, including: mounting deficits, crumbling infrastructure, and
too many young people who lack the skills to compete
effectively with their global peers. These problems
will likely be difficult to manage, but they require
the resources that are now devoted to providing the
frontier defenses of friends who prefer not to have
to build and maintain their own nuclear weapons or
even dress up in uniforms.
The bad habits of our allies are largely of our own
making, but are buttressed by the nuclear nonproliferation regime.41 The American military leans far forward
quite willingly on the claim that local conflicts must be
managed in order to prevent their potential escalation.
The NPT makes our friends permanently vulnerable
to nuclear coercion and subtly shifts the burdens of
their security too much onto the United States. It is the
ultimate exemption from adult responsibility. Instead
of trying to enforce the treaty, the United States ought
to be trying to get rid of it. Nuclear nonproliferation
deceives no one but the American taxpayer.
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CHAPTER 2
WHY U.S. POLICYMAKERS WHO LOVE THE
BOMB DON’T THINK “MORE IS BETTER”
W. Seth Carus 1
Disconnects between the academic and policy
worlds are not unusual. Nevertheless, it still is striking
when an academic debate, supposedly about a topic of
vital national security concern, rages for decades but is
totally ignored by those responsible for policymaking
in that arena. This is certainly true for the argument
offered by some academics that nuclear proliferation
contributes to the stability of the international system,
arguing that “more is better.” Yet, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to find any Washington policymaker accepting such a position. Indeed, during the
past 50 years, there has been a widespread consensus
amongst U.S. policymakers, across the political and
ideological spectrum, that “more is NOT better” and
that nonproliferation efforts are an essential element
of U.S. national security policy.
The pages that follow will start by first examining
the views of the academics who espouse the “more
is better” argument, followed by a review of some of
the perspectives that explain why almost all U.S. national security policymakers have ignored it. Who are
the policymakers in question? They include executive
branch officials, starting with the last 12 presidents
and continuing with their immediate advisors—national security advisors, secretaries of defense and
state, and other senior officials (deputy secretaries,
undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries of various
departments), as well as many members of Congress.
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This discussion is focused exclusively on Washington
and the men and women responsible for creating and
executing U.S. national security policies. It does not
address the potentially different perspectives of officials in other countries, who may operate using different rules and perceive the world in different ways.
PROLIFERATION OPTIMISTS AND PESSIMISTS
In academic circles, nuclear proliferation “optimists” and “pessimists” argue over the dangers posed
by the risks of the further spread of nuclear weapons.
The proliferation optimists, represented articulately
and starkly by Kenneth Waltz, argue that nuclear arsenals reduce the chances of armed conflict, and that
the benefit from this reduction in conventional warfare means that “more is better” when it comes to
nuclear proliferation.2 Waltz’s influence in this arena
resulted in part from his towering status as a scholar
of international relations.3 Indeed, he remains, according to a biographical account, “one of the most cited,
and controversial, authors in the field of international
relations.”4 He served as a President of the American Political Science Association (1987–1988); and,
as a teacher, he influenced generations of students of
international studies.5
In contrast to the proliferation optimists, proliferation pessimists contend that the dangers of nuclear
proliferation are substantial and that growth in the
number of countries with nuclear arsenals poses real
risks to international peace and stability. Scott Sagan
has taken a lead in representing this perspective, arguing that “more will be worse,”6 although most other
academic students of nuclear proliferation agree with
him on this issue, even if not accepting any or all of his
arguments.
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Waltz and Sagan have honed their disagreement
in a short book, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, widely
used in the classroom to teach nuclear proliferation issues. First appearing in 1995, the two authors released
revised versions in 2002 and 2013.7
THE NUCLEAR PEACE HYPOTHESIS
At the center of the debate between the proliferation optimists and pessimists is what is sometimes
called the nuclear peace hypothesis.8 The thesis, first
articulated in the months after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is an argument that the destructiveness of atomic weapons fundamentally alters international society by making warfare intolerable. In
essence, the atomic bomb created a situation in which
the means of warfare were incommensurate with the
ends, such that it no longer made sense to contemplate
general wars as a tool of policy. Bernard Brodie offered a stark statement of the concept in one of the
seminal works of nuclear strategy:
Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief
purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no
other useful purpose.9

Although Brodie came to modify his views, especially
in his subsequent work on limited warfare, this 1946
statement is at the core of the argument offered by
proliferation optimists.
Proponents of the nuclear peace hypothesis argue
that the destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes national leaders reluctant to pursue military actions that
might escalate into a nuclear exchange. From this perspective, there are few war objectives that could justi27

fy risking the death and destruction associated with a
war fought using nuclear weapons. Some have argued
that nuclear arsenals played a central role in creating
the so-called “Long Peace” during the Cold War, a
reference to the absence of significant armed conflict
between the Soviet Union and the United States despite bitter enmity and mass arms build-ups.10 Others
also argue that nuclear weapons are responsible in
part for the absence of major power wars in the past
6 decades.11 While many contest the nuclear peace hypothesis, that debate will not be reviewed here.12
The focus of this chapter is on a different issue,
closely connected, that helps explain the indifference
of policymakers to the Waltz argument: Why do U.S.
policymakers—meaning government officials who
have had positions of responsibility for such matters—overwhelmingly support nuclear nonproliferation efforts, irrespective of party, ideology, or attitude
toward nuclear weapons, even those who accept the
tenets of the nuclear peace hypothesis? Alternatively, to reframe the question in the context of the academic debate: why are policymakers overwhelmingly
inclined toward proliferation pessimism?
NUCLEAR OPTIMISM, PROLIFERATION
OPTIMISM, AND PROLIFERATION
RELATIVISM
As a starting point, there are important differences
between “nuclear optimism,” the concept that nuclear
weapons can prevent wars with limited danger of nuclear use, and “proliferation optimism,” the decidedly
different argument that the spread of nuclear weapons is not accompanied by an increase in the dangers
that they pose. Sagan, for example, implicitly assumes
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that those who accept the nuclear peace hypothesis
also favor proliferation, meaning that “nuclear optimists” are the same as “proliferation optimists.”13
That is a doubtful conclusion. A “proliferation optimist” inevitably will be a “nuclear optimist,” believing that the spread of nuclear weapons will favor international peace; but a “nuclear optimist” need not
be a “proliferation optimist.” Indeed, as will become
evident, many “nuclear optimists” are “proliferation
pessimists,” and even those sometimes classified as
“proliferation optimists” often are highly selective in
their optimism.
Distinguishing the “proliferation optimist” from
what Peter Lavoy has called the “proliferation relativist” is critically important to understanding different
views regarding the merits of nuclear proliferation.14
Some academics considered “proliferation optimists”
hold positions radically different from the one advanced by Waltz, perhaps accepting the “nuclear
peace hypothesis” but not necessarily considering all
nuclear proliferation beneficial.
John Mearsheimer, often identified as a “proliferation optimist,”15 is better characterized as a “proliferation relativist.” Rather than advocating “more is better,” he has supported selective proliferation. Thus, in
the early-1990s he argued that Ukraine should retain
the nuclear weapons that it acquired with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In his view, international
stability was enhanced when the major European
powers had nuclear weapons.16 He also made clear
that smaller countries should not get them at all. According to Mearsheimer, “Nuclear proliferation does
not axiomatically promote peace and can in some cases
even cause war.”17 While it is beyond the scope of this
chapter to assess the theoretical foundations of their
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worldviews, it is perhaps worth noting that Waltz and
Mearsheimer share fundamentally similar conceptions of the international system, but still seem to have
rather different views on the role of nuclear weapons.
While Waltz is a strong advocate of the nuclear peace
hypothesis, Mearsheimer appears less convinced that
a nuclear revolution has changed the fundamentals of
international relations.18
Indeed, what is striking is that most so-called “proliferation optimists” are actually “proliferation relativists.” Bruce Bueno de Mesquita wrote about the benefits of “selective” proliferation, arguing that in some
instances nuclear proliferation was beneficial, even as
he accepted that it could have profoundly negative
consequences in other cases.19 Similarly, Dagobert L.
Brito and Michael D. Intriligator, also often considered “proliferation optimists,” actually make a rather
different argument. While they contend that increasing the number of nuclear weapons states may or may
not increase the risks of deliberate nuclear war, more
proliferation does increase the prospects for “nuclear
war due to accidents, irrationality, or political instability.”20 While more sanguine than many others, it
would be a stretch to identify such views as optimistic.
The distinction between “proliferation optimism”
and “proliferation relativism” is critical to understanding how Waltz’s views of proliferation fit within
the broader spectrum of alternative perspectives of
the challenges posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. Similarly, as will become clear, support for the
nuclear peace hypothesis—what might be termed
“nuclear optimism”—does not necessarily lead to
“proliferation optimism.” It is these distinctions that
help explain why policymakers, even those who may
accept the “nuclear peace hypothesis,” dismiss Waltz
and his optimistic views on nuclear proliferation.
30

PROLIFERATION OPTIMISM
What are the arguments justifying proliferation optimism? The following paragraphs summarize the key
elements of Waltz’s argument, ignoring some important points he makes for the purposes of completeness
that are relatively tangential to his core argument.
Underlying Waltz’s argument are several assumptions that are derived from his views of how the international system operates and his adherence to the
nuclear peace hypothesis. First, he argued, “Deterrent balances are inherently stable.”21 He contended
that nuclear deterrence did not depend on the size
of nuclear arsenals, because there was little incentive
to acquire more weapons once a country “securely
established” its deterrent.22 Second, he argued that
the resulting deterrence stability is insensitive to the
character of regimes, essentially arguing that all states
and all possible national leaders can be trusted to use
their nuclear forces with prudence. For that reason, he
argued that Libya under Muammar Qaddafi, Uganda
under Idi Amin, or Iraq under Saddam Hussein would
behave similarly to a United States under Dwight
Eisenhower or a Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. Indeed, he even argued that a nuclear-armed
Europe would have moderated the behavior of Adolf
Hitler.23 Third, Waltz believed that extremely small
nuclear arsenals, perhaps consisting of only a handful
of weapons, can establish a credible deterrent. Based
on this belief, he argued that Israel could deter Libya
with only two weapons, one for Benghazi, and one for
Tripoli, while Libya need only possess enough weapons to destroy Tel Aviv and Haifa in return.24
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Waltz believed that establishing the conditions
for stable deterrence relationships was not difficult,
although he did recognize that it was not necessarily
automatic. First, he accepted that a slow pace of proliferation was essential, because “rapid changes in international conditions can be unsettling.”25 However,
he rejected the concept of proliferation cascades, and
so did not see this as a significant concern. From his
perspective, only a few non-nuclear states will have
an interest in acquiring a nuclear arsenal at any given
point in time.
Second, Waltz also recognized that countries must
create nuclear capabilities that could reliably mount
retaliatory attacks. Waltz specified several requirements for such a force. It must be able to survive attack
and have the means to deliver the surviving weapons.
He saw these requirements as important primarily because they obviated the need for a launch-on-warning
or under attack capability. Also essential was a robust
command and control system, primarily to prevent
unauthorized use.26 Waltz was convinced that it was
not hard to satisfy these requirements, even for a small
country with a limited nuclear arsenal. Hiding weapons and protecting them (and their delivery systems)
from attack was simple to achieve in his view, and the
rudimentary command and control systems required
were within the reach of even the smallest of powers.27
He applied similar thinking to both the U.S.-Soviet
nuclear balance and the U.S. nuclear arsenal. As a
result, he rejected the core precepts that guided U.S.
nuclear policy during the Cold War, whether it was
the complicated interactions between deterrence and
nuclear warfighting in Department of Defense nuclear
planning, or the force structure that he saw as grossly
oversized.28 Thus, Waltz adopted theoretical con-
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structs that are in specific opposition to past and present U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and operations.29 It
is that divergence that lies at the core of the disagreement between the perspectives of Washington policymakers and academic theorists.
POLICYMAKERS AND NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION
During the past 7 decades, U.S. policymakers worried about the prospects for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, even if ultimately other considerations
took precedence. This perspective is reflected in the
observation of the Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States that, since the
beginning, U.S. nuclear policy has had two “imperatives”: the requirement for a strong nuclear deterrent
and reliance on arms control and nonproliferation
measures.30 This juxtaposition is significant, given that
this commission was comprised of men and women
selected to represent the views of Washington’s political elite, including amongst its members former U.S.
Government policymakers in the U.S. Government
who had been involved in the development or implementation of strategic nuclear policy.
Every U.S. president since the detonation of the first
atomic bomb has articulated policies consistent with
this dual vision, although some had little confidence
in nonproliferation and can be justifiably criticized for
that. Official policy from the dawn of the atomic age
called for constraints on nuclear weapons, starting in
the months after Hiroshima, when the leaders of the
Western countries announced what became the Baruch Plan, which called for international, not national, control of nuclear materials. Consistent with this
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vision, the Atomic Energy Act prohibited transfers
of nuclear materials and weapons information even
to our British and Canadian allies, who had contributed substantially to the Manhattan Project. As former
U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson asserted in 1966,
perhaps with some overstatement, “The United States
believed—and this is something that it is easy for everyone in the world to forget—that even one nuclear
power was too many, and immediately after World
War II we sought to remove nuclear energy from the
military field.”31
In the subsequent 2 decades, until the negotiation
of the 1969 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
most policymakers at best tolerated nuclear proliferation and only a few actively thought it a good thing.32
Even former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, often
criticized by the nonproliferation community for his
role in spreading nuclear technology through the Atoms for Peace program, opposed nuclear proliferation
and apparently thought that his policies were consistent with that objective.33
In some respects, this consensus in policymaking
circles is surprising; on other nuclear matters, there
often was widespread disagreement. Yet, it is evident
that many people who firmly believed in the strength
of deterrence, and probably believed that nuclear
weapons played an important (perhaps even a decisive role) in maintaining global peace during the Cold
War, also fought to prevent the further proliferation
of nuclear weapons. Amongst the primary intellectual
figures of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy were individuals closely associated with nuclear nonproliferation policies, such as Albert Wohlstetter.34
How do we know what they think? While there are
no opinion surveys to prove the point, there is little
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doubt that the overwhelming majority of U.S. senior
national security executives during the nuclear age
opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons, even
when friendly countries were involved. We know this
in several ways. First, we know what they have said
and written. Few have adopted a position consistent
with the proliferation optimists,35 while most have
viewed proliferation as a serious national security
challenge.36 Perhaps more significantly, we also can
review what policies they have advocated and implemented.
What are some of the considerations that make
most U.S. policymakers nuclear proliferation pessimists? This chapter explores five such considerations:
(1) widespread ambivalence about nuclear weapons;
(2) concerns about the stability of nuclear deterrence;
(3) the challenges that nuclear proliferation pose to
the U.S. global position; (4) the risks of nuclear terrorism resulting from loss of control of nuclear arsenals
in failed states; and, (5) the complexity of crisis management. Other considerations could be added to this
list, such as worries about the quality of intelligence
concerning foreign nuclear programs, or the ability
of any country to ensure the safe operation of nuclear
arsenals.37
U.S. AMBIVALENCE TOWARD NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
In contrast to Waltz’s comfort with a nucleararmed world, U.S. Government officials, especially
at the more senior levels, often are more ambivalent.
They recognize the strategic value of nuclear weapons, but also worry about their destructiveness and
the dangers associated with their possession and
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potential use. This view is aptly summarized in
another of Brodie’s writings:
All civilized people share in greater or less degree the
desire to put the “nuclear genie back in the bottle”
(though, like the classical genie, it has also done some
useful service—such as critically reducing the probability of war between the United States and the Soviet
Union).38

More importantly, most U.S. presidents have had
such conflicted views. Almost none have been completely comfortable with nuclear weapons; many
sought to limit or eliminate them. The views of U.S.
President Barack Obama on the ultimate need to create a world without nuclear weapons, sometimes articulated as a new departure, also reflect the publicly
and privately expressed opinions of most of his predecessors. Famously, then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan was willing to discuss the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons during the October 1986 Reykjavik Summit, declaring “It would be fine with me if
we eliminated all nuclear weapons.”39 He justified his
support for the Strategic Defense Initiative by talking
of “rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and
obsolete.”40 Even former President Eisenhower, who
of all the presidents was most attracted to the benefits
provided by nuclear deterrence, often expressed both
his fears of their destructive powers and the ultimate
need to eliminate them.41
Striving for the ultimate elimination of nuclear
weapons has never been seen as necessarily incompatible with acceptance of nuclear deterrence in the
shorter term. Indeed, since the dawn of the nuclear
age, official U.S. policy has been the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, even if only in the context
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of general and complete disarmament. This incongruity is well demonstrated with the varying views of
nuclear weapons evident among the so-called “Gang
of Four,” the four former U.S. senior statesmen (Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and George
Shultz) who called for the revitalization of efforts to
eliminate nuclear weapons.42 While often viewed as a
radical break from the past, the differences are actually less obvious. All support maintaining a reliable
nuclear deterrent.43
Such skepticism does not comport well with “more
is better.” Why actively promote the spread of a weapon that you believe ultimately should be banned? At
the very least, this helps explain the ambivalence that
often attended thinking about such matters when the
issue of nuclear assistance arose.
Many in the United States argue that nuclear weapons are essential only to deter other nuclear weapons.44 This is not official U.S. national policy, although
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review noted a trend to move
in that direction:
The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear
weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the
objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on
the United States or our allies and partners the sole
purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.45

This reflected a long-standing effort to reduce the role
of nuclear weapons by providing the president with
conventional options. The United States has developed
formidable advanced conventional military capabilities, involving precision strike munitions; sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
systems; and complex command and control systems.
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Part of the impetus for the development of these systems was a desire to raise the threshold for the use
of nuclear weapons.46 The United States currently can
employ conventional forces to accomplish military
objectives requiring nuclear weapons in an earlier
era. For this reason, the United States does not rely on
nuclear weapons to the same extent as other powers
(and certainly not as much as Russia, which requires
them even for defense against large-scale conventional attacks). From this perspective, so argues Harold
Brown, the former Secretary of Defense who did much
to encourage the development of such capabilities,
the United States would benefit more than any other
power, should nuclear weapons totally disappear today.47 While many of his peers would disagree with
his ultimate conclusion, few would disagree that during the past 4 decades the United States systematically
worked to acquire conventional weapons capabilities,
motivated in part by a desire to reduce requirements
for nuclear weapons.48
THE DIFFICULTIES OF MAINTAINING
A DETERRENT
Policymakers and analysts intimately involved
with the U.S. nuclear weapons policy were not sanguine about the ease of maintaining deterrence relationships. Indeed, most clearly accepted the view
articulated by Albert Wohlstetter in the late-1950s
when writing about the initial efforts to create a stable
deterrent in a world populated both by thermonuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs): “Deterrence in the 1960s is neither assured
nor impossible but will be the product of sustained
intelligent effort and hard choices.”49 As Wohlstetter
argued in his seminal article, “The Delicate Balance of
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Terror,” ensuring the survivability of a nuclear deterrent is complex and costly.50
From the perspective of practitioners of nuclear
strategy, Waltz ignored the harsh realities of nuclear
strategy development and implementation. Consider
the comments of David Rosenberg about his seminal
article on early U.S. nuclear strategy:
[This article] addresses nuclear strategy not as an exercise in conceptualization, but rather as a complex
endeavor, partly intellectual and partly bureaucratic.
It focuses specifically on the strategic and operational
planning process for nuclear war—where concepts
were translated into damage criteria, tactics, targets,
and weapons—and how that process is related to dynamics such as high policy guidance, strategic theory,
and technological development, which should have
served to control and regulate it.51

In contrast, Waltz views deterrence “as an exercise in
conceptualization.” Consider the difference between
Waltz’s views and those of practitioners on two issues: ensuring the survivability of nuclear forces and
evaluating the utility of small nuclear forces.
Waltz contended that any state possessing nuclear
weapons will take effective steps to ensure the survivability of its arsenal. That was not the sense of Wohlstetter and his RAND colleagues, who believed that
the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC), focused largely on its own retaliatory capabilities, largely ignored
its own vulnerability to a surprise attack.52 Waltz discounted such concerns by arguing that they were misguided, claiming that during the Cuban Missile Crisis
the United States was deterred by a relatively small
Soviet nuclear force (perhaps limited to 60-70 weapons capable of reaching the United States, contrasting
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with the 2,000 weapons that we had that could strike
the Soviet Union).53 However, Waltz also apparently
was quite comfortable retaliating against cities in response to counterforce attacks, a position that many
American nuclear strategists found unpalatable.54
We also have some evidence to suggest that small
nuclear powers have difficulty in maintaining the survivability of their nuclear arsenal. The South Africans
stored their entire arsenal of six bombs in a single
building vulnerable even to conventional air strikes,
protected only by their ability to keep its location a secret.55 While one presumes that these weapons would
have been dispersed in the event of a crisis, we are
told that the Soviet Union considered preemptive attacks against the nascent South African program.56
Admittedly, we do not know if the Soviets knew the
location of those weapons, but given known penetrations of the South African military establishment, it is
possible that they did.57
The Pakistanis certainly seem to worry about the
survivability of their nuclear arsenal, concerned both
that the United States might attempt to seize control
of it and that India might preemptively neutralize
their deterrent forces by destroying the weapons still
in their storage bunkers. Indeed, experts on Pakistan’s
nuclear forces appear to believe that its arsenal will be
dispersed in the event of a crisis due to concerns about
its survivability.58 Clearly, the Pakistanis are not confident about the survivability of their arsenal under
routine circumstances.
It is surprising that Waltz is so confident about the
survivability of small nuclear arsenals. The argument
rests largely on the confidence that any country can
have that its greatest secrets have not been compromised. In the case of South Africa, knowledge of one
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location would have permitted a decisive disarming
attack. Even in the case of Pakistan, with its larger and
more sophisticated force structure, weapons apparently are stored at only 6 to 12 sites, according to at
least one account.59 Much can be done to reduce the
vulnerability of such a force by relying on hardened
bunkers or underground facilities, but that transforms
the arsenal into something that begins to look like a
small version of a major power nuclear infrastructure.
As has been noted, Waltz argues that small nuclear
forces can satisfy the requirements for a secure deterrent, contrasting the small arsenals of France and
the United Kingdom with the vastly larger U.S. force
structure. He seems to imply that the leaders of those
two European countries believed that their arsenals
comprised a self-sufficient deterrent to Soviet nuclear threats. Yet, the reality is that both countries saw
their nuclear deterrent only in the U.S. context, not as
totally isolated and independent forces. The British
integrated their nuclear forces into a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) theater and a U.S. strategic response, while the French strategy focused heavily on manipulation of U.S. responses.60
Clearly, those who had to take responsibility for
sustaining the U.S. deterrent were far less confident
than Waltz about strategic stability. Indeed, during
the decades that followed publication of Wohlstetter’s article, concerns about strategic stability were
a constant, irrespective of administration. Whether
addressing the central strategic balance between the
Soviet Union and the United States, or the NATOWarsaw Pact regional balance in Europe, U.S. policymakers found nothing simple or easy about the process of generating and sustaining a credible deterrent.
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Ultimately, Waltz’s views matter rather less than
the perspectives of several generations of practitioners who had rather different views on deterrence. For
those responsible for the lives of tens, perhaps hundreds of millions of people, it is perhaps not surprising that they would be less inclined to take for granted
the inherent stability of deterrence; or that they might
be less than comfortable with the argument that we
should view the nuclear postures of other countries
with complacency.
CHALLENGING U.S. DOMINANCE
Many in Washington opposed nuclear weapons
programs because the proliferation of nuclear weapons would undermine U.S. political and military power. Former President Eisenhower apparently believed
that the United States would benefit more from the
elimination of nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union,
given his confidence in U.S. economic and industrial strength.61 As future Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger would note in the late-1960s, “Further nuclear spread would lead to a reduction of the relative
influence of the United States on the world scene.”62
Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk made it a generalized principle when he told a Soviet diplomat in
1963, “It was almost axiomatic that no nuclear power has any interest in seeing others become nuclear
powers.”63
The most obvious point about nuclear proliferation
is that it may strengthen adversaries and weaken U.S.
responses to their aggressive moves. Once it became
clear in the 1950s that nuclear weapons, even when
possessed in overwhelming numbers, could not prevent uses of conventional weapons peripheral to the
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core interests of the United States, U.S. policymakers
had to worry that a nuclear umbrella could shield destabilizing actions by hostile countries, even if we did
not fear the use of nuclear weapons. This was one of
the concerns that arose from consideration of China’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons,64 and it has been a recurring theme in connection with lesser powers (such
as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, openly hostile to
U.S. interests) who might strive to use a nuclear arsenal to undermine U.S. influence and interests.
Even more intriguing is the ambivalence or hostility of the United States toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons by close allies. The U.S. theater nuclear
weapons policy in Europe was calibrated to reduce
incentives for NATO and even non-NATO countries
to acquire their own independent nuclear deterrent.
Although the British had been closely involved with
the original Manhattan Project, it took time for the
U.S. political establishment to accept Britain’s nuclear status and, even longer, to develop the close ties
that eventually emerged between the two country’s
nuclear programs.65
During the late-1950s and early-1960s, some U.S.
Government officials thought that the United States
benefited from the acquisition of nuclear weapons by
allies. Thus, in 1955, then-President Eisenhower asked
Harold Stassen to undertake arms control negotiations
with the Soviet Union. Initially, Stassen was skeptical about the prospects for nuclear nonproliferation,
but changed his views after concluding it was a possible area of diplomatic collaboration with the Soviet
Union. However, some Department of Defense officials strongly opposed his efforts in part because they
thought it would be to the U.S. advantage if France
and Japan had nuclear weapons.66
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Days after the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964,
then-U.S. President Lyndon Johnson established the
Gilpatric Committee to review the nuclear nonproliferation policy. The Committee discovered that the
Department of Defense no longer opposed nuclear
nonproliferation, but that the Department of State was
strongly opposed to any policy that would overtly
prevent certain U.S. allies from retaining the right to
acquire nuclear weapons. In particular, some senior
Department of State officials at the time believed
that U.S. alliance relations depended on creation of
the Multi-Lateral Force (MLF), which would have
given NATO allies direct access to nuclear weapons.
Moreover, some senior Department of State officials
believed that we would undermine alliance relationships if we tried to deny Germany and Japan the right
to acquire nuclear weapons.67 However, the MLF never became a reality, and the president never accepted
the Department of State’s hostility toward nuclear
nonproliferation.
Over time, U.S. officials came to worry that allied
nuclear weapons capabilities posed dangers to the
U.S.-Soviet deterrence relationship. In addition, although it may be true that the United States provided
assistance to the French nuclear weapons program,68
it is equally clear that from the French perspective the
United States was a huge obstacle in its development
of an independent nuclear capability in the 1950s and
1960s.69 Indeed, one rationale for the French nuclear
program was to deny the United States independence
of action in responding to the Soviet Union. Paris
wanted to ensure that the United States took into account French security interests. Unfortunately, it also
complicated NATO nuclear weapons planning. For
example, the United States worried that efforts to keep
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a conflict limited might be derailed by French nuclear
attacks against attacking Soviet ground forces in Central Europe.70
Ultimately, the United States exerted considerable
pressure on other friendly countries during the Cold
War, such as South Korea and Taiwan, to constrain
their nuclear ambitions, and worked during the 1950s
and 1960s—admittedly not always pursued consistently—to limit the spread of nuclear weapons in
Europe.71
Interestingly, Waltz at one point concedes such
worries about the negative impact of nuclear proliferation by accepting that the “limitation of America’s
policy choices has been one of the costs” of proliferation, but finds the benefits he sees in limiting adversary choices are well worth that price.72 It is perhaps
unsurprising that those in Washington responsible for
U.S. policy are less sanguine about the costs of permitting reductions in U.S. relative power.
FAILED STATES AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM
A major concern for U.S. policymakers, especially
since 9/11, has been the danger that nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of terrorists. While some
analysts believe that the threat of nuclear terrorism is
overstated, and others that it is irrelevant, the concern
is not new.73 The national security community in the
United States has discussed the issue since at least the
early-1970s, and worries about nuclear terrorism have
motivated much of the activity intended to control fissile material.74
For many, the most likely way in which this could
happen is as a result of political instability in a nucleararmed country. This problem first emerged as a con-
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cern in the early-1990s with the collapse of the Soviet
Union at the end of the Cold War. At that time, the Soviet nuclear arsenal was divided between four countries, and security for protecting weapons and fissile
material was uncertain at best. In addition to taking
steps to ensure consolidation of the weapons under
the sole control of Russia, the United States funded
a variety of programs intended to prevent the loss of
weapons, fissile material, or critical technology.75
Today the primary concern is that the political collapse of North Korea or Pakistan could lead to a loss
of control and the subsequent acquisition of nuclear
weapons by a terrorist group. This is particularly worrying in the case of Pakistan, given the presence and
strength of terrorist groups in that country that might
be inclined to use such weapons.76 President Obama
has made the risks of terrorist acquisition of nuclear
weapons a central concern of his administration. As
he argued in his 2009 Prague speech, “This is the most
immediate and extreme threat to global security.”77
While the rationale differed, former U.S. President
George W. Bush also considered nuclear terrorism as
one of his top national security challenges.78
Recent developments in Syria also illustrate this
point. The Syrians amassed a militarily significant
quantity of chemical weapons, and there were widespread fears in the United States and elsewhere that
terrorists might gain control of some of this arsenal.
The concern was so sufficiently great that the Western
countries were willing to work with the Assad regime,
previously considered a pariah, in order to dispose of
these weapons.79 Significantly, the dangers could have
included a nuclear dimension, given Syria’s abortive
effort to build nuclear infrastructure that was terminated in 2007 when Israel destroyed a nuclear reac-
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tor about to become operational. As one former U.S.
Government official notes, “Think of how much more
dangerous to the entire region the Syrian civil war
would be today if Assad had a nuclear reactor, and
even perhaps nuclear weapons, in hand.”80 There are
certainly other countries on the list of potential proliferators, which might raise similar concerns.81
In his original writings, Waltz argued that unstable states were “unlikely to initiate nuclear projects,”
but in any case discounted the concern because he
doubted nuclear weapons would be employed during
internal strife. He did not address the dangers of nuclear terrorism (nor did he address the risk that loss of
control might result in nuclear proliferation if another
country gained access to weapons).82 Waltz addressed
the problem in his more recent writings, but dismissed
the concerns as either overblown or not made worse
by the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries.83
He did not address the problem of failed states at all.
In this sense, Waltz had a far more simplistic view
of the terrorism problem than either those who worry
about it or even those who are more dismissive. He is
far more complacent than others sometimes identified
as “proliferation optimists.” For example, Bueno de
Mesquita, another so-called “proliferation optimist,”
saw terrorism as a significant risk associated with
additional nuclear proliferation.84
THE COMPLEXITY OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT
For U.S. policymakers, a nuclear crisis between
third parties is a nightmare scenario. It is easy to assert
that nuclear deterrence is inherently stable. It is more
difficult to demonstrate in practice. U.S. policymakers
knew, either from personal experience or from studies
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of nuclear history, that managing nuclear crises with
the Soviet Union were fraught with danger. While
many came to trust in the experience and wisdom of
their colleagues and Soviet adversaries, they also realized that there was a learning curve. No one comes
born into the world understanding the manifest complexities of policymaking in the context of a nuclear
crisis. Hence, it is perhaps not surprising that U.S. policymakers have worried about the dangers confronting the world as policymakers in other countries climb
the learning curve of nuclear strategy.85
Why should policymakers in Washington care
about what happens elsewhere, especially when the
U.S. national interest may not be at risk? One reason
is that in the era of globalization, the United States has
interests in most countries vulnerable to the negative
consequences of a nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, for example, could lead to
tens of millions of deaths, potentially including many
U.S. citizens, even if one does not accept recent theories about the prospects for climatic impacts induced
by a regional war involving tens of nuclear weapons.86
Such a conflict also would cause negative economic
and political repercussions, including some specifically related to the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, such as potentially undermining
the taboo against operational employment of nuclear
weapons.87
Hence, it is not surprising that U.S. policymakers
moved into high gear when there was a threat that a
conflict between India and Pakistan had the potential
to escalate. While such crises have been rare, there
were two of them in a short period of time during the
Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.
In many ways, this is an intensely personal concern for policymakers. There were two occasions, in
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1999 and 2001-2002, during which U.S. policymakers worried that a war might erupt between the two
countries. The 1999 Kargil crisis started when Pakistan infiltrated forces into parts of Kashmir that the
Indians thought belonged to them and thereby threatened Indian lines of supply. The Indians attacked the
Pakistani positions, and, when it proved impossible
to overcome the Pakistanis in the difficult mountain
terrain, escalated the conflict by launching air strikes.
All of this occurred under a nuclear shadow, with the
two countries having tested nuclear weapons the year
before.88
U.S. policymakers clearly took this crisis seriously,
and viewed it in a nuclear context from the very beginning. After all, the consequences of a nuclear exchange
were frightening. Estimates put the death toll from an
attack on Bombay at between 150,000 and 850,000.89 It
is thus not surprising that former U.S. President Bill
Clinton took a personal role in trying to convince the
Pakistanis to withdraw from the territory that they
had occupied, and that diplomacy involved the most
senior officials in the U.S. Government with responsibility for South Asian affairs, including from both the
military and Department of State.90
The same level of involvement emerged at the time
of the 2001-2002 Twin Peaks crisis. In December 2001,
terrorists subsequently linked to the Pakistani intelligence services attacked the Indian Parliament. The
Indians responded by mobilizing their military and
preparing to mount retaliatory attacks, leading the
Pakistanis to mobilize their own military. The following May, terrorists attacked Indian military encampments near the border between the two countries, killing both soldiers and family members.91
Ongoing military operations in Afghanistan in the
wake of our intervention following the 9/11 attacks
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by al-Qaeda made these events even more worrying
to U.S. policymakers. In essence, a war between India and Pakistan, not to mention a nuclear exchange,
would put the U.S. military forces operating in Afghanistan at risk. As happened in the previous crisis,
the diplomacy involved senior level U.S. Government
officials, and reflected the same degree of concern as
the earlier crisis.
Thus, even in a situation where the United States
had no intention of providing extended deterrence,
nuclear weapons created a complex problem for international diplomacy. Indeed, some argue that one of
the intended roles for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was
to force U.S. diplomatic interventions in crises with
India.92
AN ARGUMENT FOR ALL PERSUASIONS
The arguments supporting pessimism about the
consequences of nuclear proliferation cover such a
wide range of issues that almost any U.S. policymaker
can find one sufficiently compelling to guide his or
her actions. A Democratic advocate of nuclear zero
and a Republican opponent of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty can find common ground in
the arena of nuclear nonproliferation, even if the arguments that they find most compelling differ fundamentally.93 Such policymakers, while convinced that
nuclear deterrence works, and perhaps even believing that nuclear weapons make the world unsafe for
the prosecution of large-scale conventional wars, also
tend to believe that the workings of nuclear deterrence
are potentially problematic and certainly have no faith
that its sometimes Byzantine logic will work in every
situation.
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This is not to say that all policymakers are devotees of nonproliferation; quite the contrary. Many
policymakers found and find nonproliferation efforts
in tension with other policies, and it is often evident
that those other policies take precedence. Policymakers tend toward proliferation relativism, viewing the
problem in a broader context that takes account of
other issues as well.94
Yet, to find nonproliferation an obstacle to other
policy objectives is rather different from arguing its
reverse. Most officials who tolerated or condoned specific instances of nuclear proliferation apparently did
not do so because they thought the spread of nuclear
weapons was a positive thing, but because they believed the available policy alternatives were even
worse. While perhaps not provable, it seems clear
that no senior U.S. Government official ever actively
promoted nuclear proliferation as a general principle,
although admittedly some did on occasion actively
support proliferation in specific cases.
In this sense, Waltz has done the field a profound
disservice, because a whole debate has been defined
by his writings. His views are widely cited in the
academic literature to present the case for nuclear
optimism, even though his arguments are more appropriately referred to as proliferation optimism.
Waltz offers a straw man that presents grossly simplified versions of the complex and rich strategic
thinking that has characterized the practice of nuclear
strategy. While Sagan and other critics appropriately
take Waltz to task, they are less concerned about the
practice of nuclear strategy then they are about highlighting the very real risks from nuclear proliferation.
The result is that the perspectives of those who have
conceptualized, developed, or implemented nuclear
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policy, strategy, and operations are lost; and academic
students refer to Waltz as though his work represents
the depths of the subject.
In contrast to the rich complexity and nuance of
writings on U.S. nuclear strategy, which take into account the vagaries of the world confronting national
leaders, Waltz offered a simple, straightforward assessment. While John Gaddis views nuclear weapons
as one of many factors accounting for the “long peace,”
Waltz fixated on their role. While two generations of
nuclear policymakers worried about the limitations
of nuclear deterrence (articulated since the mid-1950s
in theories of limited war), Waltz adopted an absolutist position that makes former Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles and the doctrine of Massive Retaliation
appear subtle by comparison.
U.S. policymakers have a range of reasons for
seeing Waltz’s arguments as irrelevant to the world
they face.95 For them, Panglossian worldviews are no
substitute for the potentially deadly realities of armed
strife in the real world. Ultimately, the academic debate between proliferation optimists and pessimists is
exactly that: academic. Thus, it is not surprising that
few, if any, officials responsible for national security
will find the perspectives of the proliferation optimists attractive; in fact, many will work actively to
prevent proliferation. The only surprising thing is that
some people seem to think that there is something to
debate.96
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CHAPTER 3
“AT ALL COSTS”:
THE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF
ANTI-PROLIFERATION POLICY
John Mueller
Over the decades, analysts of nuclear proliferation
have separated themselves, or have been separated by
others, into two camps.1
Proliferation alarmists constitute the vast majority,
occupying a prominent position in what Bernard Brodie once called “the cult of the ominous.”2 They argue
that proliferation is a dire development that must be
halted as a supreme policy priority. Thus, Graham
Allison argues that “no new nuclear weapons states”
should be a prime foreign policy principle, and Joseph
Cirincione insists that nonproliferation should be “our
number one national-security priority.”3 Of late, such
alarmism has been sent into high relief by the apparent efforts of Iran to move toward a nuclear bomb
capacity. In the Presidential campaign of 2008, candidate Barack Obama repeatedly announced that he
would “do everything in [his] power to prevent Iran
from obtaining a nuclear weapon—everything,” while
candidate John McCain insisted that Iran must be kept
from obtaining a nuclear weapon “at all costs.”4 Neither bothered to tally what “everything” might entail
and what the costs might be, and both continue to
make the same kinds of pronouncements.
The other camp, which is quite tiny, consists of
proliferation sanguinists who maintain that, on balance, a certain amount of proliferation might actually
enhance international stability by deterring war or
warlike adventures.5
67

However, there is another possible approach to the
proliferation issue that might be called “irrelevantist.”
People in this near-empty camp stress two considerations:
First, it really doesn’t bloody well matter whether
the bomb proliferates or not: proliferation has been
of little consequence (except on agonies, obsessions,
rhetoric, posturing, and spending), and no country
that has possessed the weapons has found them useful or beneficial, nor have those who abandoned them
suffered loss because of this. Thus, the consequences
of proliferation that have taken place have been substantially benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to
deter real or imagined threats.
Second, alarmed efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons have proved to be very costly,
leading to the deaths of more people than those who
perished at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.
This chapter evaluates these two irrelevantist considerations.6
THE BENIGN CONSEQUENCES
OF PROLIFERATION
Although we have now suffered through twothirds of a century characterized by alarmism about
the disasters inherent in nuclear proliferation, the substantive consequences of proliferation have been quite
limited.
Military Value.
Although the weapons have certainly generated
obsession and have greatly affected military spending,
diplomatic posturing, and ingenious theorizing, the
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few countries to which the weapons have proliferated
have, for the most part, found them a notable waste
of time, money, effort, and scientific talent. They have
quietly kept them in storage and haven’t even found
much benefit in rattling them from time to time.
There has never been a militarily compelling—or
even minimally sensible—reason to use nuclear weapons, particularly because of an inability to identify
suitable targets, or targets that could not be attacked
as effectively by conventional munitions. Moreover,
it is difficult to see how nuclear weapons benefited
their possessors in specific military ventures. Israel’s
presumed nuclear weapons did not restrain the Arabs from attacking in 1973, nor did Britain’s prevent
Argentina’s seizure of the Falklands in 1982. Similarly, the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the
arsenals of the enveloping allied forces did not cause
Saddam Hussein to order his occupying forces out of
Kuwait in 1990. Nor did possession of the bomb benefit America in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan;
France in Algeria; or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.7
Domination.
Proliferation alarmists may occasionally grant that
countries principally obtain a nuclear arsenal to counter real or perceived threats, but many go on to argue
that the newly nuclear country will then use its nuclear
weapons to “dominate” the area. That argument was
repeatedly used with dramatic urgency before 2003
for the dangers supposedly posed by Saddam Hussein, and it has also been frequently applied to Iran.
Exactly how that domination business is to be carried out is never made clear.8 However, the notion,
apparently, is that: should an atomic Iraq (in earlier
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fantasies), or North Korea or Iran (in present ones),
rattle the occasional rocket, other countries in the
area, suitably intimidated, would supinely bow to its
demands. Far more likely, any threatened states will
make common cause with each other and with other
concerned countries against the threatening neighbor.
It seems overwhelmingly likely that if a nuclear Iran
brandishes its weapons to intimidate others or to get
its way, it will find that those threatened, rather than
capitulating to its blandishments or rushing off to
build a compensating arsenal of their own, will ally
with others to stand up to the intimidation—rather in
the way they coalesced into an alliance of convenience
to oppose Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
It is also argued that nuclear weapons embolden
a country to do mischief with less fear of punishing
consequences. However, countries like Iran already
seem about as free as they need to be to do mischief
(from the U.S. standpoint) in the Middle East; and
rogue states like the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), China, and North Korea do not seem to
have stepped up their mischief after gaining nuclear
weapons.
Deterrence.
Although there are conceivable conditions under
which nuclear weapons could serve a deterrent function, it is questionable whether they have yet ever
done so. In particular, it is far from clear that nuclear
weapons are what kept the Cold War from becoming
a hot one.
The people who have been in charge of world affairs since World War II have been the same people, or
the intellectual heirs of the people, who tried assidu-
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ously, frantically, desperately and, as it turned out,
pathetically to prevent World War II; and when, despite their best efforts, a world war was forced upon
them, they found the experience to be incredibly horrible, just as they had anticipated. On the face of it, to
expect these countries to somehow allow themselves
to tumble into anything resembling a repetition of that
experience—whether embellished with nuclear weapons or not—seems almost bizarre. The people running
world politics since 1945 have had plenty of disagreements, but they have not been as obtuse, depraved,
flaky, or desperate as to need visions of mushroom
clouds to conclude that another world war, nuclear or non-nuclear, win or lose, could be decidedly
unpleasant.9
Moreover, each leak from the archives suggests
that the Soviet Union never seriously considered any
sort of direct military aggression against the United
States or Europe. Such as, Robert Jervis:
The Soviet archives have yet to reveal any serious
plans for unprovoked aggression against Western Europe, not to mention a first strike against the United
States.10

Vojtech Mastny:
The strategy of nuclear deterrence [was] irrelevant to
deterring a major war that the enemy did not wish to
launch in the first place. . . . All Warsaw Pact scenarios
presumed a war started by NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization].11

Stephen Ambrose:
At no time did the Red Army contemplate, much less
plan for, an offensive against West Europe.12
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Bernard Brodie:
It is difficult to discover what meaningful incentives
the Russians might have for attempting to conquer
Western Europe.13

George Kennan:
I have never believed that they have seen it as in their
interests to overrun Western Europe militarily, or that
they would have launched an attack on that region
generally even if the so-called nuclear deterrent had
not existed.14

As Kennan suggests, given the Soviets’ global
game plan, which stressed revolutionary upheaval
and subversion from within (not Hitlerian conquest),
and given their experience with two disastrous world
wars, another such experience scarcely made any
sense whatsoever. That is, there was nothing to deter.
Status Symbols.
Moreover, the weapons have not proved to be
crucial status—or virility—symbols. Then-French
President Charles de Gaulle did opine in 1965 that “no
country without an atom bomb could properly consider itself independent,” and Robert Gilpin concluded
that “the possession of nuclear weapons largely determines a nation’s rank in the hierarchy of international
prestige.”15 In Gilpinian tradition, some analysts who
describe themselves as “realists” have insisted for
years that Germany and Japan must soon come to
their senses and quest after nuclear weapons.16
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As Jervis has observed, however, “India, China,
and Israel may have decreased the chance of direct attack by developing nuclear weapons, but it is hard to
argue that they have increased their general prestige
or influence.”17 And, as Jenifer Mackby and Walter
Slocombe note:
Undoubtedly some countries have pursued nuclear
weapons more for status than for security. However,
Germany, like its erstwhile Axis ally, Japan, has become powerful because of its economic might rather
than its military might, and its renunciation of nuclear
weapons may even have reinforced its prestige. It has
even managed to achieve its principal international
objective—reunification—without becoming a nuclear
state.18

How much more prestige would Japan have if it
possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a
great deal more attention to Britain or France if their
arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or would anybody pay much less if they had none? Did China need
nuclear weapons to impress the world with its economic growth? Or with its Olympics?
Pace of Proliferation.
These considerations help explain why alarmists
have been wrong for decades about the pace of nuclear
proliferation. Dozens of technologically capable countries have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, but
very few have done so. Indeed, as Jacques Hymans
has pointed out, even supposedly optimistic forecasts
about nuclear dispersion have proved to be too pessimistic.19 Thus in 1958, the National Planning Association predicted “a rapid rise in the number of atomic
powers . . . by the mid-1960s.”20 A few years later, C. P.
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Snow sternly predicted, “Within, at the most, 6 years,
China and several other states [will] have a stock of
nuclear bombs”; while former U.S. President John
Kennedy observed that there might be “ten, fifteen,
twenty” countries with a nuclear capacity by 1964.21
Such punditry has gone astray, in part because the
pundits insist on extrapolating from the wrong cases.
A more pertinent prototype would have been Canada,
a country that could easily have had nuclear weapons
by the 1960s but declined to make the effort.22 In fact,
over the decades, a huge number of countries capable
of developing nuclear weapons have neglected to even
consider the opportunity—for example, Canada, Italy,
and Norway. Even Argentina, Brazil, Libya, South
Korea, and Taiwan have backed away from or
reversed nuclear weapons programs, and Belarus,
Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine have actually
surrendered or dismantled an existing nuclear arsenal.23 Some of that reduction is no doubt due to the
hostility of the nuclear nations, but even without that,
the Canadian case seems to have proved to have rather general relevance. Its experience certainly suggests,
as Stephen Meyer has shown, that there is no “technological imperative” for countries to obtain nuclear
weapons once they have achieved the technical capacity to do so.24
In consequence, alarmist predictions about proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, epidemics, and points-of-no-return have proved
to be faulty. Insofar as most country leaders (even
rogue ones) have considered acquiring the weapons,
they have come to appreciate several defects: nuclear
weapons are dangerous, distasteful, costly, and likely
to rile the neighbors. Moreover, as Hymans has demonstrated, the weapons have also been exceedingly
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difficult to obtain for administratively dysfunctional
countries like Iran.25
Potential Dangers.
Even if nuclear weapons so far have had little
impact, there is an array of potential (or imagined)
dangers that alarmed anti-proliferators suggest might
come about.
Crazy Leaders. It is sometimes said, or implied, that
proliferation has had little consequence because the
only countries to possess nuclear weapons have had
rational leaders. But nuclear weapons have proliferated to large, important countries run by unchallenged
monsters who, at the time they acquired the bombs,
were certifiably deranged: Josef Stalin, who in 1949 was
planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by
planting a lot of trees; and Mao Zedong, who in 1964
had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that
resulted in an artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished.26 It is incumbent on those
who strongly oppose an Iranian bomb to demonstrate
that the Iranian regime is daffier than these are.
Atomic Terrorism. Thus far, terrorist groups seem to
have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. That lack of action may be because, after a brief exploration of the possible routes,
they—unlike generations of alarmists—have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely
likely to be successful.27
In the wake of 9/11, however, concern about the
atomic terrorist surged even though the attacks of that
day used no special weapons. By 2003, United Nations
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Ambassador John Negroponte judged there to be “a
high probability” that within 2 years al-Qaeda would
attempt an attack using a nuclear weapon or other
weapon of mass destruction (WMD). In that spirit, Graham Allison published a book in 2004—over 10 years
ago—relaying his “considered judgment” that “on the
current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in
the decade ahead is more likely than not.”28 Allison
has quite a bit of company in his unfulfilled alarmist
conclusions. According to Robert Gates, former Secretary of Defense, every senior government leader is
kept awake at night by “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially
nuclear.”29 Moreover, in 2010, U.S. President Barack
Obama held the atomic terrorist to be “the single biggest threat to U.S. security.”30
One route a would-be atomic terrorist might take
would be to receive or buy a bomb from a generous,
like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad. That
route is highly improbable, however, because there
would be too much risk—even for a country led by
extremists—that the ultimate source of the weapon
would be discovered. As prominent analyst Matthew
Bunn puts it, “A dictator or oligarch bent on maintaining power is highly unlikely to take the immense
risk of transferring such a devastating capability to
terrorists they cannot control, given the ever-present
possibility that the material would be traced back to
its origin.”31 Important in this last consideration are
deterrent safeguards afforded by “nuclear forensics,”
which is the rapidly developing science (and art) of
connecting nuclear materials to their sources even
after a bomb has been exploded.32
Moreover, there is a very considerable danger to
the donor that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered before delivery, or that it would be exploded
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in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve of—including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence.33
In addition, almost no one would trust al-Qaeda.
As one observer has pointed out, the terrorist group’s
explicit enemies list includes not only Christians and
Jews, but also all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims
who don’t share its views; most Western countries;
the governments of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and
Russia; most news organizations; the United Nations;
and international nongovernmental organizations.34
Most of the time, al-Qaeda did not even get along
all that well with its host in Afghanistan, the Taliban
government.35
There has also been great worry, especially in postcommunist Russia, about “loose nukes”—weapons,
“suitcase bombs” in particular, that can be stolen or
bought illicitly. A careful assessment conducted by
the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded
that it is unlikely that any of those devices have been
lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be
very low or even nonexistent because they (like all nuclear weapons) require continual maintenance.36 Even
some of those people most alarmed by the prospect of
atomic terrorism have concluded, “It is probably true
that there are no ‘loose nukes,’ transportable nuclear
weapons missing from their proper storage locations
and available for purchase in some way.”37
It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory because
it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups—particularly Chechen ones with whom
Russia has been waging a vicious on-and-off war with
for decades. The Government of Pakistan, which has

77

been repeatedly threatened by terrorists, has a similar
interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material—and scientists. As noted by Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory, “Regardless
of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations
take the security of their weapons very seriously.”38
Even if a finished bomb were somehow lifted somewhere, the loss would soon be noted and a worldwide
pursuit undertaken.
Moreover, finished bombs are outfitted with devices designed to trigger a non-nuclear explosion that
would destroy the bomb if it were tampered with. In
addition, there are other security techniques: bombs
can be kept disassembled with the components stored
in separate high-security vaults; and security can be
organized so that two people and multiple codes are
required not only to use the bomb but also to store,
maintain, and deploy it. If the terrorists seek to enlist
(or force) the services of someone who already knows
how to set off the bomb, they would find, as Younger
stresses, that “only few people in the world have the
knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a
nuclear weapon.” Weapons designers know how a
weapon works, he explains, but not the multiple types
of signals necessary to set it off, and maintenance personnel are trained in only a limited set of functions.39
There could be dangers in the chaos that would
emerge if a nuclear state were to fail, collapsing in full
disarray—Pakistan is frequently brought up in this
context and sometimes North Korea as well. However,
even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would
likely remain under heavy guard by people who know
that a purloined bomb: would most likely end up going off in their own territory; would still have locks
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(and in the case of Pakistan would be disassembled);
and could probably be followed, located, and hunted
down by an alarmed international community. The
worst-case scenario in that instance requires not only
a failed state but also a considerable series of additional permissive conditions, including consistent
(and perfect) insider complicity and a sequence of
hasty, opportunistic decisions or developments that
click flawlessly in a manner far more familiar to Hollywood scriptwriters than to people experienced with
reality.40
Accidental or Inadvertent Detonation. A common concern has been that the weapons would somehow go
off by accident or miscalculation, devastating the
planet in the process. In 1960, a top nuclear strategist
declared it “most unlikely” that the world could live
with an uncontrolled arms race for decades.41 Moreover, in 1979, political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau
declared:
The world is moving ineluctably towards a third world
war—a strategic nuclear war. I do not believe that anything can be done to prevent it. The international system is simply too unstable to survive for long.42

In addition, Eric Schlosser remains deeply concerned
about that danger today.43
In a 1982 New Yorker essay and best-selling book,
both titled The Fate of the Earth, Jonathan Schell passionately, if repetitively, argued the not entirely novel
proposition that nuclear war would be terrible, and he
concluded ominously:
One day—and it is hard to believe that it will not be
soon—we will make our choice. Either we will sink
into the final coma and end it all or, as I trust and
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believe, we will awaken to the truth of our peril . . .
and rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons.44

As it happened, both options were avoided: Neither final coma nor nuclear cleansing ever took place.
The common alarmist prognostications assuming
that, because the weapons exist, sooner or later one or
more of them will necessarily go off, has now failed
to deliver for 70 years—this suggests that something
more than luck is operating.
THE COSTLY CONSEQUENCES OF
ANTI-PROLIFERATION POLICIES
Although the consequences of nuclear proliferation have proved to be substantially benign, the same
cannot be said for the consequences of the nuclear
anti-proliferation quest. The perpetual agony over
nuclear proliferation has resulted in an obsessive effort to prevent or channel it—and it is this effort, not
proliferation itself, that has inflicted severe costs.
The Costs in Iraq.
The war in Iraq, with deaths that have run well
over 100,000 (and counting)—greater than those inflicted at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined—is a key
case in point.45 It is far from clear, however, what Saddam Hussein, presiding over a deeply resentful population and an unreliable army (fearing overthrow, he
was wary about issuing his army bullets and would
not allow it within 30 miles of Baghdad with heavy
equipment), could have done with a tiny number
of bombs against his neighbors and their massively
armed well-wishers other than seek to stoke his ego
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and to deter real or imagined threats. He was, then,
fully containable and able to be deterred.46 The war
against him was a militarized anti-proliferation effort
substantially sold as a venture required to keep his
pathetic regime from developing nuclear and other
presumably threatening weapons and to prevent him
from palming off some of these to eager and congenial
terrorists.47 The notion that the war was designed to
spread democracy in the Middle East did gain significance but, as Bruce Russett notes, only after the antiproliferation arguments for going to war proved to be
empty; or, as Francis Fukuyama has put it, a prewar
request to spend “several hundred billion dollars and
several thousand American lives in order to bring democracy to . . . Iraq” would “have been laughed out of
court.”48
Thus, in an influential 2002 book, Kenneth Pollack
strenuously advocated a war whose “whole point”
would be to “prevent Saddam from acquiring nuclear
weapons,” which Western intelligence agencies, he
reported, were predicting would occur by 2004 (pessimistic) or 2008 (optimistic).49 He fully recognized
the costs of the war he advocated, costs that he felt
might cause thousands of deaths and run into the tens
of billions of dollars. However, war would be worth
this price, concluded Pollack, because with nuclear
weapons Saddam would become the “hegemon” in
the area, allowing him to control global oil supplies.50
The nuclear theme was repeatedly applied by the administration in the run-up to the war, perhaps most
famously in former National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice’s dire warning about waiting to have firm
evidence before launching a war: “We don’t want the
smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.” As Paul Wolfowitz from the Department of Defense pointed out,
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nuclear weapons or WMDs were the “core reason”
used for selling the war.51 At a press briefing on April
10, 2003, shortly after the fall of Baghdad, former
White House press secretary Ari Fleischer insisted,
“We have high confidence that they have weapons of
mass destruction. That is what this war was about and
it is about.” And Karl Rove, one of former U.S. President George W. Bush’s top political advisers, reflected
in 2008 that, absent the belief that Saddam Hussein
possessed WMD, “I suspect that the administration’s
course of action would have been to work to find more
creative ways to constrain him like in the 90s.”52
For their part, Democrats have derided the war
as “unnecessary,” but the bulk of them only came to
that conclusion after the United States was unable to
find either nuclear weapons or weapons programs in
Iraq. Many of them have made it clear that they would
have supported putatively preemptive (actually, preventive) military action and its attendant bloodshed if
the intelligence about Saddam’s programs had been
accurate.53
However, the devastation of Iraq in the service of
limiting proliferation did not begin with the war in
2003. For the previous 13 years, that country had suffered under economic sanctions visited upon it by both
Democratic and Republican administrations that were
designed to force Saddam from office (and effectively
from life, since he had no viable sanctuary elsewhere)
and to keep the country from developing weapons,
particularly nuclear ones. Multiple, although disputed, studies have concluded that the sanctions were the
necessary cause of hundreds of thousands of deaths
in the country, most of them children under the age of
five—the most innocent of civilians.54
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The Costs in North Korea.
The costly alarmist perspective on atomic proliferation is also evident in policies advocated toward
North Korea at various times. Thus, if diplomacy
failed, as proposed by Graham Allison in 2004, a Pearl
Harbor-like attack should be launched even though
potential targets had been dispersed and disguised,
and even though a resulting war might kill tens of
thousands in the South.55
Members of the Bush administration, perhaps because they had become immersed in their own antiproliferation war in Iraq at the time, were able to contain their enthusiasm for accepting Allison’s urgent
advice. Since then, North Korea has become something of a nuclear weapons state. In 2004, Allison had
sternly insisted that such an outcome would be caused
by “gross negligence” and would foster “a transformation in the international security order [that] no
great power would wittingly accept.” We are now in
position, then, to see if his confident predictions have
come true: A North Korean bomb, he declared, would
“unleash a proliferation chain reaction, with South
Korea and Japan building their own weapons by the
end of the decade” (that is, by 2009), with Taiwan
“seriously considering following suit despite the fact
that this would risk war with China,” and with North
Korea potentially “becoming the Nukes R’ Us for terrorists.”56
Decision-makers in the Clinton administration
showed the same mentality in 1994. The United States
never actually sent troops into action in its confrontation with North Korea at that time, but it certainly
edged threateningly in that direction when a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate concluded that there was
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“a better than even” chance that North Korea had the
makings of a small nuclear bomb. This conclusion was
hotly contested by other American analysts and was
later “reassessed” by intelligence agencies and found
to have been possibly overstated. In addition, skeptics
pointed out that even if North Korea had the “makings” in 1994, it still had several key hurdles to overcome in order to develop a deliverable weapon.57
Nonetheless, the Clinton administration was apparently prepared to go to war with the miserable
North Korean regime, to prevent or to halt its nuclear
development.58 Accordingly, the United States moved
to impose deep economic sanctions to make the isolated country even poorer (insofar as that was possible); a measure which garnered no support even
from neighboring Russia, China, and Japan.59 The U.S.
Government also moved to engage in a major military
buildup in the area. So apocalyptic (or simply paranoid) was the North Korean regime about these two
developments that some important figures think it
might have gone to war on a preemptive basis if the
measures had been carried out.60 The Pentagon estimated that a fullscale war on the peninsula, not perhaps without its own sense of apocalypse, could kill
1,000,000 people, including 80,000 to 100,000 Americans; cost over $100 billion; and do economic destruction on the order of a trillion dollars.61 A considerable
price, one might think, to prevent a pathetic regime
from developing weapons with the potential for killing a few tens of thousands—if the weapons were actually exploded, an act that would surely be suicidal
for the regime.
In the next years, floods and bad weather exacerbated the economic disaster that had been inflicted
upon the country by its rulers. Famines ensued, and
the number of people who perished reached hundreds
84

of thousands or more, with some careful estimates putting the number at over two million.62 Although food
aid was eventually sent from the West, there seem to
have been systematic efforts, in the early days of the
famine in particular, to deny its existence for fear that
a politics-free response to a humanitarian disaster
would undercut efforts to use food aid to wring diplomatic concessions on the nuclear issue from North
Korea.63
Encouraging Extortion.
Due to its anti-proliferation fixation, the United
States has often allowed itself to become a victim of
extortion. North Korea has undoubtedly been the
greatest winner in this somewhat tricky process, with
the regime accepting a $4 billion energy package for
its cooperation in 1994.64 Taiwan and South Korea
have also essentially extorted funds from the handwringers by accepting funds and favors and then giving in to what is likely to be their own best interests.
Israel played the game in a different way during its
1973 war. After being attacked by Egypt and Syria, Israel made known that it might use its nuclear weapons
in the conflict—the country may have had 20 bombs
at the time. This move reportedly forced the United
States to desperately initiate an immediate and massive resupply of the Israeli military, which aided in
Israel’s subsequent victory against the invading Arab
armies.65
The American reputation generated by this episode for being a willing victim of extortion also had
the perverse result of fueling, or supplying a rationale
for, South Africa’s nuclear ambitions. As one South
African official put it:
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We argued that if we cannot use a nuclear weapon on
the battlefield (as this would have been suicidal), then
the only possible way to use it would be to leverage intervention from the Western Powers by threatening to
use it. We thought that this might work and the alleged
Israel-USA case gave some support to our view.66

Hampering Economic Development.
Leonard Weiss notes “restrictions on nuclear trade
and development are important elements of a nonproliferation regime.”67 Anti-proliferation efforts can
thus hamper worldwide economic development by
increasing the effective costs of developing nuclear
energy. As countries grow, they require ever-increasing amounts of power. Any measure that limits
their ability to acquire this vital commodity—or increases its price—effectively slows economic growth
at least to some degree and thereby reduces the gains
in life expectancy inevitably afforded by economic
development.
In the various proclamations about controlling the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, this cost goes almost
entirely unconsidered. For example, one of the common proposals by anti-proliferators is that no country
anywhere (except those already doing it) should be
able to construct any facilities that could produce enriched uranium or plutonium—substances that can be
used either in advanced reactors or in bombs. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does specifically
guarantee to signing non-nuclear countries “the fullest possible exchange of technology” for the develop-
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ment of peaceful nuclear power. However, as Richard
Betts points out, this guarantee has been undermined
by the development of a “nuclear suppliers cartel”
that has worked to “cut off trade in technology for reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium,” thereby
reducing the NPT to “a simple demand to the nuclear
weapons have-nots to remain so.” Under some proposals, the cartel would be extended to fuel as well.68
Anti-proliferator Allison is among those advocating the cartelization of nuclear fuel. He further suggests that nuclear states guarantee to sell the non-nuclear ones all the nuclear fuel they need (presumably
in perpetuity) at less than half price, but does not
attempt to calculate the price tag for this.69 The 2008
Graham Commission, of which Allison was a member, repeats this demand, though it suggests that nuclear fuel be made available at market prices “to the
extent possible.” It, too, eschews cost considerations.70
There is, however, a glimmer of evidence that the
economic cost of hampering the nuclear industry has
been considered, at least in passing, by some dedicated anti-proliferators. In a 2007 plea that the world be
made free of nuclear weapons, four former top policy
officials insisted that the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) be phased out from civil commerce and
be removed from all the research facilities in the entire world—a costly demand that was not repeated in
their 2008 version.71
The anti-proliferation obsession has also resulted
in the summary dismissal of potentially promising
ideas for producing energy. Thomas Schelling points
out that there was a proposal in the 1970s (the decade
that experienced two major shocks in the price of oil)
to safely explode tiny thermonuclear bombs in underground caverns to generate steam that could produce
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energy in an ecologically clean manner. According
to Schelling, both arms control and energy policy
analysts universally rejected the proposal at the time
“without argument, as if the objections were too obvious to require articulation.”72 On closer exploration, of
course, this scheme might have proved unfeasible for
technical or economic reasons. However, to dismiss it
without any sort of analysis was to blithely sacrifice
energy needs—and therefore human welfare—to an
anti-proliferation knee-jerk.
Something similar may now be in the cards. Though
currently in the research phase, it may become possible in the future to radically reduce the cost of producing nuclear energy by using lasers for isotope separation to produce the fuel required by reactors.73 This,
of course, might also make it easier, or at any rate less
costly, for unpleasant states to develop nuclear weapons. Accordingly, a balanced assessment of costs and
benefits would have to be made if the technique ever
proves to be feasible. However, there is an excellent
chance no one will ever make it: like the technology
Schelling discusses, it will be dismissed out of hand.
Relatedly, the anti-proliferation obsession has sometimes hampered the potentially valuable expansion of
nuclear power to ships, particularly to icebreakers.
Enhancing Dependence on Foreign Oil.
There is also something of a security aspect to
this process. Ever since the oil shocks of the 1970s, it
has become common in American politics to espy a
danger to the country’s security in allowing it to be
so dependent on a product that is so disproportionately supplied to the world by regimes in the Middle
East that are sometimes contemptible, hostile, and/
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or unstable. One obvious solution would be to rely
much more on nuclear energy. There are a number of
reasons why this has failed to happen, but the association of nuclear power with nuclear weapons and worries about nuclear proliferation have had the result of
making it much more difficult and expensive—often
prohibitively so—to build nuclear reactors.74
Undercutting Efforts to Prevent Global Warming.
In addition, because nuclear power does not emit
greenhouse gases, it is an obvious potential candidate
for helping with the problem of global warming, an
issue many people hold to be of the highest concern
for the future of the planet. Since many of the policies
arising from the nonproliferation fixation increase the
costs of nuclear power, they, to that degree, exacerbate the problem.
Exacerbating the Nuclear Waste Problem.
The anti-proliferation focus has also exacerbated
the nuclear waste problem in the United States. In
the late-1970s, the Carter administration banned the
reprocessing (or recycling) of nuclear fuel—something that radically reduces the amount of nuclear
waste—under the highly questionable assumption
that this policy would reduce the danger of nuclear
proliferation.75
Encouraging Proliferation.
Moreover, anti-proliferation efforts can be counterproductive in their own terms. As Mitchell Reiss
observes, “one of the unintended ‘demonstration’
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effects” of the American anti-proliferation war against
Iraq “was that chemical and biological weapons
[CBWs] proved insufficient to deter America: only nuclear weapons, it appeared, could do this job.”76 This is
likely a conclusion that North Korea has drawn.
Israel: the Potential for Self-Destruction.
I am not a fan of worst-case scenarios. However,
one that may be worthy of consideration concerns
the danger that, stoked by an obsession over atomic
weapons in the hands of Iran, Israel could essentially
destroy itself—that is, cease to exist as a coherent Jewish state—without a single Iranian bomb ever being
developed.77
There have been extreme apprehensions in Israel
about atomic annihilation at the hands of Iran, and
these have sometimes inspired a sense of despair and
desperation—and in many quarters a loss of hope.78
Indeed, Yossi Klein Halevi and Michael Oren observed
in early 2007 that “military men suddenly sound like
theologians when explaining the Iranian threat.”
Moreover, some of the ponderings were downright
spooky:
Ahmadinejad’s pronouncements about the imminent
return of the Hidden Imam and the imminent destruction of Israel are not regarded as merely calculated for
domestic consumption; they are seen as glimpses into
an apocalyptic game plan. Ahmadinejad has reportedly told his Cabinet that the Hidden Imam will reappear in 2009—precisely the date when Israel estimates
Iran will go nuclear.79

The existential danger for Israel in this arises not
so much from Iran’s capacity (or potential capacity)
to do harm—though judicious and balanced concerns
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about that danger are justified, of course—as from
the consequences of the hype, at once apoplectic and
apocalyptic, over the prospective Iranian bomb. The
problem if the hysteria persists is that a considerable
and increasing number of Israelis may be led to conclude that since there is no way to guarantee that Iran
will never be able to obtain a bomb, the situation is
hopeless; that Israel is ultimately doomed, and that
it is best to live elsewhere—in a place where one can
bring up children free from nuclear fears.
“There is nothing more regular in Jewish history
and myth than Jews ‘returning’ to the Land of Israel to
build a collective life,” observed Ian Lustick in 2008,
“except for Jews leaving the country and abandoning
the project.” Moreover, Lustick continued, “so far,
in the 21st century more Jews have left than have arrived,” noting a survey indicating that only 69 percent
of Jewish Israelis say they want to stay in the country.80
He also cites a 2007 poll indicating that one quarter of
Israelis were considering leaving the country, including almost half of all young people.81 Jeffrey Goldberg
points to another survey finding that 44 percent of Israelis say they are ready to leave if they could find a
better standard of living elsewhere, and he notes that
“the emigration of Israel’s most talented citizens is a
constant worry of Israeli leaders.”82
Thus, there is some danger that by wallowing in
its atomic obsession, Israel will scare itself into extinction.
BOMBING IRAN
President Obama’s administration is notable for
the apparent absence of anyone (else) in a high foreign policy office who clearly and publicly opposed
the war on Iraq before former President George W.
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Bush launched his invasion.83 However, due in considerable part to the subsequent disastrous experience
in that enterprise—a disaster that continues to evolve
and unfold—misgivings about the wisdom and consequences of launching a Pearl Harbor-like military
strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities increased over time.
Among the considerations:
• Following from the previous discussion, if
the rattled and insecure Iranian leadership
was lying when it repeatedly proclaimed
it had no intention of developing nuclear
weapons or if it were to undergo a conversion from that position—triggered perhaps
by an Israeli airstrike—it would likely soon
find, like all other nuclear-armed states, that
the bombs are essentially useless and a very
considerable waste of time, effort, money,
and scientific talent.
• If Iran were to seek to develop nuclear weapons, the process—contrary to intelligence
exaggerations persistently spun out—would
likely take years or even decades. For example, it was in March 2010 that Doyle McManus conveyed the information that “most
experts now estimate that Iran needs about
18 months to complete a nuclear device and
a missile to carry it,” although it needed to
overcome “technical bottlenecks, the exposure of secret facilities and equipment breakdowns.”84 Hymans, unlike the “experts”
McManus consulted, goes much deeper,
stressing the administrative difficulties of
developing a bomb. These require “the fullhearted cooperation of thousands of scientific
and technical workers for many years.” The
task is “enormous,” and:
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the key driver of an efficient nuclear
weapons project has not been a country’s
funding levels, political will, or access to
hardware. Rather, the key has been managerial competence. Nuclear weapons projects
require a hands-off, facilitative management approach, one that permits scientific
and technical professionals to exercise their
vocation. But states such as Iran tend to feature a highly invasive, authoritarian management approach that smothers scientific
and technical professionalism. Thus, it is
very likely that Iran’s political leadership—
with its strong tendency toward invasive,
authoritarian mismanagement—has been
its own worst enemy in its quest for the
bomb.85

• Iran scarcely has a viable delivery system for
nuclear weapons.86
• If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, it
would most likely “use” them in the same
way all other nuclear states have: for prestige (or ego-stoking) and to deter real or perceived threats.87 Indeed, as Thomas Schelling
suggests, deterrence is about the only value
the weapons might have for Iran. Such devices, he points out, “would be too precious
to give away or to sell” and “too precious to
waste killing people” when they could make
other countries “hesitant to consider military
action.”88 Actually, in the wake of the Iraq
disaster, Iran has scarcely needed nuclear
weapons for deterrence. It can credibly deter an invasion by the Americans simply by
maintaining a trained and well-armed cadre
of a few thousand troops dedicated to, and
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capable of, inflicting endless irregular warfare on the invaders.
• The leadership of Iran, however hostile and
unpleasant in many ways, does not consist of
a self-perpetuating gaggle of suicidal lunatics. Thus, as Schelling suggests, it is exceedingly unlikely that Iran would give nuclear
weapons to a substate group like Hezbollah
to detonate—particularly on a country like
Israel—not in the least because the non-lunatics in charge would fear that the source
of the weapon would be detected by nuclear
forensics, inviting devastating retaliation.
• An Iranian bomb would be unlikely to trigger
a cascade of proliferation in the Middle East.
Although Joseph Cirincione has held that a
nuclear Iran could readily be deterred from
using a nuclear weapon against its neighbors
or the United States, and although he discounts the likelihood that it might “intentionally give a weapon to a terrorist group they
could not control,” he has set off on an extravagant alarmist fear cascade, envisioning
“a nuclear chain reaction where states feel
they must match each other’s nuclear capability.” This, he concludes, “could lead to a
Middle East with not one nuclear weapons
state, Israel, but four or five,” and that “is a
recipe for nuclear war.”89 However, as noted
earlier, if Iran were to brandish nuclear weapons, it would find itself, like Iraq in 1990, confronting a coalition of convenience made up
of countries far stronger militarily.
• The long-term negative consequences for Israel from an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities,
either by Israel or by the United States, could
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surpass those that developed even from such
ill-advised ventures as Israel’s 1982 invasion
of Lebanon and its government-induced policy to encourage settlement in occupied territories. In addition, the casualties inflicted by
an attack on Iran by direct action and by its
“collateral damage” (including, potentially,
induced nuclear radiation) could conceivably
be considerable. Moreover, the results would
most likely be counterproductive. Israel’s
highly touted air strike against Iraq’s nuclear
program in the Osirak attack of 1981, as Dan
Reiter and Richard Betts have pointed out,
actually caused Saddam Hussein to speed up
his nuclear program 25-fold while decreasing
its vulnerability by dispersing its elements—
a lesson Iran has also learned.90
• In the end, it is incumbent upon those who
have advocated a Pearl Harbor-like attack on
Iran to demonstrate that the rather innocuous
history of nuclear proliferation over the last
two-thirds of a century is irrelevant, and that
the regime there is daffier and more threatening than, for example, the ultimate rogue in
1964—China.91
CONCLUSION
In 1950, notes John Lewis Gaddis, no one among
foreign policy decision-makers anticipated most of the
major international developments that were to take
place in the next half-century. Among these were “that
there would be no World War” and that the United
States and the USSR, “soon to have tens of thousands
of thermonuclear weapons pointed at one another,
would agree tacitly never to use any of them.”92
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However, as discussed earlier, it could have been
reasonably argued at the time that major war was simply not in the cards—that despite the huge differences
on many issues, the leading countries of the world
would manage to keep themselves from plunging into
a self-destructive cataclysm like, or even worse than,
the one they had just survived. This perspective was
not, of course, the only one possible, but there was no
definitive way to dismiss it. Thus, as a matter of simple, plain, rational decision-making, this prospect—
the one that proved to be true—should have been on
the table.
If no one anticipated this distinct possibility in 1950,
the irreverent might be led ungraciously to suggest
that the United States would have been better served
if those at the summit of foreign policy had been replaced by coin-flipping chimpanzees who would at
least occasionally get it right from time to time out of
sheer luck. (The chimps would have to flip coins because the animals are all too human and would likely
otherwise fall into patterns of repetitive, and probably
agitated, behavior.)
We seem to be at it again. Just about the whole
of the foreign policy establishment has taken it as a
central article of faith that the proliferation of nuclear
weapons is an overwhelming danger and that all possible measures, including war, must be taken to keep
it from happening.93
Concern is justified I suppose, but the experience
of two-thirds of a century suggests that any danger
is far from overwhelming. It would certainly be preferable that a number of regimes never obtain nuclear
weapons. Indeed, if the efforts to dissuade Iran from
launching a nuclear weapons program succeed, they
would be doing it a favor—though, quite possibly, the
Iranians will not notice.
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The handful of countries that have acquired nuclear weapons seem to have done so sometimes as an ego
trip for current leaders, and more urgently (or perhaps merely in addition) as an effort to deter a (supposed) potential attack on themselves: China to deter
the United States and the Soviet Union, Israel to deter
various enemy nations in the neighborhood, India to
deter China, Pakistan to deter India, and now North
Korea to deter the United States and maybe others.94
Insofar as nuclear proliferation is a response to a perceived threat, it follows that one way to reduce the
likelihood that such countries would go nuclear is a
simple one: stop threatening them.
More generally, any anti-proliferation priority
should be topped with a somewhat higher one: avoiding militarily aggressive actions under the obsessive
sway of worst-case scenario fantasies, actions that
might lead to the deaths of tens—or hundreds—of
thousands of people.95
“It is dangerous,” muses Hymans aptly, “to fight
smoke with fire.”96 Nuclear proliferation, while not
particularly desirable, is unlikely to accelerate or prove
to be a major danger, and extreme anti-proliferation
policies need careful reconsideration. They can generate costs far higher than those likely to be inflicted by
the potential (and often essentially imaginary) problems they seek to address.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3
1. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2nd Ed., New York: Norton, 2002.
2. Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 93.

97

3. Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable
Catastrophe, New York: Times Books, 2004, Ch. 7; Joseph Cirincione,
“Cassandra’s Conundrum,” National Interest, No. 92, November–
December 2007, p. 15.
4. CQ Transcriptions, “Transcript of Barack Obama’s Remarks at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s Annual
Policy Conference, Washington, DC, June 4, 2008,” The New York
Times, June 4, 2008, available from www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/us/
politics/04text-obama-aipac.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Tim Reid and
Tom Baldwin, “Nuclear Iran Must Be Stopped at All Costs, Says
McCain,” The Times (London), January 26, 2006.
5. For example, Kenneth Walz, “Why Iran Should Get the
Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean More Stability,” Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4, July/August 2012, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-n-waltz/why-iran-should-getthe-bomb.
6. This chapter draws on ideas and approaches presented in
John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to
al-Qaeda, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
7. For an extended discussion, see Mueller, Atomic Obsession,
especially Chapters 4 and 5.
8. On this issue, see in particular Stephen M. Walt, “Containing Rogues and Renegades: Coalition Strategies and Counterproliferation,” in Victor A. Utgoff, ed., The Coming Crisis: Nuclear
Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order, Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2000, pp. 191–226.
9. John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics, New York: HarperCollins, 1995, ch. 5;
Mueller, Atomic Obsession, ch. 3.
10. Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?”
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 2001, p. 59.
11. Vojtech Mastny, “Introduction,” in Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark and Andreas Wenger, eds., War Plans and Alliances in the

98

Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West, London, UK and
New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 3.
12. Stephen E. Ambrose, “Secrets of the Cold War,” The New
York Times, December 27, 1990.
13. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, pp. 71–72.
14. George F. Kennan, “Containment Then and Now,” Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 4, Spring 1987, pp. 888-889. See also Robert H.
Johnson, Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold
War and After, New York: St. Martins, 1994, p. 29.
15. Charles de Gaulle, “The Thoughts of Charles de Gaulle,”
The New York Times Magazine, May 12, 1968, p. 103; Robert Gilpin,
War and Change in World Politics, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1981, p. 215.
16. Christopher Layne contended in 1993 that Japan by natural impulse must soon come to yearn for nuclear weapons. Layne,
“The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 5–51. Three years
earlier, John Mearsheimer argued that “Germany will feel insecure
without nuclear weapons,” see Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future:
Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol.
15, No. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 5–56.
17. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 4. For an assessment of this
issue, see Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006, pp. 211-212.
18. Jennifer Mackby and Walter Slocombe, “Germany: A Model Case, A Historical Imperative,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J.
Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why
States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2004, p. 210.
19. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 5.

99

20. National Planning Association (NPA) Special Project Committee on Security through Arms Control, 1970 without Arms Control, Planning Pamphlet No. 104, Washington, DC: National Planning Association, 1958, p. 42.
21. C.P. Snow, “The Moral Un-Neutrality of Science,” Science,
Vol. 133, No. 3448, January 27, 1961, p. 259; John F. Kennedy quoted in Sidney Kraus, ed., The Great Debates: Kennedy vs. Nixon, 1960,
Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1962, p. 394. Kennedy
reportedly considered a Chinese nuclear test “likely to be historically the most significant and worst event of the 1960s,” see William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby
in the Cradle’,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3, Winter 200001, p. 61. Actually, that designation should probably go instead to
Kennedy’s decision to send American troops in substantial numbers to Vietnam, largely to confront the Chinese “threat” that was
deemed to lurk there.
22. For a discussion of the relevance of the Canadian case, concluding from it that the issue of nuclear proliferation—then often
known as the “Nth country problem”—was approaching “a finite
solution,” see John Mueller, “Incentives for Restraint: Canada as a
Nonnuclear Power,” Orbis, Vol. 11, No. 3, Fall 1967, pp. 864–884.
For some early commentary suggesting that alarm about nuclear
proliferation was unjustified, see Richard N. Rosecrance, “International Stability and Nuclear Diffusion,” in Rosecrance, ed., The
Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons: Strategy and Politics, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1964, pp. 293–314.
23. William M. Arkin, “The Continuing Misuses of Fear,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 62, No. 5, September–October
2006, p. 45; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press, 1995; T. V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations
Forgo Nuclear Weapons, Montréal, QC: McGill–Queen’s University
Press, 2000.
24. Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation,
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1984. See also Hymans, Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 2-12. On the very limited impact of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), see Mueller, Atomic
Obsession, ch. 9.

100

25. Jacques E. C. Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Idem., “Crying Wolf about an Iranian Nuclear
Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 17, 2012, available
from thebulletin.org/crying-wolf-about-iranian-nuclear-bomb.
26. On Stalin’s mental condition, see John Mueller, Retreat
from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War, New York: Free
Press, 1989, p. 123. On Mao, see Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962,
New York: Walker, 2010.
27. For an extended discussion, see Mueller, Atomic
Obsession, ch. 12–15.
28. John D. Negroponte, “Letter Dated 17 April 2003 from
the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to
the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee,” United Nations Security Council, document S/AC.37/2003/
(1455)/26, April 22, 2003, available from www.globalsecurity.org/
security/library/report/2003/n0335167.pdf; Allison, Nuclear Terrorism,
p. 15. He had presumably relied on the same inspirational mechanism in 1995 to predict, “in the absence of a determined program
of action, we have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear terrorism against American targets before this decade is out;” Idem.,
“Must We Wait for the Nuclear Morning After?” The Washington
Post, April 30, 1995.
29. Quoted in Bob Graham, World at Risk: The Report of the
Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism,
New York: Vintage, 2008, p. 43.
30. White House Press Office, “Remarks by President Obama
and President Zuma of South Africa before Bilateral Meeting,”
Blair House, Washington, DC, April 11, 2010, available from www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-zuma-south-africa-bilateral-meeting.
31. Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007, Cambridge, MA,
and Washington, DC: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard
University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2007, p. vi. See also William Langewiesche, The Atomic Bazaar: Dispatches from the Underground World of Nuclear Trafficking, New York: Farrar, Straus and
101

Giroux, 2007, p. 20; Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2008, p. 198.
32. For an excellent discussion of nuclear forensics, see Michael
A. Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2007, pp. 127–133.
33. Robin M. Frost, Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11, London, UK:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, p. 64; Jenkins, p.
143. On this issue, see also Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “Why
States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists,” International
Security, Vol. 38, No. 1, Summer 2013, pp. 80-104.
34. Peter Bergen, “Where You Bin? The Return of Al Qaeda,”
New Republic, January 29, 2007, p. 19.
35. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road
to 9/11, New York: Knopf, 2006, pp. 230–231, 287–288.
36. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Suitcase Nukes”: A Reassessment, Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002, pp. 4 and 12; Langewiesche, p. 19; Jenkins, pp. 149–150.
37. Anna M. Pluta and Peter D. Zimmerman, “Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent,” Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer
2006, p. 56. See also Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History,
New York: Ecco Press, 2009, p. 152.
38. Stephen M. Younger, Endangered Species: How We Can Avoid
Mass Destruction and Build a Lasting Peace, New York: Ecco Press,
2007, p. 93. See also, Idem., The Bomb, pp. 152–153.
39. Idem., The Bomb, pp. 153–154. On triggers, see Jenkins, p.
141. On disassembled parts, see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 11, 13;
and Joby Warrick, “Pakistan Nuclear Security Questioned,” The
Washington Post, November 11, 2007.
40. For a discussion of the failed-state scenario, including useful suggestions for making it even less likely, see Levi, pp. 133–138.
On the unlikelihood of a Pakistan collapse, see Juan Cole, “Obama’s
Domino Theory,” Salon, March 30, 2009, available from www.salon.
com/2009/03/30/afghanistan_7.

102

41. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1960, p. x.
42. Quoted in Francis Anthony Boyle, World Politics and International Law, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985, p. 73. See
also Marc Trachtenberg, The Cold War and After: History, Theory,
and the Logic of International Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012, p. 25.
43. Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons,
the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety, New York: Allen
Lane/Penguin Books, 2013. For commentary, see John Mueller,
“Fire, Fire,” The Times Literary Supplement (London), March 7,
2014, p 26.
44. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth, New York: Knopf,
1982, p. 231.
45. For both, estimates start at around 110,000 with many
ranging higher, see “Casualties of the Iraq War,” Wikipedia, last
modified March 12, 2015, available from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War; “The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki: Total Casualties,” Atomic Archive, available from
www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/MED/med_chp10.shtml.
46. See Mueller, Atomic Obsession, p. 133. For ammunition, see
James Fallows, “Why Iraq Has No Army,” The Atlantic, December 2005, p. 72. For heavy weapons, see Maggie O’Kane, “Saddam
Wields Terror—and Feigns Respect,” The Guardian, November 24,
1998. For critical pre-war examinations of the assumption that Iraq,
however armed, posed much of a threat, see John Mearsheimer and
Stephen Walt, “Iraq: An Unnecessary War,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 82,
No. 1, January/February 2003, pp. 50–59; Brink Lindsey and John
Mueller, “Should We Invade Iraq?” Reason, January 2003. See also
John Mueller, Overblown, New York: Free Press, 2006, pp. 131–133.
47. Olivier Roy, “Europe Won’t Be Fooled Again,” The New
York Times, May 13, 2003.
48. Bruce Russett, “Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 6, No. 4, November 2005, p.
396. Francis Fukuyama, “America’s Parties and Their Foreign Pol-

103

icy Masquerade,” Financial Times, March 8, 2005. On these issues,
see also John Mueller, War and Ideas: Selected Essays, London and
New York: Routledge, 2011, ch. 7; Jon Western, Selling Intervention
and War: The Presidency, The Media, and the American Public, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005, ch. 6.
49. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for
Invading Iraq, New York: Random House, 2003, p. 418.
50. Ibid., pp. xiv, 335, 413, 418. Pollack also estimated that another $5 to $10 billion over the first 3 years would be required for
rebuilding (p. 397).
51. Sam Tannenhaus, “Interview with Paul Wolfowitz,” Vanity
Fair, May 9, 2003; “Wolfowitz: WMD Chosen as Reason for Iraq
War for ‘Bureaucratic Reasons’,” CNN.com, May 30, 2003, transcript available from transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0305/30/
se.08.html.
52. Sam Stein, “Rove: We Wouldn’t Have Invaded Iraq If
We Knew the Truth about WMDs,” Huffington Post, December 2,
2008, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/02/rove-wewouldnt-have-inva_n_147923.html. Some still consider it “open to
debate,” however, “that the war was fought primarily as a nonproliferation campaign.” Henry D. Sokolski, Underestimated: Our
Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2015, p. 4 note 7.
53. On this issue, see also Arkin, p. 45.
54. Richard Garfield, Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children from 1990 through 1998, South Bend, IN: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1999. John
Mueller and Karl Mueller, “The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2000, pp. 163-187. Matt Welch,
“The Politics of Dead Children,” Reason, March 2002, pp. 53-58.
Pollack, pp. 138-139. Mohamed M. Ali, John Blacker, and Gareth
Jones, “Annual mortality rates and excess deaths of children under
five in Iraq, 1991-1998,” Population Studies, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2003, pp.
217-226. Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes:
The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein, New York: HarperCollins, 1999,

104

ch. 5. However, for the argument, based on later intelligence, that
high estimates of a half-million or more child deaths are likely exaggerated due in particular to regime manipulation of the numbers,
see Michael Spagat, “Truth and death in Iraq under sanctions,” Significance, Vol. 7, No. 3 , September 2010, pp. 116-120.
55. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 165-171.
56. Ibid., p. 166.
57. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History,
New York: Basic Books, 2001, pp. 307-308, 316. Selig S. Harrison,
Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 213. On this issue, see also James Fallows, “The Panic Gap: Reactions to North
Korea’s Bomb,” National Interest, No. 38, Winter 1994/95, pp. 40-45.
58. Oberdorfer, pp. 308, 316.
59. Ibid., p. 318.
60. Ibid., p. 329. See also Derek D. Smith, Deterring America:
Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 70-71.
61. Oberdorfer, p. 324. See also Harrison, pp. 117-118.
62. Oberdorfer, p. 399; Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press,
2001, p. 215.
63. Natsios, pp. 147-148.
64. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 327.
65. There was also a strong perception in Israel that the United States might like to see the Arabs win some ground, something
that might help compel Israel to negotiate a peace treaty later. The
result of Israel’s atomic gambit seems to have undercut support
for that approach to the degree that it existed. On these issues, see
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and
American Foreign Policy, New York: Random House, 1991, pp. 40,

105

139, 226–39; T.V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 127–128.
66. Peter Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African
Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2, Fall 2001, p. 62. See
also Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 15, 28.
67. Leonard Weiss, “Safeguards and the NPT: Early History
Portended Current Problems,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty Missteps, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, forthcoming.
68. Richard K. Betts, “Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism,” in Utgoff, ed., The
Coming Crisis, p. 70.
69. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 156–165.
70. Graham, World at Risk, pp. xx.
71. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger,
and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall
Street Journal, January 4, 2007; Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn,
“Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” The Wall Street Journal, January
15, 2008.
72. Thomas C. Schelling, “An Astonishing Sixty Years: The
Legacy of Hiroshima,” Nobel Prize Lecture, Stockholm, Sweden, December 8, 2005, p. 369, available from nobelprize.org/nobel_
prizes/economics/laureates/2005/schelling-lecture.html.
73. Mark Anderson, “Beware New Nukes,” Wired, October
2008, p.182.
74. On this issue, see especially Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear
Fear: A History of Images, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1988.
75. Richard L. Garwin and Georges Charpak, Megawatts and
Megatons: A Turning Point in the Nuclear Age? New York: Knopf,
2001, pp. 144–145.

106

76. Mitchell Reiss, “The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects for
a World of Many Nuclear Weapons States,” in Campbell, Einhorn,
and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point, p. 12.
77. See also John Mueller and Ian S. Lustick, “Israel’s Fight-orFlight Response,” National Interest, No. 98, November/December
2008, pp. 68-71.
78. Benny Morris, “Israel’s unhappy birthday,” Los Angeles
Times, May 11, 2008. See also Ian S. Lustick, “Abandoning the Iron
Wall: Israel and ‘the Middle Eastern Muck’,” Middle East Policy,
Vol. XV, No. 3, August 2008.
79. Yossi Klein Halevi and Michael B. Oren, “Israel’s Worst
Nightmare,” New Republic, January 30, 2007. For later, but similar,
apocalyptic visions, see Ari Shavit, “The Bomb and the Bomber,”
The New York Times, March 21, 2012.
80. “Israel’s Future: The Time Factor,” A Debate between
Efraim Inbar and Ian S. Lustick, Israel Studies Forum, Vol. 23, No. 1,
Summer 2008, pp. 6, 10.
81. Lustick, “Abandoning the Iron Wall.”
82. Jeffrey Goldberg, “Unforgiven,” The Atlantic, May 2008,
p. 40.
83. John Mueller, “What Americans Get That the Foreign
Policy Elite Doesn’t,” Huffington Post, May 30, 2014, available
from www.huffingtonpost.com/john-mueller/what-americans-get-thatt_b_5420173.html.
84. Doyle McManus, “What if Iran gets the bomb?” Los
Angeles Times, March 21, 2010.
85. Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Crying wolf about an Iranian nuclear bomb;” See also Idem., Achieving Nuclear Ambitions.
86. Richard L. Garwin, “Evaluating Iran’s missile threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 2, May/June 2008, p. 40;
“Pentagon Appears to Downgrade Iran Strategic Missile Threat,”
Global Security Newswire, July 11, 2014, available from www.nti.org/
gsn/article/pentagon-appears-downgrade-iran-icbm-threat-assessment/.
107

87. For the conclusion that these would be Iran’s sole motivations, see Colin Dueck and Ray Takeyh, “Iran’s Nuclear Challenge,”
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 2, Summer 2007, p. 195.
88. Schelling.
89. Cirincione, pp. 16-17. Cirincione has much company. As
William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova observe, “Today it
is hard to find an analyst or commentator on nuclear proliferation
who is not pessimistic about the future. It is nearly as difficult to find
one who predicts the future without reference to metaphors such as
proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, and
tipping points.” However, after considerable study and research
on the issue, they finally became “convinced that the metaphor is
inappropriate and misleading, as it implies a process of nuclear
decisionmaking and a pace of nuclear weapons spread that are
unlikely to transpire.” William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions,” International Security, Vol. 33,
No. 1, Summer 2008, p. 159.
90. Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs
and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No.
2, July 2005, pp. 355-371. Ibid., Preventive War and Its Alternatives:
The Lessons of History, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, 2006, pp. 46; Richard K. Betts, “The Osirak Fallacy,” National Interest, No. 83, Spring 2006, pp. 22-25. Moreover, as
Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, also stresses, the reactor the
Israelis bombed was not even capable of producing weapons-grade
fissile material.
91. See Francis J. Gavin, “Blasts from the Past: Proliferation
Lessons from the 1960s,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3,
Winter 2004/05, pp. 100–135.
92. John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life,
New York: Penguin, 2011, p. 403.
93. Thus, it is impressive how casually the sanguinist perspective of Waltz—a plausible line of argument, whatever my reservations—has been commonly dismissed without even so much as
an analysis or effort at refutation. As Betts notes, the argument
cannot simply be “brushed off,” yet that is exactly what has hap-

108

pened; “surprisingly few academic strategists” have tried to refute it in detail. See Betts, “Universal Deterrence or Conceptual
Collapse?” p. 64; Thus the generally careful and thoughtful Reiss
worries (or did worry in 2004) that we are nearing a nuclear “tipping point” that could trigger a “proliferation epidemic.” Should
this occur, he assures us, “few would take comfort in the assurances of some academic theorists [a double putdown if there ever
was one] that ‘more may be better’,” directly quoting Waltz, but
not even affording him a footnote. See Reiss, “The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects,” p. 4. If academics have substantially ignored the argument, policymakers have been at least as oblivious.
For example, James Kurth simply dismisses the Waltz argument
out of hand: “There probably has not been a single foreign policy
professional in the U.S. government,” he noted in 1998, “that has
found this notion to be helpful.” Kurth, “Inside the Cave: The Banality of I.R. Studies,” National Interest, No. 53, Fall 1998. But not,
one strongly suspects, because any has spent any time thinking
about it.
94. On China, see Mueller, Atomic Obsession, p. 144. Hymans
puts prime emphasis on ego—with the added proviso that only
when the ego in charge has a conception of a national identity that
can be considered to be what he calls “of the oppositional nationalist” variety will the country really try to get nuclear weapons;
Hymans, Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation. For somewhat related
findings, see Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. See also the discussion in Potter and
Mukhatzhanova.
95. The phrase “worst case fantasies” is from Bernard Brodie,
“The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security, Vol.
2, No. 4, Spring 1978, p. 68.
96. Hymans, Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 225.

109

CHAPTER 4
SHOULD WE LET IT ALL GO?
Victor Gilinsky
The traditional criticism of U.S. efforts to stop the
spread of the bomb has been that we cannot do much
about it. (Decades ago former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown quipped that he could replace all
the government’s nonproliferation experts and diplomats with two—one to announce each additional nuclear state, and the other to wring his hands over the
increase.) However, no one questioned the bomb’s importance. John Mueller takes a different approach; he
says the whole thing does not matter. My assignment
is to take issue with the broad thesis of his chapter in
this volume, “‘At All Costs’: The Destructive Consequences of Anti-Proliferation Policy.”1 He questions
the past and future significance of the spread of nuclear weapons, and if there is ever a compelling case
for their use. He questions even more the efforts to
restrain the spread; and he concludes that anti-proliferation efforts have proved exceedingly costly and—
counting in this category the 2003 Iraq invasion—have
led to more deaths than the nuclear bombs dropped
on Japan. In passing, he skewers prominent nuclear
terrorism and nuclear war alarmists who have been
purveying “worst case scenario fantasies.” He goes
after their insistence that we immediately put their
solutions at the top of the national security agenda,
and their introduction of extravagant language that
has now fed into the political discourse. Mueller calls
then-presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama
on his limitless promise made to an American-Israeli
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Public Affairs Committee conference, to do “everything” within his power to stop Iran from getting the
bomb, and Senator John McCain matching it by saying
it had to be done “at all costs,” with neither explaining what “everything” and “at all cost” could lead to.
Mueller suggests that one way to reduce incentives for
“errant regimes” to take interest in the bomb is to stop
threatening them.
In short, there is much to like. However, he goes too
far, and seems to acknowledge that himself. He writes
that no country has found the weapons particularly
useful; and the spread of the weapons is not necessarily desirable; and that further spread is unlikely to
accelerate or prove a major danger. The trouble is that
for most people, putting nuclear war in the “unlikely”
category still leaves a lot to worry about.
But Mueller goes on to dismiss such concerns and
conclude that proliferation hardly matters at all, that
up to now its effects have been benign, whereas efforts
to restrain it do more harm than good. So let us focus
mainly on that.
HAS THE BOMB MADE A SIGNIFICANT
IMPACT ON THE WORLD?
One is almost ashamed to ask the question. Anyone who has lived through the rough parts of the
Cold War, or is old enough to remember jumping under his desk during what was then called an atomic
drill, has no doubt that it did, in ways both large and
small. I will pass over the enormous size and expense
of the nuclear weapons enterprise to mention a few
items related to life in the United States: The Manhattan Project was, as Annie Jacobsen recently wrote,
“the mother of all black programs and it is the parent
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from which all black operations have sprung.”2 That
precedent plus the Cold War justified the existence of
a vast secret national security state, some aspects of
which we are just beginning to learn about. That secret
world required vetting the “loyalty” of large numbers
of people, which implies unprecedented intrusions
into their private lives. We have gotten so used to this
we think it is normal, but it is a long way from what
was considered normal in pre-World War II times.
The bomb, plus means for intercontinental delivery in
minutes, also changed the U.S. Constitution, shifting
the power to initiate war to the president and away
from Congress, and therefore away from the democratic process.
We had many close calls during the decades of the
Cold War, some of which could conceivably have led
to nuclear war. There were quite a number of highly
placed U.S. officials who counseled use of the bomb,
and in fact were ready to take the president and the
country over the cliff to achieve their Cold War aims.3
Fortunately, reason prevailed. Or the taboo against
nuclear use was sufficiently intimidating. Adding to
the dangers in the early days of the Cold War, there
were no independently controlled locks on the nuclear weapons. Harold Agnew tells of visiting a U.S. air
base in Germany and seeing nuclear-armed German
planes lined up ready to go. U.S. physical control over
the weapons consisted of a single U.S. sentry. The
Strategic Air Command (SAC) was very aggressive
during this time, flying mock nuclear attacks not only
up to the Soviet borders, but also inside those borders
to get data on Soviet radars. Some U.S. planes were
shot down with loss of aircrews. We were very lucky
to get through that time unscathed, or perhaps more
accurately, unirradiated.
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We know less about how close other countries
came to using nuclear weapons, but it appears that at
one point in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, former Israeli
Prime Minister Golda Meir was the only one that stood
between Israel’s bomb and its use on the battlefield.
There were also serious accidents with bombs;
some were inadvertently dropped from planes. The
most spectacular incident occurred over Goldsboro,
NC. A plane carrying megaton bombs broke up in
mid-air, dropping its bombs. They had multiple sequential locks to prevent unintentional or accidental
nuclear detonation. The arming sequence on one fourmegaton bomb passed through five of its six locks on
impact, and the bomb failed to detonate only because
the last one held. Had the thermonuclear weapon exploded, a good part of North Carolina would have
been flattened, and if the wind had then been blowing north, much of the Eastern coast would have been
heavily contaminated with radioactivity. Again, we
were very lucky. One should add that all these locks
were put on the weapons over the considerable resistance of the Air Force, which worried more about the
bombs failing to go off when they were supposed to
than having them go off accidentally.
WAS THE BOMB USEFUL TO ITS OWNERS?
The usefulness of the bomb—or bombs, as others have them, too—is a more complicated question.
The first two nuclear bombs ended the war with Japan more quickly than it otherwise would have. The
price America paid for this was the eternal onus for
being the first to use this new energy source to kill
large numbers of people. Without the experience of
the Manhattan Project, would others have developed
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the bomb? Once uranium fission was understood in
1939, many scientists around the world understood
the possibility of nuclear weapons. The Manhattan
Project, after all, was hurried in fear of a German
bomb. Nevertheless, without the U.S. effort, the development elsewhere probably would have been slower.
Recall, however, that most of the World War II effort
was in producing the nuclear explosives, highly enriched uranium (HEU), and plutonium. Commercial
nuclear programs now make that easy for possessors
of uranium enrichment plants and plutonium separation, or reprocessing, plants.
The bomb did not do much for the United States in
the few years it had a monopoly. Moreover, once the
Soviets exploded theirs, it was pretty much a standoff.
There was not much you could do with it, but you did
not want to be without it if former Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had it. In time, the weapon took on a life
of its own. We built them, and they built them. One
thing we know, the bomb was constantly on the mind
of leaders.
It was U.S. policy to rely on nuclear weapons to
overcome the disparity in manpower if the Soviets attacked Western Europe and thus to deter such an attack. Years after he was the U.S. Secretary of Defense,
Robert McNamara told me that despite our declared
policy, he would never have authorized use of U.S.
nuclear weapons unless the Soviets used them first.
(He said he told no one, including former National
Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and former U.S.
President John F. Kennedy, because he didn’t want to
be thought of as weak, which in itself says quite a lot.)
Whether there was actually any deterrence is problematic. If the Soviets weren’t going to attack Western
Europe anyhow, there was nothing to deter. Still, in
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this and other situations, the bomb owners saw (and
see) it differently than outside observers.
The participants in the Cuban Missile Crisis
thought that we came close to nuclear war, and subsequent disclosures about the presence of Soviet battlefield nuclear weapons only underlined that conclusion. The possibilities for disastrous mistakes were
considerable, as top officials did not have the degree
of control they thought they had. In the 1990s, in an
interval between sessions of an international meeting,
I happened to be standing with two or three others
to whom former Secretary McNamara was explaining
how dangerous the situation was on a particular Saturday. One of those present had been in SAC’s Omaha
“tank,” and proceeded to tell a stunned McNamara
what really went on there on that day. It was the first
he had heard about it.
There is no question that nuclear weapons confer
status, both to the countries possessing them, and to
the individuals directly involved with them. It’s no accident that the five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council are nuclear-armed. Whether
the bomb actually does them any good beyond that
status at this point is doubtful. However, none of
them is in any hurry to give it up. Even the Socialists
in France and the Laborites in Britain, who when out
of power talked of giving up nuclear weapons, quickly
changed their mind when they gained power. In addition, bureaucratic prestige is undoubtedly a factor in
keeping our land-based missiles still on alert.
India and Pakistan are, if anything, increasing
their stockpiles. India has plans to outfit submarines
with strategic missiles. Israel, too, would presumably
insist its nuclear weapons were useful, that is, if they
ever admitted they had them. North Korea now brags

116

about its nuclear bombs. And, of course, the Obama
administration is committing hundreds of billions to
upgrade its nuclear weapons complex.4 So whatever
we may think of the nuclear weapons situation, and
the seeming uselessness of it all—which could also be
said of most military expenditures—the owners are
not about to take advice from interfering academic
onlookers.
HAVE THOSE WHO HAVE GIVEN UP THE
BOMB REGRETTED IT?
In support of the unilateral divestment of nuclear
weapons, the claim is made that countries that have
given up the weapons have not suffered for it and do
not regret it. A respectable argument can certainly
be made for giving up nuclear weapons.5 However,
the experience of countries that have done so is not
of much relevance. In reality, only South Africa gave
them up, and it only had a few warheads of rudimentary design that weren’t of much use in South Africa’s
military situation—that is, the situation of the former
white-only government. The elimination of the weapons took place in unique circumstances—moving
from a white to black government—and was a condition for joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and good standing in the world community. It
is doubtful that the other countries sometimes listed in
the former nuclear weapon state category—the former
Soviet republics on whose territory nuclear weapons
remained after the breakup of the Soviet Union—were
ever really nuclear states. It’s true they relinquished
the weapons on their soil, or were bribed to do so, but
it does not appear that they ever had the ability to use
them.
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HAVE NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS CAUSED
GREAT HARM?
The Nonproliferation Efforts up to 1974.
Which brings us to the efforts, since the bomb’s
invention, to keep it within few hands (so-called nonproliferation) and the issue of whether these efforts,
especially recent ones, have been on balance harmful.
A brief examination of the history of attempts at international nuclear controls shows this is not a sustainable proposition. The fact is, they have not been potent
enough to be harmful. Rather, we have suffered from
the lack of adequate international protection against
militarizing nuclear energy.
The starting point in the effort to control what
was then called the atom was the U.S. proposal based
on the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report6 for the international development of nuclear energy. The central
idea was international ownership of what the report
called dangerous nuclear facilities. The report grasped
the essential problem of the dual potential of nuclear
energy, but was unfortunately deeply flawed in its
specific proposals.7 In any case, the U.S. proposal
had no chance of acceptance by Stalin’s Soviet Union,
and indeed went nowhere. The United States then
did its best to maintain tight security over nuclear
technology.
Once the Soviets and the British exploded bombs,
we changed course. Former U.S. President Eisenhower launched Atoms for Peace, which amounted to a
huge giveaway of nuclear technology to gain political
advantage and to create a market for U.S. commercial
nuclear reactors and fuel under minimal international
controls.8 In fact, President Eisenhower explained
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that initially no “onerous” controls would be needed
because the exported facilities would be too small to
worry about. We sponsored the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), principally
as a distributor of our largesse. The Agency included
an inspectorate whose real function was to provide
a patina of legitimacy to international nuclear trade,
the underlying notion being to avoid any need for our
own inspection of customers and any resentment that
might provoke. It was not a serious inspection system,
rather more a matter of inspectors making friendly
visits to their colleagues in the field.
President Kennedy took the spread of nuclear
weapons more seriously. Among other things, he
pressed Israel to allow inspection of its French-supplied Dimona facility, already suspected of being a
weapons facility.9 Kennedy’s observation that there
could soon be a couple of dozen nuclear states is often described, in view of the present nine, as an example of undue alarm.10 It was not a prediction; it was
a warning, which led to a number of steps that slowed
the spread of the bomb, starting with the 1968 NPT.
The draft treaty started out as an effort by states
without nuclear weapons to protect themselves by
mutually agreeing not to obtain them. In the lengthy
negotiations, however, other features were added
that changed its character, most particularly a promise, summed up in the oft-quoted phrase “inalienable
right,” to access nuclear technology on a non-discriminatory basis, so long as they were subject to IAEA
inspections. As the treaty was then interpreted, this
included uranium enrichment and separation of plutonium, the technologies that offer access to nuclear
explosives. The treaty barred countries beyond the
original five weapons states from getting bombs, but
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had no explicit limits on how close such a country
could come to a bomb without violating the treaty.
Former U.S. President Richard Nixon, while cool
to the treaty that had been signed by his predecessor,
U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, nevertheless sent it to
the Senate for ratification after deciding that it did not
in any way reduce his freedom of action with respect
to U.S. nuclear weapons. Most notably, that included
sharing them with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He gave instructions to his administration’s officials that they were not to press countries to
sign, especially West Germany. The country did sign,
as did Japan, and ultimately nearly all countries—but
that was later.
The first test of U.S. application of the treaty came
in 1969, immediately after ratification. The United
States had been aware that Israel had been conducting a secret nuclear weapons program since the 1950s.
It already had built some nuclear weapons, although
the United States was not sure about this. The U.S. Departments of State and Defense wanted to withhold
the advanced F-4 aircraft Israel wanted in return for
restrictions on Israel’s manufacture of nuclear weapons, a position that carried over from the Johnson
administration.11 Former U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was still hoping to get Israel’s
signature on the NPT. His cynical—but not entirely
wrong—observation was that this would be worthwhile, even though he expected Israel to maintain a
clandestine weapons program, because it would be a
smaller one than otherwise. The Department of State
offered to come up with a favorable legal opinion on
treaty compliance if Israel would stay a screwdriver
turn away. However, when it came to President
Nixon’s September 1969 meeting with Israel’s prime
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minister, Golda Meir, none of this mattered. He let
it all go. What he mainly cared about was that Israel
would support him in the Cold War, and especially
in Vietnam. Since it served neither party’s interests
to publicize them, Israeli nuclear weapons became a
non-subject in the U.S. Government, and the NPT was
relegated to its place off to the side.
It’s worth remembering that during those years,
nonproliferation was regarded in the foreign policy
and defense establishments as a kind of side show
handled by intellectual officials who were not considered weighty enough or tough enough to perform
in the main ring—the Cold War. (To jump ahead, it
was only after the demise of the Soviet Union that the
U.S. Department of Defense, desperately searching for
budget justifications, acquired more respect for nonproliferation, or rather counter-proliferation, which is
its more expensive cousin.)
The Nonproliferation Efforts Post-1974.
There was considerable consternation after the
1974 Indian bomb test, which turned out to be a pivotal event in U.S. nonproliferation policy.12 It became
evident to all that a country with access to reprocessing, and thus plutonium, could easily produce nuclear
bombs. Once a country had ready access to nuclear
explosives—HEU and plutonium—IAEA inspections
(optimistically labeled “safeguards”) could no longer
be relied upon to provide warning of a shift to weapons. To prevent easy access to nuclear weapons there
needed to be restrictions on the technologies that produced these explosives—enrichment and reprocessing. At the initiative of the United States, the main
nuclear technology exporters formed the Nuclear
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Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975 to put some brakes on
such exports.
At first, the arrangement functioned sub rosa because on the face of it, it is at odds with the extravagant interpretation of the “inalienable right” language
in the NPT, and the United States and other exporters
shied away from taking on the argument. In fact, the
opposite is true. Only with some technological controls could the IAEA inspections provide the “safeguard” protection that the treaty requires.
In this post-Indian bomb phase, the United States
succeeded in preventing several reprocessing exports
from Europe to Asian countries. In 1976, former U.S.
President Gerald Ford announced that the United
States would abide by the same nonproliferation restrictions that it asked others to abide by. It would
not plan on the use of plutonium fuel and would not
conduct civilian reprocessing. The nuclear energy
community saw this, and still professes to see this, as
a limitation on the application of nuclear power. In
reality, reprocessing to produce plutonium fuel for
current nuclear power plants is grossly uneconomic.
Therefore, while avoiding wasteful expenditure was
not the prime intention, the restriction on reprocessing saved the United States and other countries a great
deal of money. To jump ahead, the same is true of restrictions on enrichment—these have hurt the vanity
of some countries, but not their pocketbooks, or their
carbon dioxide emissions. There were never any bars
to any NPT member country importing nuclear power reactors. Quite to the contrary, the suppliers beat
the drums for reactor sales. What held back nuclear
power, and still holds it back, was the inability of the
industry to turn out an economic product that met
safety requirements. The proposition that internation-
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al nonproliferation policies hobbled the development
of nuclear power is therefore entirely untenable.
India’s 1974 bomb had other delayed consequences. It became widely known that India produced the
plutonium for its bomb in facilities that, although not
internationally inspected, were covered by peaceful
use pledges to Canada and the United States. India
tried to explain this away by saying its bomb was
peaceful.13 It was too much for Congress to swallow. It
became an important impetus for passage of the 1978
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), which imposed nonproliferation conditions for nuclear exports,
among them that the importer accepts IAEA inspections on all its nuclear facilities.
HAS NONPROLIFERATION CAUSED
LOSS OF LIFE?
John Mueller makes the claim that nonproliferation
policy caused more deaths than the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki explosions, by which he is referring to the
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. He is right about the effect
of the 2003 invasion, but it would be a considerable
stretch to count the invasion in the nonproliferation
column. In an oft-cited 2003 Vanity Fair interview with
former U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, he cites eliminating “weapons of mass destruction
[WMD],” not as the real reason for the U.S. invasion,
but as the politically convenient reason.14 It was, as we
have learned, an outright lie that the Bush administration had significant evidence pointing to Iraqi nuclear
weapons.15 In any case, the invasion was named Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, which points in a different
direction—one relating to control of the Middle East.
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A related question is whether nonproliferationinspired Iraqi sanctions in the decade preceding the
2003 invasion resulted in the deaths of large numbers
of Iraqis, especially children. That there were many
deaths as a consequence does not seem to be at issue,
although there is not agreement on the numbers. In a
famous 1996 CBS interview, Lesley Stahl asked thenU.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright about the
effect of U.S. sanctions against Iraq: “We have heard
that a half million children have died. I mean, that’s
more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you
know, is the price worth it?” Madeleine Albright’s
chilling reply was “I think this is a very hard choice,
but the price—we think the price is worth it.”16 Again,
there is no denying the consequences. The question is
whether they had much to do with nonproliferation,
or were they simply part of an effort to hem in thenIraqi President Saddam Hussein.
Mueller raises the same point with respect to sanctions against North Korea. Here, if anything, the reasons for sanctions are even more complex than in the
case of Iraq, as is the relationship of the sanctions to the
misery of the non-privileged population.17 It should
be remembered that the initial reaction of the Clinton
administration to North Korea’s refusal in 1992 of key
IAEA inspections (and therefore of the NPT) was to
make the country an extraordinarily generous offer,
which after the conclusion of negotiations in 1994 was
known as the Agreed Framework. The North Koreans agreed to shut down their small plutonium production reactor and stop building two larger but still
relatively small reactors; the United States agreed to
shield them from their NPT violation by getting the
IAEA to agree to postpone the disputed inspections.
In the meantime North Korea would receive (from
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South Korea and Japan), two large light water reactors
worth about $5 billion. In addition, the North received
a large supply of oil. The deal did not make sense, and
fell apart when it became obvious that North Korea
was not keeping to its terms.18 However, the point for
our purposes here is that U.S. nonproliferation policy
in this instance could not have been more generous.
WHAT DOES CURRENT U.S.
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY REALLY
AMOUNT TO?
U.S. nonproliferation policy is far from the strict
system (let alone overly strict system) that it is made
out to be by the nuclear community in its frequent
complaints. There are two aspects to it: the first is the
broad effort conducted mainly at mid-levels in the
Department of State, working through the IAEA and
other agencies, and ostensibly based on the NPT; the
second, in many ways the more important, is conducted from the top and deals with Iran and, to a limited
extent, with North Korea.19
The broad international effort deliberately takes an
incremental and non-confrontational approach to the
problem—working to get others to agree to voluntary
improvements in the application of IAEA safeguards,
for example, or details of export procedures. The officials involved are the ones who go to the IAEA’s conferences and meet with corresponding representatives
from other supplier states. In practice, their activities
amount to nibbling at the issues; and even then, they
are subject to the condition that they not disturb the
promotion of nuclear power and especially the possibility of U.S. sales of nuclear power plants.
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In this, the Obama administration has outpaced the
footsteps of its predecessors. However, it is not widely
known that this administration has created a “Team
USA,” composed of officials from the Departments
of State, Energy, and Commerce, to promote nuclear
power abroad. In addition, there is a designated official on the National Security Council staff to shepherd
the effort. It’s no wonder that when Congress takes
up the nuclear export agreements with potential customers, the Department of State invariably testifies in
favor of laxer conditions.20
To maintain friendly and especially non-confrontational relations with potential customers, the Department of State has gone along with a watering down of
the NPT’s objectives by describing the treaty as resting
on three pillars, only one of which is nonproliferation.
The others are nuclear disarmament and, most importantly, the development of nuclear energy. Moreover,
it is said that progress on any of the three depends
on progress of the other two. In practical terms, it
means that the offices charged with trying to rein in
proliferation are therefore committed to supporting
the expanded worldwide use of nuclear energy, and
in doing so when we admittedly still do not have a
satisfactory way of ensuring that it will not be put to
military use.
The diplomats busy themselves with inoffensive
solutions, however impractical; the best example being fuel banks, which have become a standard “solution” to the problems posed by national enrichment
facilities. It is unlikely that top-level people understand that a fuel bank makes no economic or engineering sense at all, but it sounds good, and so has become
entrenched in nuclear proliferation boilerplate.21
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Another way in which nonproliferation has been
soft-pedaled is by the current shift in emphasis to
combating nuclear terrorism by nonstate actors as opposed to nuclear weapons development by established
states. The diplomatic aspects of combatting terrorism
are relatively easy—everyone is against it so one can
organize security summits in total agreement.22 That
agreement would be more difficult to obtain if we
were talking about the necessary restrictions on the
use of nuclear energy to keep it from spilling over into
military applications.
The dilution of the effort to stop the proliferation
of nuclear weapons is further effected by the nowstandard inclusion of it in the broader category of the
proliferation of WMDs, which include biological and
chemical weapons.23 Neither of the latter two is remotely as significant as nuclear weapons, but including them blurs the focus on nuclear weapons.
The second aspect of U.S. nonproliferation policy,
the one that the president and top officials do take
seriously, has to do with mainly constraining Iran’s
potential nuclear weapons capabilities. The enmity
between the United States and Iran goes back to the
1979 Islamic Revolution and the deposing of the Shah.
Iran’s nuclear program, and an interest in nuclear
weapons, also goes back to the time of the Shah.24 The
current U.S. concern about Iran’s nuclear capabilities has several elements. There is the obvious worry
about Iran’s intentions in developing uranium enrichment technology that could give it ready access to
large quantities of HEU, should it decide to develop
nuclear weapons. However, other countries have comparable capabilities without drawing the same level of
concern. It is difficult to justify—under the NPT, as it
has been interpreted for decades—a separate standard
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for Iran than that applied to other NPT members. The
concern over Iran’s nuclear capabilities is inextricably
tied to fear of the political shadow such capabilities,
even if not militarized, may cast over the Middle East
and the influence Iran may derive from it.
A clearer way to view what is going on in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program is to see it as a
struggle by the United States and Israel to maintain Israel’s nuclear weapons monopoly in the Middle East.
If anything sums up the major themes of U.S. nonproliferation policy, it would be protecting against the
possibility of nuclear terrorism and protecting Israel’s
nuclear weapons. The United States has gone so far as
to cooperate with Israel in physically sabotaging Iran’s
uranium enrichment activities.25 Which is more than a
little odd, as it puts the United States in cooperation
with a country that resists the NPT norm to enforce
NPT discipline on an NPT member suspected of harboring intentions at odds with its treaty obligations.
We never went this far before, but there is a long
history to U.S. protection for Israel’s putatively secret
nuclear weapons, a policy supported even by U.S. politicians who otherwise take a strong stand on nonproliferation. 26 The U.S. president still feigns ignorance
about Israel’s nuclear weapons, and the subject is offlimits even within the government, as it has been since
the Nixon administration. It is not off-limits in the rest
of the world and we pay heavily in terms of international credibility when it comes to nonproliferation.
In 2010, the NPT Review Conference unanimously approved a final statement and called for a conference
on WMDs in the Middle East, to take place in 2012.
Immediately after the vote, to which the U.S. representative agreed, President Obama trashed the notion
of such a conference. It has still not taken place. No
one is fooled.
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WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US?
Faced with a history of ineffective and hypocritical
nonproliferation policy, should we just let it all go? It
turns out there are things worse than fecklessness and
hypocrisy.27
The original, perhaps simplistic, logic behind nonproliferation was that as the number of nuclear weapons states increases, the number of strategic relationships among them increases much faster, and it will
become extremely difficult to keep the weapons from
being used. Henry Kissinger recently reiterated his
belief in the validity of this view:
If one imagines a world of tens of nations with nuclear
weapons and major powers trying to balance their
own deterrent equations, plus the deterrent equations
of the subsystems, deterrence calculation would become impossibly complicated. To assume that, in such
a world, nuclear catastrophe could be avoided would
be unrealistic.28

It would be nice to think that this paints an overly pessimistic picture that, faced with the potentially awful
consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons and
remembering the awfulness of the large wars fought
in the last century, people and leaders would keep
far away from any possibility of nuclear war. However, those views conflict with history. The horrors
of World War I did not prevent World War II from
happening 20 years later. The lessons of Vietnam did
not prevent our repeating the experience in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Wars and aggression are intertwined
with domestic politics, and politicians, no matter how
bright, have little time or inclination to understand the
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issues.29 That is even truer when there is a technical
component, or when the consequences are likely to
be delayed, a state of affairs that is ever-present when
dealing with nuclear issues. It is well to recall that former President Eisenhower’s Atom for Peace program
of the 1950s set much of the configuration of presentday nuclear programs around the world. Soon after he
announced it, former Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov
asked former U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
why the United States wanted to spread nuclear weapons capabilities through the program. Dulles had no
idea what Molotov was talking about, and when he
returned to Washington he asked his assistant Gerard
Smith to confirm that Molotov was talking nonsense.
Smith had to explain to the astonished Dulles that Molotov had a point. We should not assume that today’s
top-level politicians around the world are brighter or
wiser than their predecessors. Moreover, in crises all
bets are off.
Insofar as nuclear energy programs are concerned,
the only thing that makes sense from a security point
of view is to seek a healthy margin between nuclear
energy activities and any possible military applications, and to maintain as best we can the taboo on
nuclear weapon use. As tattered as it is, the NPT is
all that we have as a rallying banner. In the end, this
will work only if we all agree on common standards.
Holding back the spread of the bomb—and, in fact,
rolling back the bomb—remain important objectives.
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CHAPTER 5
THE NEXT NUCLEAR WAR
Matthew Kroenig and Rebecca Davis Gibbons1
Since the United States dropped atomic bombs on
Japan at the close of World War II, world leaders have
had the wisdom to avoid another nuclear war. Humanity witnessed the terrifyingly destructive power
of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and
vowed never to repeat the mistake. The Cold War
superpowers set up effective international systems
to control the spread of nuclear technology and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries. While there are a handful of states
that possess nuclear weapons today, none of them
are run by leaders who are so irrational or suicidal
as to intentionally launch a nuclear attack. Moreover,
these countries have put in place prudent policies and
technologies to prevent an accidental or unauthorized
nuclear launch. The upshot of these developments is
that nuclear weapons have not been used in 70 years
and we have little reason to fear that they will ever be
used again.
This line of thinking is certainly comforting, but
is it correct? The fact is that nuclear weapons and
international conflict continue to exist. The number
of nuclear-armed states has slowly grown over time
and, outside of the United States and Europe, nuclear powers are increasing the size and sophistication
of their nuclear arsenals, as well as their reliance on
nuclear weapons in military doctrine and strategy.
Indeed, recent years have seen an increase in overt
nuclear threats by some leaders. Political tensions
remain among nuclear powers and in many regions
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of the world, and these conflicts are becoming more
intense. In addition, poorly safeguarded nuclear material around the globe could find its way to extremist
organizations that could use nuclear weapons as an
instrument of terror. While the risk of nuclear war on
any given day is low, it is not zero. Moreover, this risk
must be multiplied across many nuclear-armed actors
and international conflicts for years to come. In sum,
there is a frighteningly real risk that humanity has not
witnessed its last nuclear war.
This article will examine the prospects for the next
nuclear war. It will begin by defining our key concept:
nuclear use. Next, it will review the first and only instance of nuclear use, the dropping of atomic bombs
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II, to assess whether the pathway to the first and only existing
case of nuclear use might be repeated. It then articulates the theoretical processes that could give rise to
nuclear war as identified in the international relations
and nuclear deterrence literatures. Next, in order to
identify the flashpoints that could result in the next
nuclear exchange, it examines the most salient geopolitical rivalries between nuclear-armed actors in
the world today. Finally, it offers concluding remarks
regarding the steps world leaders can take to prevent
future nuclear wars.
DEFINING NUCLEAR USE
We begin by defining a key term: nuclear use.
We define nuclear use as the detonation of a nuclear
weapon against an enemy target. Some Department
of Defense officials declare: “Nuclear weapons are
used every day,” to emphasize that nuclear weapons
play an important and enduring role in maintaining
strategic deterrence and keeping the peace.2 Simi138

larly, scholars have explored the deterrent, coercive,
and symbolic effects of nuclear weapons.3 We do not
mean nuclear use in this sense. We also exclude from
our definition nuclear tests or nuclear demonstration
shots that could be used for political effect, but that
do not result in death or destruction. Rather, for the
purposes of this chapter, nuclear use is defined as a
nuclear attack resulting in physical damage of enemy
targets.
NUCLEAR USE IN WORLD WAR II
When considering the next use of nuclear weapons, the most logical place to begin is the last and only
instance of nuclear use, the U.S. atomic bombing of Japan at the end of World War II. Understanding former
U.S. President Harry Truman’s decision to employ
nuclear weapons in warfare may shed some light on
why leaders might consider nuclear use in the future.
On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an
atomic bomb on Hiroshima; and, 3 days later, on August 9, a second weapon was used against Nagasaki.
More than 70 years after the event, historians continue to debate the motivations behind Truman’s decision.4 According to the traditional account, the United
States used nuclear weapons to quickly conclude the
war in the Pacific and save the lives of many American troops (and Japanese soldiers and civilians) that
would have been lost if Washington had pursued the
alternative route of a ground invasion of the Japanese
islands. According to a more recent revisionist view,
the nuclear weapons were not in fact necessary to
force a Japanese surrender because Tokyo was nearly
ready to capitulate and the Soviet Union’s impending
entrance into the Pacific War would have been more
than enough to force Japan to concede defeat.5 Rather,
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according to this perspective, Truman’s use of nuclear
weapons was aimed not at Tokyo, but at Moscow. By
using nuclear weapons, Truman was able to end the
war quickly enough to prevent Soviet forces from occupying large portions of East Asia, and to demonstrate America’s awesome new military capability to
its future Cold War rival.
Our purpose here is not to adjudicate between
these interpretations, nor to improve upon the existing debate, but rather to ask what this historical event
might tell us about future nuclear use. If Truman were
motivated to end a costly conventional war quickly,
as the traditional account would have us believe, then
there is reason to suspect that such processes could
reoccur. Desperate times call for desperate measures,
and it is conceivable that a nuclear-armed state could
be tempted to use nuclear weapons in a future attempt
to staunch the bloodletting from a drawn-out conventional conflict. Indeed, as we will see below, some
states in the world today actively plan to use nuclear
weapons early in warfare as a way to offset the conventional superiority of potential adversaries.
It is also possible that states will use nuclear
weapons in the future in order to demonstrate their
capabilities to potential adversaries. If Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were primarily about revealing a revolutionary new military capability, then this case is less
instructive as no adversary is likely to need that message again. After all, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, along
with the hundreds of nuclear tests that followed their
bombing, provided sufficient proof of concept. In this
way, the first nuclear use may have been idiosyncratic
because it was the first.
If, however, Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be interpreted as a warning shot to a potential future enemy
about possessing both the ability and the will to go
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nuclear, then it may be more relevant. It is possible
that future decisions to use nuclear weapons could
include a consideration of secondary and tertiary effects, such as demonstrating resolve to other states or
deterring or otherwise precluding other parties from
intervening in an ongoing conflict.
One must be cautious, however, about extrapolating from a single data point; this single episode, no
matter how important, cannot be the only input into
our study on the future of nuclear use. To broaden our
perspective, therefore, we next turn to theory.
THEORIES OF NUCLEAR USE
International relations scholars and nuclear deterrence theorists have identified several possible processes by which nuclear war could occur. The most
prominent of these scenarios are reviewed here, including: irrational nuclear use, accidental nuclear use,
inadvertent nuclear use, catalytic nuclear war, nuclear
use against non-nuclear opponents, splendid first
strike, use ‘em or lose ‘em, brinkmanship, and limited
nuclear use.
Irrational Nuclear Use.
The first potential cause of nuclear use is irrationality. In practice, irrational nuclear use means a leader is
using nuclear weapons in pursuit of goals that are so
vastly different from our own as to be utterly unrecognizable. Political scientists tend to assume that states
are unified rational actors that value their continued
existence above all else, but this is a simplifying assumption, not a description of the world in which we
actually live.6 Historically, there have been rare leaders who have been willing to destroy their own states
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in the pursuit of broader ideological goals, including
Adolf Hitler in World War II.7 One could similarly
imagine a leader of a nuclear-armed state on the losing end of a major war deciding that he has nothing
left to lose and voluntarily choosing to unleash the destructive force of nuclear weapons. For example, if the
North Korean regime were to collapse, might North
Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un decide to use
nuclear weapons, figuring that if he is going down he
might as well take everyone else with him?
Alternatively, it is at least conceivable that somewhere, someday, a leader could ascend to power with
religious, nationalist, racist, or some other extremist
worldview that causes him to value nuclear destruction over self-preservation. Iran’s clerical establishment, for example, contains a minority of individuals
who genuinely appear to hold millenarian religious
beliefs.8 If Iran acquires nuclear weapons and one of
these leaders comes to have his finger on the nuclear
trigger, it is at least imaginable that he might try to
launch an unprovoked nuclear attack in an attempt
to bring about an apocalypse. Granted, this type of
nuclear use may be the most far-fetched of those discussed in this chapter, but many international events,
including the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the recent
global financial crisis, were virtually unimaginable
until they happened.
Accidental Nuclear Use.
A second type of potential nuclear use can be
characterized as accidental or unintentional. In 1982,
the Department of Defense catalogued all previously
known nuclear accidents from the 1950s to the 1980s.9
The list included the 1982 Titan II crisis in which a
dropped wrench socket in a nuclear missile silo nearly
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caused a nuclear explosion, and a number of cases in
which aircraft carrying nuclear weapons crashed or
dropped nuclear weapons into the ocean but that fortunately failed to detonate.10
Scott Sagan, in his book The Limits of Safety, catalogs
a number of near nuclear accidents during the Cold
War period, including a 1966 midair collision between
a B-52 bomber and a KC-135 tanker that led to the release of four hydrogen bombs near Palomares, Spain.11
In 1968, a B-52 bomber on airborne alert caught fire
over Greenland near a U.S. early warning site, causing four one-megaton thermonuclear bombs to hurtle
toward the ground.12 The current era is not immune
from nuclear accidents either, as evident from the 2007
incident in which nuclear weapons were accidentally
and unknowingly transported from Minot Air Force
Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in
Louisiana.13 Other nuclear weapons states have also
had their share of incidents,14 and newer nuclear
weapons states may be even more prone to accidents,
especially as they strive to develop stable command
and control structures.15 In none of these cases did the
nuclear warhead detonate; however, we might not be
so lucky next time.
Inadvertent Nuclear Use.
An inadvertent nuclear use would occur if a nuclear-capable state decided to launch a nuclear war under the incorrect belief that it is already under nuclear
attack.16 Thomas Schelling provides perhaps the most
sophisticated theoretical discussion of inadvertent
nuclear war in his discussion of “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.”17 Schelling argues that when two nuclear adversaries face each other in crisis, each side may
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rightly worry that the other side is considering nuclear
attack. If there is an advantage to striking first, then,
in these difficult circumstances under intense time
pressures, a cycle of fear could lead to nuclear war. As
Schelling writes, “Fear that the other may be about to
strike in the mistaken belief that we are about to strike
gives us a motive for striking, and so justifies the other’s
motive.”18
In the Limits of Safety, Sagan provides several examples of near-inadvertent nuclear war during the
Cuban Missile Crisis. In one episode, an intruder—
later identified as a bear—led to the sounding of a
“sabotage alarm,” which set off similar alarms at all
the bases in the area. At one base, an incorrectly wired
alarm sent pilots of nuclear-armed fighter aircraft to
prepare for takeoff before a car raced down the runway
to stop them.19 Also during the crisis, Vandenberg Air
Force Base conducted a regularly scheduled ballistic
missile test that the Soviet Union might have reasonably misread as a nuclear missile launch.20 Finally, at
the end of the crisis, Moorestown, New Jersey radar
operators alerted North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) that an incoming missile attack
was underway when a training tape simulating an
attack was mistakenly run in their system.21
Inadvertent nuclear war nearly occurred again in
the 1983 Able Archer incident, in which a very realistic
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military
exercise during a period of tension led the Soviets to
worry that the training operation was a cover for war
preparations. The Soviets put their own nuclear forces
on alert in response.22 A similar scare occurred in the
post-Cold War era in January 1995 when a U.S.-Norwegian weather balloon was launched from Norway
to study the Aurora Borealis. A Russian early warn-
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ing radar detected this object, leading former Russian
President Boris Yeltsin to activate his “nuclear keys”
for the first time. Eventually radars detected that the
balloon was going out to sea and Russian forces stood
down.23 Given the frequency with which countries
have feared themselves to be under nuclear attack in
the past, it will likely continue to happen in the future, and it is always possible that at least one of them
could lead to a nuclear response.
Catalytic Nuclear War.
During the early Cold War era, strategists theorized about the possibility of “catalytic nuclear war.”
They imagined that the United States could be attacked
with nuclear weapons, and that U.S. leaders would
assume, quite reasonably, that the Soviet Union had
been responsible for the attack and decide to strike
back. Both states would have been vastly weakened
after absorbing the nuclear exchange, but what if it
had not been the Soviets, but the Chinese who had initially attacked the United States? In the aftermath, the
Chinese could emerge as the preeminent power. One
party initiates the attack, but the attack is attributed
to another party and the secret attacking state comes
out of the conflict more powerful than the two victimstates.24 Given today’s more advanced intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, a
secret attack scenario may seem less plausible, but it
is at least imaginable that a third party could begin a
crisis that would bring other states to nuclear conflict.
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Nuclear Use Against a Non-Nuclear Opponent.
In an ongoing crisis or conflict with a non-nuclear
state, a nuclear-capable state may be tempted to use
nuclear weapons. Nuclear use could be attractive in
this situation because there would be no danger of
nuclear retaliation from the targeted state, although
such use could have other ill effects, including international opprobrium.
The only case of nuclear use, against Japan during World War II, illustrates this type of use. Nuclear
attacks against non-nuclear states have also been considered on at least a few other occasions. Reportedly,
the French briefly contemplated nuclear use against
the Vietnamese in the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu
during the First Indochina War.25 Almost 2 decades
later in the same country, former U.S. President Richard Nixon mentioned the possibility of using a nuclear
weapon to then U.S. National Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger, saying “I’d rather use the nuclear bomb.”
Kissinger responded that nuclear use would be “too
much,” to which Nixon responded, “The nuclear
bomb. Does that bother you?” He went on to say, “I
just want you to think big.”26
Thus far, leaders from nuclear-capable states have
appeared to agree with Kissinger that nuclear use
against non-nuclear weapons states is “too much.”
However, two points are important to note. First,
the conflicts in which nuclear states have forgone
nuclear use against non-nuclear states—in addition to
the above conflicts, one could add China in the Korean War, the Falklands War, and the first and second
Gulf Wars—were not existential threats to the nuclear
states. In future conflicts with greater stakes, nuclear
weapons states may be more likely to consider nuclear

146

use. Second, there is also the possibility of nuclear use
against a non-nuclear state brandishing chemical and
biological weapons (CBWs). The unique physical and
psychological damage caused by these unconventional weapons have caused leaders to consider nuclear
weapons as a potentially appropriate response and
a stronger means of deterrence than conventional
threats. During the 1991 Gulf War, the administration
of then U.S. President George H. W. Bush attempted
to threaten nuclear use to deter Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from using chemical weapons against
U.S. soldiers.27 Similarly, during the 2003 Iraq War, officials from the George W. Bush administration again
made veiled threats of nuclear use by claiming no options were off the table to deter Iraqi use of CBWs.28
Bush administration officials later said they would
not have used nuclear weapons, but they must have
thought use was credible enough to issue the threat.
Today U.S. nuclear doctrine continues to leave
open the possibility of nuclear use in response to unconventional attacks. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
states, “there remains a narrow range of contingencies
in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role
in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the
United States or its allies and partners.”29 Similarly,
the 2010 Russian nuclear doctrine reserves the option
“to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass
destruction [WMD] against it and (or) its allies.”30
Finally, there are those who argue that nuclear
weapons should be considered in cases of cyberattack.
In January 2013, the Department of Defense, Defense
Science Board issued a report arguing that the United
States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons in
response to major cyberattacks, and Washington has
not yet ruled out any such use in official doctrine.31
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Splendid First Strike.
A sixth potential use of nuclear weapons is the
so-called “splendid first strike.” The purpose of this
type of nuclear use is to destroy all of an adversary’s
nuclear weapons in a single nuclear campaign, leaving the adversary unable to strike back with nuclear
weapons.
No state has ever attempted a nuclear first strike,
but such strikes have been considered. Early in the
Cold War, it was plausible for the United States, with
its head start in the nuclear arms race, to consider a
splendid first strike against the Soviet Union. In April
1950, the U.S. National Security Council rejected preventive war on the nascent Soviet arsenal “on strategic
and moral grounds.”32 Although the decision document, NSC-68, did allow for a pre-emptive strike if the
United States were under imminent attack from the
Soviet Union.33 During the administration of former
U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, military planners
explored a preventive war option, with a Joint Chiefs
of Staff Advance Study Group recommending the
United States consider starting a war with the Soviets
before their nuclear forces became “a real menace.”34
Other military leaders disagreed, in effect calling such
an attack un-American, and this option was ruled out
by December 1954.35 Both the United States and the
Soviets considered a nuclear first strike against China
in the 1960s.36
As the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal developed
over time, Washington began to worry that its nuclear
forces might themselves be vulnerable to a splendid
first strike. RAND Corporation analyst Albert Wohlstetter argued that the balance of terror might be more
“delicate” than previously believed and, as a result,
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the U.S. military dispersed its air bases and took other
measures to ensure nuclear survivability.37
Carrying out a nuclear first strike would entail
great risk. If the strike failed to destroy every single
nuclear weapon of the adversary, then the attacker
would risk devastating nuclear retaliation in response.
Even Herman Kahn, author of On Thermonuclear War,
argued that “for . . . practical reasons alone, not to
speak of vitally important moral and political ones,
the notion of having a Splendid First Strike Capability seems fanciful.”38 This type of nuclear use would
be most plausible, therefore, against a target state that
possessed relatively few weapons at known locations.
Though there are no historical examples of a splendid first strike using nuclear weapons, the strategic
logic underpinning this type of attack, to wipe out an
adversary’s nuclear capability in one strike to prevent
one’s own state from being targeted in the future, has
been pursued by states using conventional weapons.
In destroying Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, for
example, Israel attempted to take out Iraq’s developing nuclear capability, striking before it had a more
developed weapons program. Israel took similar action when bombing the Syrian al-Kibar reactor in
September 2007. If a country were further along in a
nuclear weapons program and conventional weapons
were insufficient to destroy an enemy nuclear program, it is conceivable that leaders would consider
nuclear weapons appropriate for the task for the same
underlying reasons.
Use ‘Em or Lose ‘Em.
In a crisis situation involving two nuclear-armed
states, each may fear their nuclear weapons will
be vulnerable to attack by their adversary and thus
149

decide to use them before they are wiped out. Pressure
to “use ‘em or lose ‘em” in a crisis might be heightened
if a country possesses a nuclear arsenal that is vulnerable to a splendid first strike or if the adversary’s nuclear posture favors the offense. For example, during
the Cold War, each side maintained ballistic missiles
with relatively accurate multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). With this capability, a
single missile could target and destroy a number of
the adversary’s nuclear weapons. Even if not all of the
targeted state’s missiles were destroyed, it would be
left at great numerical disadvantage vis-à-vis the attacking state. This condition meant each side felt immense pressure to launch its missiles first in the event
of conflict, leading to the development of “launch on
warning” postures in which weapons already on alert
could be quickly deployed if an incoming attack were
detected. In this situation, it might be more reasonable
for a leader to simply back down rather than initiate a
nuclear war from such a disadvantaged position, but
it is possible that a future leader would prefer to use
them than lose them.
Nuclear Brinksmanship.
Many scholars and practitioners incorrectly believe that nuclear use is impossible, or at the very least
irrational, once one’s adversary possesses a secure
second-strike capability. If an adversary has the ability to absorb a nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack, then one can no longer hope
to conduct a splendid first strike and any nuclear use
could result in unacceptable retaliation. Meanwhile,
states would not feel the same use ‘em or lose ‘em
pressures, because they would understand that they
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could ride out a nuclear attack and still hit back with
force. Since both sides understand these facts, a situation of restraint arises due to the condition of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Yet, nuclear deterrence theorists have identified several rational uses of
nuclear weapons even in a condition of MAD.
Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational
means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed
opponents.39 He argued that leaders cannot credibly
threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war,
but they can make a “threat that leaves something to
chance.”40 They can engage in a process, a nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down.
As states escalate a nuclear crisis, there is an increasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear
exchange. As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase in the risk
of nuclear war, threats to escalate nuclear crises are
inherently credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest
risk of nuclear war before backing down will win the
crisis as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for
this reason that Schelling called great power politics
in the nuclear era a “competition in risk taking.”41
This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the
risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching
decisions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit
the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an
important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Alternatively, they can escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear
exchange.
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On brinksmanship, former U.S. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles stated, “The ability to get to the
verge without getting into the war is the necessary art
. . . . If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to
go to the brink, you are lost.”42 The bipolar Cold War
conflict provides several examples of nuclear brinksmanship, with the Cuban Missile Crisis as the most
notable. Former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
initially raised the stakes by placing nuclear weapons
in Cuba, gravely threatening the U.S. homeland and
meddling within the U.S. sphere of influence. In response, then U.S. President John F. Kennedy escalated
by placing a blockade around the island so Soviet ships
could not deliver additional missiles. In the end, the
Soviet Union withdrew its missiles from Cuba, but not
before the risk of nuclear war was raised to, in President Kennedy’s mind, “between 1 in 3 and even.”43
Other historical examples of brinkmanship include
Moscow’s threats against the British and the French
during the 1956 Suez Crisis, Moscow’s threats to attack China during the Sino-Soviet border war in 1969,
former President Nixon’s nuclear alerts in 1969 and
1973, and finally, Indian and Pakistani threats and
nuclear weapons movements during the 1999 Kargil
Crisis.44 Looking to the future, as long as rivalries continue and as long as leaders are willing to initiate and
escalate high-stakes crises in search of their geopolitical goals, the risk of war through nuclear brinkmanship will remain with us.
Limited Nuclear War.
During the course of the Cold War, nuclear strategists considered an alternative to all-out nuclear war
between the two superpowers: limited nuclear war.45
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This is conflict “in which each side exercises restraint
in the use of nuclear weapons, employing only a limited number of weapons on selected targets.”46 By
launching a single nuclear weapon against a small city
or an isolated military base, for example, a nucleararmed state could signal its willingness to escalate a
crisis, while leaving its adversary with enough left to
lose to deter the adversary from launching a full-scale
nuclear response.
U.S. proponents of limited nuclear war included
Henry Kissinger and Robert Osgood.47 In his 1957 book
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Kissinger argued
that the United States should be prepared for alternatives to “all-out” nuclear war, especially in peripheral
conflicts.48 Limited nuclear war, he argues, cannot be
“improvised” during the course of conflict, but it has
“its own appropriate tactics . . . with limitations as to
targets, areas and the size of weapons used.”49 Most
importantly, limited nuclear war requires communicating to adversaries in advance the understandings
of limited war, otherwise “miscalculations and misinterpretations” of intentions “may cause the war to
become all-out even if both sides intend to limit it.”50
In the current era, there are a number of conflicts
in which adversaries could engage in limited nuclear
war. Because arsenal sizes vary, the defining feature
of this type of nuclear war is not that it seeks to avoid
all-out nuclear exchange, but that nuclear weapons
are employed with some level of restraint, to avoid
the widespread use of nuclear weapons on both sides.
History provides examples of states planning to
deploy nuclear weapons in a limited way to achieve
limited aims. During the early Cold War when the
United States was conventionally inferior to the Soviet Union, U.S. leaders felt they had no choice but
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to go nuclear to stop Soviets from overrunning Europe. This is similar to France’s approach to nuclear
strategy during the Cold War. Vastly overmatched by
Moscow, the French plan was also to resort to launching nuclear weapons as soon as conventional fighting
began.51 Similarly, at present, America’s conventionally inferior adversaries have incentives to use nuclear
weapons early in a crisis in an attempt to deter further
escalation and ensure their own survival.52
IDENTIFYING THE NEXT NUCLEAR WAR
Having reviewed the various pathways that could
produce nuclear war in theory, we turn to the empirics
to examine the countries with the capabilities and political conflicts that could conceivably produce the
next nuclear war. Nine states currently possess nuclear weapons, and a tenth, Iran, appears to be seeking at
least a latent nuclear capability. Although nuclear use
by any one state appears unlikely, there are a number
of potential conflicts involving nuclear-armed states
that could lead to nuclear use. In addition to states, a
handful of terrorist organizations have expressed the
desire to employ nuclear weapons. The following section examines the nuclear capabilities and doctrines of
these actors and the geopolitical conflicts that could
escalate into nuclear use in the future. Indeed, certain trends in nuclear force modernization, doctrine,
and regional enmities suggest nuclear use may have
become more, not less, likely in the coming years.
Russia, the United States, and NATO.
Under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(New START), the United States and Russia agreed
to limit their arsenals to 1,550 deployed nuclear war154

heads and 800 total delivery platforms by 2018. The
United States maintains a nuclear triad, with nuclear
warheads delivered by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), and bomber aircraft, and is in the early planning stages for modernizing each of these platforms.
In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, Washington vowed
not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear states in good standing with the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and their nonproliferation commitments.53 For states not covered by this
negative security assurance, U.S. leaders may consider
nuclear weapons for deterring nuclear, conventional,
biological, or even cyberattacks. The report concludes
that the United States “would only consider the use of
nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend
the vital interests of the United States or its allies and
partners.”54
Russia also maintains a nuclear triad, including
ICBMs (some of which are road-mobile), SLBMs, and
bombers, and it too is modernizing all of its delivery
systems. Russia is in the process of equipping more
of its ICBMs with MIRVs, a move that many consider
destabilizing, especially in relation to the de-MIRVed
U.S. ICBM force.55 In addition, Russia is working on
new ICBMs, including a heavy ICBM with as many
as ten warheads to replace the retiring SS-18.56 Russia is reportedly developing a new rail-mobile system,
the “Barguzin,” that will allow it to very quickly move
nuclear weapons around its vast territory.57 Russia is
also developing a new stealth long-range bomber, with
production to begin in 2020. Moscow is also modernizing the sea leg with plans for eight new Borei-class
submarines armed with 16 Bulava missiles, containing
six warheads each.58 In addition to the strategic force,
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Russia is estimated to maintain between 1,000 and
6,000 tactical or nonstrategic weapons in its arsenal.59
Unlike the United States, which has sought to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons since the end of
the Cold War, Russia has developed a greater role for
these weapons in the past decade. This change has
stemmed primarily from an imbalance in conventional capabilities vis-à-vis the United States. In the postCold War period, Russia’s conventional forces have
been vastly inferior to Western capabilities and they
lowered their doctrinal threshold for nuclear use in an
attempt to offset this weakness. In the 1990s, Russia
stated that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons was
deterrence of large-scale attacks that threaten the state
existentially, but by 2000, Russia reserved:
the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use
of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response
to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the
Russian Federation.60

The 2010 doctrine moderated this statement somewhat, but it is clear that nuclear weapons remain central to Russian strategy as military thinkers in Russia
argue that in the course of a large conventional conflict, nuclear weapons could be utilized as a means
of “de-escalation.” Moreover, since 1999, nuclear
weapons have featured prominently in Russian military exercises; and, in March 2014, Russia performed
a large-scale nuclear exercise that was presided over
by Russian President Vladimir Putin himself.61 Russian leaders engaged in outright nuclear saber-rattling
over the crisis in Ukraine, beginning in 2014; and even
threatened Denmark that it would become a target of
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Russian nuclear missiles if it hosted part of NATO’s
missile defense system.62
As the successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia
has a long history of conflict with the United States and
the countries of NATO. For 40 years, these two powers
teetered on the brink of nuclear war, especially during
periods of high tension, including the Korean War, the
1956 Suez Crisis, the 1961 Berlin Crisis, and the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis. Though the ideological struggle
between the United States and the Soviet Union ended
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, tensions between these two states remain. Nationalism
has grown in recent years with Russian strongman
Vladimir Putin declaring in 2005 that the dissolution
of the Soviet Union was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century.63 As of this writing,
reports indicate that Russia maintains thousands of
troops inside eastern Ukraine, with thousands more
on the border. NATO is planning a number of military
exercises with allies on the Russian periphery, including the March 2015 exercise in the Black Sea with Romania and upcoming military drills with Bulgaria.64
Indeed, the most likely flashpoint for U.S./NATO
and Russian conflict today is in Russia’s periphery.
The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the current crisis over Ukraine highlight the persistent tension between Russia and the West over NATO expansion—and what Russia perceives as encroachment
into its traditional sphere of influence. In addition to
Georgia and Ukraine, one can imagine future conflict
between Russia and NATO members such as Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, where Russia retains
historical and cultural interest and may find reason
for interference. If Russia were to use force against a
NATO country, Washington would be obligated by
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the NATO charter to come to its ally’s defense. Moreover, a Russian and NATO conflict in Europe would
take place under the shadow of nuclear war.
China and the United States.
Chinese military capabilities, including its nuclear
arsenal, are smaller and less effective than those of
the United States; but China is in the midst of a 3-decade process of translating its economic prowess into
vast military power. By some calculations, its military
budget is now almost $200 billion, second only to the
United States.65 The Chinese have traditionally been
comfortable with a nuclear posture that has been described as a minimal deterrent, but the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 2005 Science of Military Strategy
calls for the development of a “lean and effective”
arsenal, with many Western analysts noting that the
emphasis is on the “effective.”66 Current estimates indicate China has approximately 250 warheads in its
stockpile, and this number is expected to expand.67
Approximately 60 of these weapons are on missiles capable of reaching the continental United States.68 The
2013 Department of Defense report to Congress on
Chinese military capabilities recounts continued Chinese investments in ballistic missiles, cruise missiles,
counter-space weapons, and “military cyberspace capabilities that appear designed to enable anti-access/
area-denial (A2/AD) missions.”69 In recent years, the
PLA Rocket Force, in control of Chinese conventional
and nuclear ballistic missiles, has added two types of
road-mobile ballistic missiles to its arsenal, and one
of these modifications can reach most locations in the
United States. The 2013 report also speculated that the
PLA Rocket Force might be developing a MIRV capa-
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bility for a new road-mobile ICBM. MIRVs, maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs), anti-satellite capabilities, and penetration aids are all being developed
to overcome U.S. ballistic missile defenses.70 In addition, China has built an “underground great wall,” a
3,000-mile tunnel network in which to house and protect its mobile nuclear missiles. The Chinese Navy is
developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent, with three
Jin-class submarines in testing and as many as five in
development. These submarines will eventually carry
SLBMs. The Chinese also have bombers capable of
delivering nuclear weapons.
If a crisis in the region were to grow into a larger
conflict, what does Chinese nuclear doctrine suggest
about its willingness to use nuclear weapons? Since
detonating its first nuclear weapon in 1964, China has
persistently claimed to follow a “no first use policy,”
although its doctrine carves out space for exceptions.
For example, the 2005 Science of Military Strategy document declared that China would only use nuclear
weapons in response to a strategic attack, but that a
strategic attack would not necessarily involve nuclear
weapons and could even be political or psychological
in nature.71 Moreover, China’s conventional inferiority when faced with an adversary like the United States
may cause its leaders to consider escalation to nuclear
weapons in a future conflict short of a “strategic attack,” just like many of the conventionally inferior
nuclear-capable states discussed above. For the first
time, China’s 2013 White Paper did not explicitly state
China’s “no first use policy,” leading some to speculate that concern with U.S. conventional capabilities
may merit the option of using nuclear weapons first.72
In the past, Taiwan has been the assumed flashpoint
for potential U.S.-China conflict.73 The United States
maintains a commitment to support Taiwan through
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the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and has sold Taiwan
advanced weaponry. Meanwhile, China’s military
modernization has focused on regional contingencies,
including a Taiwan scenario. The United States and
China engaged in an intense crisis over the island in
1995 and 1996, when the Chinese government test fired
missiles near Taiwan in reaction to political developments on the island and a Taiwanese presidential visit
to the United States. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton responded by sending two carrier battle groups
to the South China Sea in a visible show of American
military support for Taiwan. Relations between China
and Taiwan have improved since 2008, but elections
in 2016 brought a more nationalistic government to
power in Taiwan and renewed tensions.
More recently, other regional disputes have taken
center stage as China’s growing power has led it to
assert a sphere of influence that overlaps with areas
claimed by U.S. allies and partners, as well as seas in
which the U.S. Navy has long sailed uncontested. China has ongoing disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, and with Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines over
islands in the South China Sea. The geography of the
region creates many opportunities for miscalculation.
Chinese naval ships pass within sight of Japan when
heading to the Pacific Ocean. Fishing and shipping
vessels regularly end up in disputed territory. Seemingly small incidents at sea could lead to crisis, which
if not managed well, could lead to broader conflict.
In May 2014, Japan reported that two Chinese fighter
jets had flown dangerously close to its reconnaissance
planes in two separate incidents in airspace both states
claim. China appears to be literally testing the waters
(and the skies) to illustrate its growing strength in the
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region, behavior that has high risk of resulting in a
clash.
Recent Chinese military exercises also demonstrate that Beijing is preparing for hostilities beyond
a Taiwan scenario. In Mission Action 2013, Chinese
forces simulated an invasion of the Senkaku Islands.
After tracking the exercise, the chief of intelligence of
the U.S. Pacific Fleet stated:
[We] concluded that the PLA has been given the new
task to be able to conduct a short sharp war to destroy
Japanese forces in the East China Sea following with
what can only be expected as a seizure of the Senkakus
or even a southern Ryukyu [islands].74

Chinese exercises also demonstrate China’s desire
to break out of its geographic confines and become
a blue water naval power. In a winter 2013 exercise
called Maneuver 5, Chinese forces successfully fought
through the “first island chain” into the Pacific Ocean.75
Unlike the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the United
States and China do not enjoy a history of interaction that promotes stability. Each side may only be
able to learn lessons about the other’s crisis signaling,
redlines, and crisis communications through dangerous experience. For example, the United States and
China do not have a Cold War-style hotline set up
between their highest leadership to mitigate the risk
that misperceptions could lead to war (a line between
the Department of Defense and Chinese Defense Ministry has not yet been tested in a period of tension).
China is notable for its lack of transparency, especially
in the nuclear realm. This position is understandable
for a power which maintains fewer nuclear weapons
than potential adversaries, but it does mean misunderstandings or miscalculations might be even more
likely.
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Russia and China.
A final great power dyad in which nuclear war
is possible is Russia and China. Both have large and
sophisticated nuclear arsenals, although, as described
above, Russia maintains a clear nuclear superiority.
However, China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities are growing and its two million-member army is
of concern to Moscow.
The two powers have clashed over their 2,700-mile
border throughout the decades and in 1969, during
the Sino-Soviet Border War, the Soviet Union issued
explicit nuclear threats against China. In the 1990s and
2000s, the countries agreed to officially end the border
disputes and there have even been subsequent signs
of cooperation. Yet, despite some shared interests due
in part to a shared perception of threat from Washington and its allies, Russia is watching China’s rise
and military modernization warily. Indeed, Moscow
is changing its nuclear posture in response to developments in Beijing. Over the past several years, Moscow
has been cheating on the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty by developing a land-based nuclear missile in the banned 300-3,400 mile range, and
Russian officials are quite clear that the nuclear forces are a necessary response to Chinese intermediate
range nuclear forces. While it is hard to conceive of a
direct military struggle between these two powers in
the near term, the rise of China will continue to pose
an increasing threat to Russia. It is likely that relations
between these two great powers will ebb and flow
over time, and if and when they worsen to the point of
another direct military confrontation, nuclear weapons will be present.
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North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and
the United States.
Over the past decade, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has demonstrated its growing
nuclear and missile capabilities. It is currently estimated to possess enough fissile material for between
13 and 30 nuclear warheads.76 It is unclear, however,
whether Pyongyang has yet developed the capability to miniaturize weapons for delivery on missiles.
North Korea has developed short and medium-range
weapons that can reach South Korea and Japan, but
has not yet successfully test launched an intercontinental-range missile.
Relations between Pyongyang and its neighbors
are openly hostile. North and South Korea have technically been in an armistice since 1953 when fighting
in the Korean War ended. Both states claim the right
to the entire peninsula and they have had tense relations since the end of the war that have occasionally
included direct military attacks. At present, Japan and
North Korea do not maintain official diplomatic relations. They also have a long history of ill will stemming from the Japanese occupation of Korea in the
early part of the 20th century and the kidnapping of
Japanese citizens by North Korea in the 1970s and
1980s.
In recent years, Pyongyang has taken provocative
action against both South Korea and Japan, such as
shelling South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in 2010,
sinking a South Korean warship in 2010, and testfiring missiles into the Sea of Japan. In January 2014,
DPRK leadership threatened nuclear war in the run
up to Republic of Korea-U.S. military exercises, com-
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plaining that these joint exercises are preparation for
an invasion of North Korea.77
The situation in North Korea is especially volatile
because Kim Jong-un has already demonstrated willingness to take drastic action to solidify his position
and remain in power. Moreover, due to similar domestic pressures, he may have incentives to create a
crisis in which nuclear use becomes possible.
If North Korea’s erratic behavior continues or escalates, there is a potential for the United States to
become involved in a conflict based on its treaty commitments to South Korea and Japan. Since they face
nuclear adversaries, U.S. reassurance tends to include
a heavy emphasis on nuclear capabilities. In the spring
of 2013, for example, the United States flew two nuclear-capable B-2s over the Peninsula to threaten the
North and reassure the South.
North Korea does not publicize an official nuclear
doctrine, although its rhetoric has been bellicose and
has included explicit nuclear threats against the United States and South Korea in the recent past. If Kim
Jong-un enters into an open conflict with the vastly
superior United States, he may have incentive to use
nuclear weapons in an attempt to bring a rapid halt
to the conflict and to preserve his life and his regime.
With such a small and vulnerable arsenal, Kim might
also feel “use ‘em or lose ‘em” pressure, encouraging
him to go nuclear early in a conflict. If Pyongyang
were to use nuclear weapons, some analysts assume
DPRK would employ a countervalue strategy, aiming
its weapons at cities in neighboring South Korea or
Japan.
If U.S. reassurances prove insufficient, it is always
possible that Japan or South Korea could decide to
build independent nuclear deterrent forces. Japan has
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considered and then rejected nuclear weapons three
times in the nuclear age, and to this day possesses
what is essentially a latent nuclear weapons capability. Due to its well-known “nuclear allergy,” nuclear
proliferation in Japan seems unlikely in the near-term,
but it remains possible. In South Korea, recent polling
indicates that two-thirds of citizens support developing nuclear weapons.78 South Korea has also been actively seeking indigenous reprocessing technology for
peaceful purposes, but that could help Seoul develop
a weapons capability at some point in the future. If
Japan and South Korea join the United States, China,
and North Korea as nuclear powers, East Asia would
become a poly-nuclear region, rife with geopolitical
tensions and rivalries that would be ripe for the next
nuclear conflict.
India and Pakistan.
If asked where a nuclear exchange is most likely
today, many analysts would select the Indian subcontinent. The longstanding rivalry between these two
nuclear-capable states has involved numerous crises.
They have an ongoing territorial dispute over Kashmir, an active arms race, and the instability generated
by a conventionally inferior and revisionist Pakistan
armed with nuclear weapons.
The two nuclear powers are currently engaged in
a nuclear arms race. Pakistan has the world’s fastest
growing nuclear arsenal.79 Currently it is estimated to
have 110 weapons, while making enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for 10-15 weapons per year.80
In addition, Pakistan has a growing plutonium production capability, with China agreeing to provide
as many as three new reactors.81 Its delivery vehicles
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include aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles.82
Pakistan recently added a maneuverable, short-range,
sub-kiloton battlefield nuclear missile to its arsenal,
the Hatf IX or Nasr, allowing it to quickly use nuclear
weapons against an advancing Indian army (and just
as worrisome, the mobility of these missiles raises
concerns about secure military custody of the weapons).83 Pakistan does not publish a formal nuclear doctrine, though its leaders have declared that its nuclear
weapons exist to deter India.
India has approximately 100 warheads in its arsenal and is in the process of developing a nuclear triad.
India possesses nuclear-capable aircraft, nuclear-capable missiles that cover both short and long ranges,
and is currently developing ICBMs as well as submarine-launched missiles. India has a long-held policy
of the “no first use” of nuclear weapons. The party of
the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has vowed
to “revise and update” India’s nuclear doctrine, writing that “the strategic gains acquired by India during
the Atal Bihari Vajpayee regime on the nuclear programme have been frittered away by the Congress.”84
Thus it is possible that the doctrine will be altered
both in response to Pakistan’s nuclear development
and recent changes in China’s doctrine.
The two states have been in conflict since their
founding and violent partition in 1948. They fought
wars in 1965 over Kashmir and in 1971 when East
Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh.
In May 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests and
within weeks, Pakistan responded with six tests of its
own. The most dangerous period in the nuclear era
occurred a year later in 1999, when Pakistani forces
crossed the Line of Control in Kashmir and occupied
part of the Kargil district, resulting in an Indian coun-
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terattack and worldwide fears of nuclear war. A 2001
terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi
and another terrorist attack in Mumbai in 2008 also
flamed tension between the nuclear adversaries and
raised the specter of nuclear conflict.
A terrorist attack or small conflict on the border
between the two states could quickly escalate to the
nuclear level. In 2004, India developed the “Cold
Start” military doctrine, a plan to mobilize conventional forces on the Pakistani border within 48 hours
of receiving orders. The goal of the plan is to overwhelm Pakistan quickly with limited territorial aims
before international actors can intervene. Because of
its conventional inferiority, however, analysts assume
Pakistan would resort to nuclear weapons early in a
large-scale conventional war. Its recent development
of battlefield nuclear weapons indicates a lowering of
the threshold for nuclear use. Indeed, former Pakistani
Ambassador to the United States Maleeha Lodhi has
argued that Pakistan needed to develop these tactical
weapons “to counterbalance India’s move to bring
conventional military offensives to a tactical level,”
suggesting these weapons are to be deployed against
advancing Indian troops. Once nuclear weapons are
used, however, even if only tactical, it might be difficult to control the escalation.
Iran, Israel, and the United States.
Israel is estimated to possess approximately 75
to 200 nuclear weapons.85 It has advanced missile
capabilities with its Jericho ballistic missile, nuclearcapable aircraft, and may deploy cruise missiles with
nuclear warheads on its Dolphin-class submarines,
possibly providing it with a second strike capability.86
Because of its policy of nuclear opacity (animut) and
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its promise not “to be the first country to introduce
nuclear weapons in the Middle East,”87 we know little
about Israel’s nuclear doctrine.
Iran's nuclear program is at least temporarily halted
under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action struck
with the international community in 2015.88 But if the
limits in this deal were contravened for any reason, it
is possible that Iran could still join the nuclear club. If
Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it is also possible that
other states in the region, including Turkey, Egypt, or
Saudi Arabia could attempt to acquire nuclear weapons in response.89 While fears of a rapid and complete
nuclear cascade in the region are probably overblown,
it is possible, if not likely, that one or two additional
states would join the nuclear club within the course of
several decades if Iran goes nuclear.90
The nuclear balance of power between Iran and its
neighbors could be highly unstable and would likely
lack many of the safeguards that existed between the
superpowers during the Cold War, including: the absence of a direct line of communication between Iran
and its rivals, short timelines for nuclear-armed missiles to travel between states, the lack of secure second-strike capabilities (at least initially), and in Israel,
a lack of strategic depth and a strategic culture that
emphasizes preemption.
Iran and Israel have viewed each other as strategic
competitors since the Iranian Revolution in 1979; Israel
has directly come into conflict with Iran’s proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran has also frequently clashed
with Israel’s superpower patron, the United States. In
1988, the United States and Iran engaged in a major
naval battle as part of the Tanker War, the U.S. Navy’s
largest engagement since the end of World War II.
Iran sponsored proxy attacks that killed U.S. service
personnel for a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. More168

over, Tehran and Washington frequently exchange
threats and counter-threats in the Persian Gulf and
over the Strait of Hormuz.91 It is, therefore, conceivable that a future conflict involving a nuclear-armed
Iran and Israel or the United States could result in a
nuclear exchange. If other states in the region, such as
Turkey or Saudi Arabia, also acquired nuclear weapons, the nuclear balance would be even less stable and
a poly-nuclear Middle East might be the most likely
candidate for the next nuclear war.
Nuclear Terrorism.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
scholars, analysts, and politicians have focused on the
nexus of nuclear weapons and terrorism. In his closing
statement at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, U.S.
President Barack Obama concluded, “We’ve agreed
that nuclear terrorism is one of the most urgent and
serious threats to global security.”92 Though there has
been some debate on how seriously this threat should
be taken,93 evidence indicates that terrorist organizations have both expressed a desire for nuclear weapons and made attempts to buy or seize nuclear material. Declassified documents from the United States
suggest that former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden
directed his associates to purchase uranium.94 In addition, Chechnya-based separatist groups, Lashkar-eTaiba in South Asia, and Aum Shinrikyo in Japan have
also expressed the desire for nuclear weapons in the
past.95
Most analysts consider it unlikely that a state
would knowingly provide a terrorist group with a
bomb, but it is conceivable that a group could steal
one. This fear is especially acute in the case of Pakistan, where an unstable government with a growing
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nuclear arsenal exists in an area with many terrorist
organizations. The government of Pakistan has taken
steps in recent years to allay these fears, yet reason for
concern remains.96
A second means by which a terrorist group could
attain a nuclear capability is by obtaining fissile material and constructing its own crude nuclear bomb.
The main challenge for terrorist organizations seeking this capability is finding sufficient fissile material.
Approximately 8 kilograms of plutonium or 25 kilograms of HEU is necessary for a bomb. Since 9/11, the
United States, Russia, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other partners have taken on
a number of efforts to decrease the risks of terrorists
accessing nuclear material. United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1540, the 2005 Amendment to the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and the 2005 International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism all seek to
increase global cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. Overall, the global stocks of HEU and plutonium
are decreasing, but the sheer volume of global fissile
material makes this an ongoing challenge and the U.S.
budget for these activities has recently been cut.
Unlike nuclear-armed states, it would be relatively difficult to deter terrorists from taking action.97 In
other words, if efforts to keep nuclear weapons out of
terrorist hands fail even once, we may very well witness a nuclear 9/11.
CONCLUSION
This chapter examined the prospects for the next
nuclear war. While we all hope that nuclear weapons
will never be used again, this chapter suggests that as
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long as nuclear weapons and geopolitical conflict exist, there remains a nonzero risk of a nuclear exchange.
To analyze this threat, this chapter looked to the only
previous instance of nuclear use, presented the theoretical mechanisms by which nuclear war might transpire, and identified the nuclear-armed actors and
related conflicts that could result in nuclear war.
Fortunately, a next nuclear war is not preordained,
and there are a number of steps that the United States
can take to reduce the risk. The first and most important step is to openly recognize, understand, and acknowledge the threat. U.S. leaders rarely talk about
nuclear war. When authorities discuss the litany of
threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons, a
frank discussion of nuclear war is often absent. For
example, in explaining why he is opposed to allowing
Iran to develop nuclear weapons, President Obama
said:
In addition to the profound threat that it poses to Israel, one of our strongest allies in the world; in addition to the outrageous language that has been directed
toward Israel by the leaders of the Iranian government—if Iran gets a nuclear weapon, this would run
completely contrary to my policies of nonproliferation. The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling
into the hands of terrorist organizations are profound.
It is almost certain that other players in the region
would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now, you have the prospect of a nuclear arms
race in the most volatile region in the world, one that
is rife with unstable governments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additional
capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearful
of retaliation.98
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President Obama never explicitly argued that a
nuclear-armed Iran could result in a nuclear attack
against the United States, Israel, or other states. Perhaps the threat was meant to be implicit in the discussion. Alternatively, perhaps Obama and others like
him do not want to be accused of hysteria for trumpeting the alarm on such a low risk, high consequence
outcome. Regardless of the cause of this reticence,
nuclear war is a possible, and the most severe, consequence of nuclear weapons proliferation. U.S. leaders
should explicitly confront this uncomfortable truth
head on. After all, if we do not accurately articulate
the threat, it will be difficult to adequately address it.
Elites in other states are less shy about broaching
the subject. North Korean leaders regularly threaten
nuclear use.99 Pakistan’s leaders have boasted to British officials about how quickly they could launch a
nuclear attack against India.100 Chinese state-owned
media has proudly reported the death and destruction that a Chinese nuclear attack could inflict on the
United States.101 Moreover, President Putin recently
explained to a youth group in Russia “that Russia is
one of the world’s biggest nuclear powers. These are
not just words–this is the reality. What’s more, we are
strengthening our nuclear deterrent capability.”102
Once U.S. leaders more frankly acknowledge the
threat of nuclear war, they must work with their counterparts abroad to take the necessary steps to stop it.
This means taking a variety of steps to stabilize relations among existing nuclear powers. Most importantly, however, it means promoting strong nonproliferation policies to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
to more countries. With each additional state that
joins the nuclear club, the probability of the next nuclear war occurring in our lifetimes increases by some
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unknown margin. While the probabilities involved
may be low, they might be just enough.
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CHAPTER 6
AFTER ARMAGEDDON: PONDERING
THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
OF THIRD USE
Matthew Fuhrmann
Nuclear weapons have thankfully not been used
in war since 1945. The nonuse of the world’s most
destructive weapon for 70 years makes it tempting to
conclude that nuclear weapons are relics of a bygone
era. The possibility of another nuclear attack, according to this line of thinking, is remote. This view may be
correct—and hopefully it is—but there is some cause
for pessimism. Several alarming incidents during the
Cold War brought the Soviet Union and the United
States to the brink of nuclear war: former Soviet leader
Nikita Khrushchev threatened to unleash nuclear attacks if Western forces did not withdraw from West
Berlin during crises in 1958-59 and 1961; an American
U-2 spy plane accidently ventured into Soviet airspace
during the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962; the United States ordered defense readiness
condition (DEFCON) 3, thereby placing nuclear forces
on alert, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War to deter Soviet involvement in the conflict; and a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) exercise, known as Able
Archer 83, caused the Soviet Union to make preparations for nuclear war in 1983.
The world remains a dangerous place in the postCold War era. It does not take too much imagination
to envision a scenario in which nuclear weapons could
be used in today’s environment. India and Pakistan
threatened nuclear escalation during the 1999 Kargil
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War, and again following the 2001 Indian Parliament
attack. A future Indo-Pakistani crisis could spiral out
of control, leading to an accidental or intentional nuclear exchange. North Korea has made multiple nuclear
threats since its first nuclear test in 2006. If backed into
a corner, a desperate North Korean Supreme Leader
Kim Jong-un may carry out his threat to turn Seoul
into a fireball. There have been three serious crises
in the Taiwan Strait involving China and the United
States—in 1954-1955, 1958, and 1995. A fourth crisis, if
it occurs, could escalate to a dangerous level.
Thinking about nuclear war scenarios is unpleasant. Indeed, it is depressing to imagine an event that
could cause such widespread death and destruction.
Studying this subject takes us into the “dark side” of
international relations.1 Uncomfortable as it may be, it
is important to consider what might happen if nuclear
weapons are used for a third time. How might nuclear
use change the world in which we live?
Little scholarly literature in political science addresses this question. On one hand, it is easy to see
why this is the case. Everyone understands that a
nuclear attack has the potential to inflict catastrophic
damage, possibly wiping entire countries off the map.
Any additional political consequences seem trivial
when compared to the human costs of nuclear war.
Most scholarly thinking, therefore, has been devoted
to the causes of war in the nuclear age. We seek to
understand why wars occur and when nuclear deterrence might fail, in part, to offer guidance on how
countries can further reduce the danger of armed conflict in the shadow of nuclear weapons.2 This is perfectly reasonable, and I have framed some of my own
research along these lines.3
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However, there is value in thinking through the
possible political effects of the third use of nuclear
weapons. First, this exercise can help us better understand a key puzzle in international relations: Why
haven’t nuclear weapons been used since 1945?4 Part
of the answer has to do with the human costs of a
nuclear attack, but this is not the full story. A nuclear
detonation in a large city could kill several hundred
thousand civilians, but one can also imagine a nuclear
use scenario in which few people die. One military
advantage of nuclear bombs is that they can destroy
“hardened” targets more effectively than conventional weapons. The United States, in theory, could launch
a nuclear attack against a remotely located weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) facility in the middle of a
desert where there are few, if any, civilians for miles.5
Such an attack may not kill any more people than a
conventional strike would. Why have countries not
used nuclear weapons in this type of scenario? We can
more fully appreciate this issue by delving deeper into
the political costs of nuclear attacks. As this chapter
will show, the third use of nuclear weapons carries
significant costs for the attacker, even if few people
are killed as a result.
Second, from a policy standpoint, we risk underestimating the costs of nuclear use if we neglect the
possible political consequences. Few credible analysts
would suggest that a nuclear attack would not be costly. However, significant costs may be “hidden,” especially in cases where a country is not directly involved
in nuclear use, as either the attacker or the target. The
analysis that follows reveals that there are significant
political risks associated with the third use of nuclear
weapons. Once we take stock of these consequences,
nuclear use seems even more cataclysmic than when
we focus on the human costs alone.
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This chapter considers the possible political ramifications of the bomb’s third use. Lacking a crystal ball,
it is impossible to know for sure how world politics
might change following a nuclear attack. Reaching
definitive conclusions about something that has not
happened is exceedingly difficult, and this inevitably
requires a fair amount of speculation. This chapter
does not intend to predict the future. It instead has
three main goals: (1) to identify some of the conceivable political consequences of nuclear use; (2) to discuss variables that are likely to shape the degree to
which these costs materialize; and (3) to comment on
what my analysis teaches us about the role of nuclear
weapons in world politics. The sections that follow
address these issues in turn.
POTENTIAL POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE
THIRD USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
This section considers some of the possible consequences of a nuclear attack. Before proceeding, some
key points warrant further clarification. I focus on the
political effects of nuclear use, largely leaving aside
the numerous humanitarian, social, environmental,
and economic consequences that would no doubt
arise from a nuclear strike. Non-political issues associated with nuclear use are critically important, but they
fall outside the scope of this particular chapter. Additionally, my analysis centers on the possible third
use of nuclear weapons. The bomb’s third use could
lead to unrestrained nuclear warfare, but this chapter
is not designed to assess the consequences of nuclear
holocaust scenarios. Nuclear escalation is one conceivable consequence of a nuclear attack, and I discuss
this possibility below, but I do not strive to compre-
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hensively analyze the political consequences of total
nuclear war.
The list of political costs that could arise from
nuclear use is practically endless. I focus on some of
the most significant consequences, grouping them
into four main categories: (1) military escalation and
the diffusion of armed conflict, (2) political blowback
toward the nuclear user, (3) damage to the nonproliferation regime, and (4) erosion of democracy. All
of these consequences, discussed in the next section,
could plausibly result from a nuclear attack. This does
not imply, however, that they would automatically
materialize.
Military Escalation and the Diffusion
of Armed Conflict.
The third use of nuclear weapons could ignite an
ongoing military conflict. Whether nuclear use leads
to further military escalation depends, in part, on how
the target state responds. If the target also possesses a
nuclear arsenal, there would be significant pressure to
launch a retaliatory nuclear strike. The third use of nuclear weapons, then, could quickly lead to the fourth
use. After that, the conflict could escalate from limited
to total nuclear war. Of course, even if the target has
the capacity to strike back with its arsenal, nuclear retaliation is by no means guaranteed. The target may
instead choose to launch a stiff conventional response,
or surrender and not respond at all.6 However, there is
a non-trivial danger that using nuclear weapons could
lead to unrestrained military escalation.
The level of escalation may depend on actors other than the nuclear user and the target. Nuclear use
could pull other countries, especially powerful ones,
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into an ongoing war. During the Cold War, most of the
plausible nuclear attack scenarios involved the United
States and the Soviet Union. The situation is different
today: many dangerous flashpoints in the world center
on disputes between regional powers, like India and
Pakistan. When regional powers armed with nuclear
arsenals fight, there is often significant pressure on
other countries to intervene. During the 1999 Kargil
War, for example, the United States actively sought
to prevent nuclear escalation. After U.S. intelligence
detected the movement of Pakistani nuclear weapons,
former President Bill Clinton warned Pakistani leader
Nawaz Sharif not to launch a nuclear attack, and this
may have helped bring an end to the conflict. If a regional nuclear power followed through on an atomic
threat, it would likely be difficult for the United States
to remain on the sidelines. Washington may decide to
intervene militarily to deter further nuclear escalation.
The prospect of suffering military punishment at the
hands of a superpower may de-escalate a war, as it
did in the case of Kargil.
Yet, superpower intervention could further escalate tensions. Should the United States join a limited nuclear war, the American arsenal could be on
the table. Pressure might mount, especially if there
were high casualties for U.S. forces, to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes against the initial nuclear user.
Imagine, for the sake of illustration, that North Korea launched a surprise nuclear attack against Japan
or South Korea. The United States may intervene to
defend its allies. If it did, Washington would surely
prefer to prevail using conventional military power
only. However, if the conflict persisted, some may
come to believe that America could not “win”—at
least not at an acceptable cost—by continuing to fight
at the conventional level. The end result, if this kind
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of thinking prevailed, could be an American nuclear
response. Not only does this stylized example illustrate how superpower intervention could intensify an
ongoing war, but it also underscores that the third use
of nuclear weapons might lead to nuclear retaliation
even if the target is nonnuclear.
There are other, less obvious ways that a nuclear
attack could lead to the further spread of military
conflict. Research shows that war undermines public health.7 Armed conflict can expose individuals to
conditions that are conducive to the spread of disease,
reduce the resources available for public health, and
destroy critical infrastructure, like hospitals. One can
imagine that the third use of nuclear weapons might
create a severe public health crisis in the target country. Hundreds of thousands of civilians could be
killed or injured, and medical help might not be readily available. The public health emergency that would
likely ensue from a nuclear attack, combined with
widespread panic in the civilian population, could
undermine stability in the target country, potentially
raising the risk of political violence or civil war.
The environmental consequences of a nuclear attack could also fuel instability in the target. Rich literature suggests that environmental degradation increases the risk of conflict, in part, by causing resource
scarcity.8 A nuclear attack would severely damage the
surrounding environment, potentially rendering large
portions of land uninhabitable. Moreover, food and
water supplies could be contaminated. People may
believe that it is unsafe to consume resources from
the target, even if the food supply is unaffected by the
nuclear blast, leading to further resource shortages.
All of this could provoke a competition over scarce
resources, potentially breeding conflict or civil war in
the target country.
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Chaos in the target state could have consequences
for neighboring states too. War is known to create refugee problems. As a result of the ongoing Syrian Civil
War, for instance, more than 2 million civilians have
fled Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and elsewhere. Individuals may flee conflict zones because their homes
are destroyed or due to concerns about their future
safety. In any case, massive refugee flows can have
significant political consequences. Most notably, the
presence of refugees from neighboring states increases the likelihood that a country will experience political turmoil and armed conflict.9 A nuclear attack could
produce a similar sequence of events on a larger scale.
Civilians in the target country could flee to neighboring states in droves. Many would leave due to
the belief that radioactive fallout from a nuclear blast
makes it unsafe to remain in the country. Others may
flee, even if they live far from the blast site, because
they fear additional nuclear attacks. Neighboring
countries would probably be ill-equipped to take on
massive refugee flows. At the very least, this could
create a major humanitarian crisis. Consider what
happened following the March 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant. Widespread
radioactive contamination forced many residents to
flee the surrounding area. Two years after the disaster, there were still 83,000 nuclear refugees who were
unable to return home.10 The large-scale movement of
people following a nuclear attack could raise the risk
of conflict in neighboring countries by sapping public
resources, inciting ethnic tensions, or spreading fear
and uncertainty. Anticipating the problems associated
with taking on refugees on a large scale, potential host
countries might deny entry to civilians from the target
country. If this happens, refugees themselves might
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turn to violence, in a desperate attempt to gain sanctuary in a neighboring state.
The third use of nuclear weapons could also have
long-term consequences for international conflict. It is
widely believed that conflict begets conflict.11 In other
words, once two countries fight, they are more likely
to experience future military disputes. War, therefore,
can lead to a vicious cycle that is difficult to reverse.
It is no accident, according to this perspective, that
countries such as India and Pakistan fight repeatedly
over similar issues. Why do many conflicts recur? Part
of the answer is that armed conflict creates grievances
and leads to resentment and distrust, which increases
the likelihood of future conflict. For example, there is
still bad blood between Japan and South Korea over
atrocities committed by Imperial Japan during World
War II. Today, due to persistent feelings of resentment, the leaders of these two countries are reportedly “barely on speaking terms.”12 The use of nuclear
weapons would likely result in widespread bitterness
toward the nuclear user among individuals in the
target country. As a result, once two countries fight a
nuclear war, they are likely to fight again in the future.
The consequences of nuclear use for international conflict, therefore, could persist long after fighting in the
nuclear war stops. Nuclear use could severely exacerbate an existing interstate rivalry, or lead to the onset
of a new one.
Political Blowback for the Nuclear User.
The preceding discussion highlights some of the
ways in which nuclear use could be damaging for
international security. In this section, I focus on consequences that are unique to the nuclear user.13 I high-
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lighted the most direct such cost previously: the user
could suffer nuclear or conventional retaliation from
the target or from third parties. Yet the possible costs
for the attacker do not end there. A state that carried
out the third use of nuclear weapons could experience
other kinds of political blowback.
A leader who carries out a nuclear attack could
put his or her political future at risk. The third use of
nuclear weapons would shatter a tradition of nuclear
nonuse that has persisted for decades, a point that I
will revisit in the subsequent section. Other countries
are therefore likely to be threatened by the nuclear
user’s actions. They may seek to remove him or her
from power through a foreign imposed regime change
(FIRC). In the past, the United States has used FIRCs
to punish leaders who pursued policies that were inimical to American interests. Washington covertly removed Mohammad Mosaddegh from power in Iran
during the 1950s, and attempted to eliminate former
Cuban leader Fidel Castro on numerous occasions in
the 1960s, to cite a couple of particularly infamous examples. The United States has also removed foreign
leaders from power overtly, as in the case of Saddam
Hussein during the 2003 Iraq War. It is not too hard
to imagine that a leader who used nuclear weapons
might suffer a similar fate. International actors may be
unnecessary to remove the nuclear user from power.
The use of nuclear weapons could incite domestic unrest, possibly triggering a domestic revolt that forces
the nuclear user to step down.
Using nuclear weapons could complicate a state’s
relations with friendly nations. Countries often strain
their alliance relationships when they take aggressive
actions. For example, the United States was displeased
when British and French troops invaded the Suez

192

Canal Zone in 1956. The Soviet Union was similarly
alarmed when one of its protégés, North Korea, seized
a U.S. military vessel known as the USS Pueblo in 1968.
Alliances are particularly likely to become strained
when there is the possibility of nuclear escalation.
Many leaders in Western Europe were incensed by
discussions of nuclear use in the United States during
the Korean War (1953), the Indochina War (1954), and
the Berlin crises (1958-1959 and 1961). Former Soviet
leader Nikita Khrushchev likewise became deeply
concerned when Fidel Castro privately advocated for
preventive nuclear strikes against the United States
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. As a result of this
episode, Khrushchev believed that he could no longer trust Castro. When the crisis ended, the Soviets
removed their tactical nuclear weapons from Cuba
(the existence of which the United States did not know
about at the time) that they had initially intended to
keep on the island. Castro’s mercurial behavior thus
cost him the weapons that could have been vital to
his security. The actual use of nuclear weapons could
have profound effects on alliance relationships. Allies
may turn their backs on the nuclear user or, at the very
least, lose confidence in that state. The nuclear user
may be left with few, if any, friends.
In addition to causing a state to lose friends, using nuclear weapons may create enemies. Other states
may align against the nuclear user, seeking to contain that state in the long term. Countries often form
military alliances to counter common threats.14 As the
old adage goes, an enemy of an enemy is a friend.
Because other countries are likely to find a state that
uses nuclear weapons highly threatening, they may
unite against it by forging formal alliances. By ganging up on the nuclear user in an attempt to contain
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it, the international community would likely frustrate
the user’s ability to pursue its interests in the realm of
foreign policy. Imagine if China used nuclear weapons in a future crisis with one of its regional rivals.
That would likely change the way that many states
perceive Beijing’s intentions, causing them to be more
wary of China’s rise than they otherwise would be.
Countries in Asia might therefore actively contain
China, to meet what they perceive as a growing threat.
In the end, China, a country whose grand strategy is
based partially on the notion of a “peaceful rise,” may
end up worse off than it would have been in the absence of a nuclear attack.
The nuclear user could also become internationally isolated in other ways. Countries might levy
harsh economic sanctions against that state or terminate commercial ties altogether. It is also conceivable
that states might sever diplomatic relations, leaving
the nuclear user politically cut off from the rest of the
world. Additionally, being labeled as a pariah could
undermine a country’s international influence.
Damage to the Nonproliferation Regime.
The third use of nuclear weapons could undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As noted
above, there is a 70-year tradition of nuclear nonuse.
Countries had opportunities to use nuclear weapons
on a number of occasions, including some of those
referenced above, but they refrained from doing so
each time. In a few instances—notably the Vietnam
War and the Soviet-Afghan War—nuclear powers accepted defeat before using their nuclear arsenals. The
persistent absence of nuclear use has led to the creation of a “nuclear taboo.”15 This taboo brings stability
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to world politics by giving states greater confidence
that they will not be subjected to unprovoked nuclear
attacks. The third use of nuclear weapons, however,
could shatter the nuclear taboo.
Using nuclear weapons a third time might set a
dangerous precedent—namely, that it is acceptable
to use atomic bombs to resolve interstate disputes.16
By changing the rules of the game, nuclear use could
make future nuclear attacks more likely. To illustrate,
consider how the use of nuclear weapons during the
1982 Falklands War might have affected the nuclear
taboo. Britain carried nuclear weapons—specifically
nuclear depths bombs—to the South Atlantic after
Argentina occupied the disputed Falkland Islands.
What if Britain had used one of those bombs, either
intentionally or accidentally? Some may find this possibility farfetched, but if it had happened, it may have
changed the way that countries thought about nuclear
weapons. Up until that point, the bomb had not been
used in war for 37 years, contributing to the perception that “responsible” countries do not use such a
destructive weapon. However, if Britain had broken
the nuclear taboo, other nuclear powers might have
believed that they too could use atomic weapons.
Nuclear arsenals, then, may have come to play a bigger role in world politics. This brings me to a related
point.
Nuclear use may foment nuclear proliferation.
One effective nonproliferation strategy is to make
the world think that nuclear weapons are utterly useless. If having a nuclear arsenal provides no benefits,
why would anyone want to build one? The third
use of nuclear weapons could cultivate the opposite
perception—that possessing the bomb allows one to
get their way in international relations. This was one
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unintended consequence of the nuclear attacks against
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the time, most observers believed that using nuclear weapons helped the
United States end the Pacific War on favorable terms.17
This perception fueled widespread interest in nuclear
weapons, particularly in the Soviet Union. If nuclear
weapons are again seen as useful for coercing other
states, interest in atomic arsenals could spike globally.
The preceding logic assumes that states desire nuclear weapons for offensive diplomatic purposes; and
yet, nuclear arsenals are useful primarily for defense.18
Even status quo oriented countries, then, might seek
nuclear weapons following their third use. Those
states might do so to protect themselves from nuclear
blackmail or nuclear attacks. History shows that countries sometimes launch nuclear weapons programs
after they are faced with perceived nuclear threats.
During the 1950s, for instance, the United States brandished its nuclear arsenal in two crises with China in
the Taiwan Strait. This caused officials in Beijing to believe that they were vulnerable to U.S. pressure in the
absence of a nuclear deterrent. As the Chinese official
statement issued after its first nuclear test in 1964 stated, China became a nuclear weapons state to “oppose
the U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and
nuclear threats.”19 The third use of nuclear weapons
could cultivate a sense of vulnerability in nonnuclear
countries, similar to what China felt in the 1950s, causing them to seek a nuclear arsenal. It is not unreasonable to suppose that China’s use of nuclear weapons
in a future crisis with Taiwan, for example, might motivate some of the other countries with whom Beijing
has ongoing disputes—Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam—to go
nuclear.
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There are, of course, significant costs associated
with building nuclear weapons. In some cases, launching a bomb program may harm a state’s security. As
underscored by Israel’s attacks against Iraq (1981) and
Syria (2007), countries suspected of pursuing the bomb
may be vulnerable to preventive military strikes. Some
states might therefore hesitate to proliferate even if
the third use of nuclear weapons leaves them feeling
threatened. They may instead opt for another strategy:
building the technical capacity to proliferate without
actually building nuclear bombs. This strategy, known
as “nuclear hedging,” allows a state to build a crude
bomb quickly in the event of a crisis. It is a potentially
attractive path because it allows a country to have its
cake (by being able to proliferate quickly if necessary)
and eat it too (by skirting some of the costs associated
with pursuing nuclear weapons). Some have argued
that this is precisely the strategy that Iran is adopting
today; Japan is another state believed to be engaging
in nuclear hedging.20 If states opt for this approach, the
third use of nuclear weapons could lead to the diffusion of advanced nuclear capabilities. Countries may
not immediately weaponize those capabilities, but the
presence of additional “latent nuclear powers” could
undermine international security.21
Another use of nuclear weapons could weaken key
international institutions, like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT allows five countries
to possess nuclear weapons, and requires everyone
else to give up the nuclear option. Many scholars and
policymakers credit the treaty with restraining the
further spread of nuclear weapons. In the early-1960s,
then-President John F. Kennedy famously predicted
that 15 or 20 countries could build nuclear weapons
in the coming 2 decades. Yet, after the NPT entered
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into force in 1970, only four states proliferated: India,
North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa. According
to NPT advocates, many more countries would have
proliferated if the treaty had not been created. Today,
the NPT has near-universal membership: all but four
countries are members.22 However, the third use of
nuclear weapons could cause states to withdraw from
the treaty, which is within their right per Article X of
the agreement, so long as they provide 90 days advanced notice. Countries who seek nuclear weapons,
alternatively, could remain in the treaty and cheat on
their NPT commitment. Either way, the glue that held
the nonproliferation regime together for more than 40
years may no longer hold, following the third use of
nuclear weapons.
The discussion in this section so far assumes that
the third use of nuclear weapons would negatively
affect the nonproliferation regime. It is also possible,
and somewhat paradoxical, that nuclear use would
result in a stronger regime. The international community often reacts to disasters by instituting sweeping
reforms. Most of the major improvements to the nonproliferation regime since 1970 resulted from crises of
confidence in existing measures. India’s nuclear test
in 1974 led to the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), a cartel designed to regulate trade in
nuclear technology and materials. Iraq’s violations of
the NPT prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War caused
the international community to give the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the main enforcer
of the NPT, more teeth through the 1997 Additional
Protocol. In addition, the international community
sought to strengthen global export controls by passing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
after the public exposure of the A. Q. Khan network,

198

a Pakistani-based operation that supplied nuclear
weapon-related technology to Iran, Libya, and North
Korea. As these examples illustrate, sweeping reforms
are sometimes possible in a time of crisis. The third
use of nuclear weapons would no doubt be horrific.
It might, therefore, create a broad international consensus to strengthen nonproliferation norms in an
attempt to lower the odds that the bomb would be
used a fourth time. This does not imply that the third
use of nuclear weapons would be a good thing. The
negative consequences would outweigh any marginal
improvement in the nonproliferation regime resulting
from nuclear use.
Erosion of Democracy.
Political theorists and international lawyers have
long recognized that war can undermine democratic
governance—especially civil liberties. In times of war,
leaders sometimes face pressures to degrade individual freedoms in the name of protecting state security.
As one British lawyer put it, “it’s always the case that
the flame of civil liberties burns less brightly when surrounded by the smoke from bombed buses and tube
trains.”23 Former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln, for
example, famously suspended the writ of habeas corpus during the American Civil War, denying detainees
the right to challenge unlawful imprisonment. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, former U.S. President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave the military authority
to remove Japanese-Americans from the west coast of
the United States. And, more recently, civil liberties
declined in the United States following the American
response to the 9/11 attacks. Measures taken by Washington to prevent future terrorist attacks—such as the
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passage of the Patriot Act—had the consequence of
reducing individual freedoms. As these examples underscore, war can put democratic values at risk in the
short-term.
War may also have enduring, long-term effects on
civil liberties, although this point is more widely contested in academic literature. Measures that are put
in place during times of emergency, according to one
line of thinking, persist long after the fighting stops.
Ronald Krebs aptly characterizes this view:
temporary states of emergency become permanent,
emergency measures are incorporated into ordinary
law, authorities employ emergency powers in everyday situations, and populations’ civil liberties baselines adjust to new realities.24

Others challenge this argument. Measures that are imposed during times of war, they argue, are lifted when
peace returns.25 Several historical cases support this
view: The United States, for instance, reinstated habeas corpus once the civil war ended (although former
President Ulysses S. Grant temporarily suspended it
again in some places during Reconstruction).
It is also possible that the long-term effects of war
on democracy are positive. An executive’s erosion of
democracy during wartime could prompt a domestic
backlash once fighting stops, leading to new measures
that reign-in executive power. Some scholars point
to the U.S. experience with the Vietnam War to substantiate this notion.26 When the war ended, Congress
passed the War Powers Resolution (1973), making
it more difficult for the President to send U.S. forces
abroad without congressional consent.
How might the third use of nuclear weapons influence democracy? There is a general consensus that
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civil liberties are more likely to erode when states face
intense threats.27 A nuclear attack would likely trigger a sense of extreme panic in the target country. It is
therefore possible that the target would face pressure
to prioritize security above all else. When the conflict
ended, the target might continue to impose restrictions
on civil liberties to forestall future nuclear attacks.
The bomb’s third use might also erode democracy
in states other than the target— particularly in those
countries that could be vulnerable to nuclear strikes.
Once the tradition of nuclear nonuse is broken, all
states might change their views on the likelihood that
they could suffer a nuclear attack. Given their obvious incentive to avoid atomic strikes, states may institute new measures to protect themselves. One possibility is that countries would give executives more
sweeping-powers, potentially at the risk of individual
liberties, institutional checks and balances, and other
hallmarks of democratic governance. Imagine if Russia launched a nuclear attack against Ukraine (leaving aside judgments about whether this is conceivable or not). Following such an attack, Russia’s other
rivals might come to believe that they are vulnerable
to nuclear strikes. In addition, states that are enemies
of nuclear powers other than Russia would probably
face a heightened sense of insecurity. If Russia used
nuclear weapons against Ukraine, for example, Japan
and South Korea might fear that North Korea would
be emboldened to follow suit against them. The potential victims of future nuclear attacks would naturally
seek to enhance their security, and, in doing so, they
may weaken their commitments to democracy.
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FACTORS THAT MIGHT INFLUENCE
THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR USE
We cannot know for certain, as noted previously,
what would happen if there is another nuclear attack. Some of the consequences identified above may
emerge following the third use of nuclear weapons,
but others may not. Whether costs materialize—and
the degree to which they do so—will depend on a
wide variety of considerations. This section focuses on
some of the relevant factors. I identify the five “W’s”—
who, what, when, where, and why—of nuclear third
use that could shape the nature and magnitude of the
above political costs.
Factor #1: Who Uses Nuclear Weapons?
The characteristics of the nuclear user could play
an important role. How powerful that state is, for
example, may affect the price that it pays for using
nuclear bombs. A superpower, like the United States
today, may be relatively insulated from political blowback. Other states might be deterred from launching
retaliatory strikes against the United States, for fear
of provoking a broader conflict that they would likely
lose. By contrast, potential punishers of the nuclear
user may be less worried about military escalation if
they are dealing with a non-superpower. The relative
“rogueness” of the nuclear user would also be important. For a state that is largely cut off from the international community already—for example, North
Korea—any additional isolation they might suffer as a
result of using nuclear weapons could be trivial. Nuclear use, therefore, may be less costly for those states.
Yet, for a country like China that is heavily integrated
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in the global economy, economic sanctions could have
a devastating effect.
Some of the preceding discussion implies that the
nuclear user would be a country. However, this need
not be the case. It is theoretically possible that the third
user of nuclear weapons could be a terrorist group.
Whether the user is a country or not would likely matter when it comes to the political fallout of a nuclear
attack, a point on which I will elaborate later.
Factor #2: What Is Targeted?
What the nuclear user destroys in an attack would
also influence the political costs. Launching an attack
against a city that kills 100,000 or more civilians is one
thing. Using tactical bombs on the battlefield against
an advancing army is another. Yet another is bombing
a remote “hardened” target that results in relatively
few casualties. The international community would
likely deplore any use of nuclear weapons, but states
would probably react the strongest to countervalue
targeting. Thus, the political costs—especially the
blowback for the nuclear user—would likely be greatest in cases where a state deliberately targets civilians.
Factor #3: When Are Nuclear Weapons Used?
When a state launches a nuclear attack is another
significant factor. It matters, in particular, whether
nuclear use occurs during an ongoing war or in
peacetime. Even conventional preventive attacks are
controversial, as underscored by the 2003 Iraq War.
A bolt from the blue nuclear attack would be a particularly strong violation of a longstanding international norm. Such an incident could draw extreme
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ire from other states, thus increasing the costs for the
attacker. Things might be different if the third use of
nuclear weapons occurred in the midst of a protracted
conventional war. The political costs for the attacker,
then, may be somewhat reduced in those cases, even
if the blowback is still severe. Think, for the sake of
illustration, about the U.S. attack on Hiroshima visà-vis a hypothetical preventive nuclear strike against
Tokyo in 1940.
Factor #4: Where Is the Bomb Used?
Against whom an attacker uses nuclear weapons
could influence the consequences of nuclear use for
world politics. Whether the target possesses nuclear
weapons is one critical consideration. If the target is
nonnuclear, the potential for nuclear escalation declines. At the same time, some of the non-military
costs for the attacker could increase. Using the bomb
against a nonnuclear state could be seen as particularly reprehensible,28 and might trigger a stiffer response
from the international community. If the target also
possesses the bomb, there is a higher probability of
nuclear retaliation. Those scenarios, then, are potentially more dangerous for international security. Yet
the non-military costs might decline slightly, as others
are less likely to perceive the attack as an attempt to
bully a defenseless country.
The target’s ability to cope with a nuclear attack
might also be significant. Several of the political costs
discussed previously may be worse when the target
is unstable. In particular, countries that are already
prone to political violence would probably be more
prone to civil war following a nuclear attack. On top
of this, unstable countries, which are also likely to be
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underdeveloped, may be relatively helpless when it
comes to addressing the fallout from a nuclear attack.
Life in a developed country would almost certainly
be chaotic after a nuclear strike, too. However, a state
with the capacity to at least partially deal with an
emergency might be able to lessen refugee problems
and other environmental issues, although these problems would still be acute. Therefore, conflict might
more likely diffuse when the target is weak (for example, Pakistan) than when it is strong (for example,
the United States).
Factor #5: Why Are Nuclear Weapons Used?
The reason a state would use nuclear weapons
represents a fifth key consideration. The third use of
nuclear weapons could be deliberate or accidental.
Indeed, many plausible nuclear attack scenarios during the Cold War and today involve non-authorized
nuclear use. It was possible that during the Cuban
Missile Crisis, for instance, a local Soviet commander
in Cuba could have fired a nuclear weapon without
explicit authorization from Moscow. If the third use of
nuclear weapons occurs due to the actions of a rogue
military officer, the nature of the political costs could
change dramatically. For example, international attention might be focused on how to better secure existing nuclear arsenals, rather than on how to punish
the nuclear user. This does not imply, of course, that a
nuclear user would be absolved of any and all responsibility simply because an attack was accidental.
When attacks are deliberate, the intentions of the attacker also matter. First, it makes a difference whether
others perceive its aims as offensive or defensive. Most
deliberate uses of nuclear weapons that one can imag-
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ine serve a coercive purpose: The attacker hopes to
change the behavior of the target by inflicting massive
amounts of punishment, or impose its will militarily.
However, not all coercive uses of nuclear weapons are
the same. In some cases, the attacker seeks a return to
the status quo ante. Using nuclear weapons to restore
stability to a system that was challenged by a revisionist power may be viewed as more acceptable than
launching a nuclear attack entirely for offensive purposes. Consider the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The United States tried to force Saddam Hussein from Kuwait,
first with diplomacy and then with military force. Yet
the international community did not view Washington as the aggressor. Most observers recognized that
the United States was responding to Saddam’s unprovoked invasion and occupation of a largely defenseless neighbor. In this type of case, nuclear use may be
less costly than when the attacker’s aims are perceived
as offensive, as in the 2003 invasion of Iraq (note that
there is some overlap here with factor #3).
Second, the attacker’s specific goals are also relevant. Other countries would probably respond differently to the third use of nuclear weapons based on
the stakes for the attacker. If the attacker is fighting for
its survival, and especially if it was attacked first, others might understand why it resorted to the nuclear
option, potentially lessening their willingness to retaliate diplomatically, politically, or economically. By
contrast, others may have a hard time empathizing
with a state that used nuclear weapons in pursuit of
an important but non-vital objective, like forcing the
target to hand over disputed territory.
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CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN WORLD POLITICS
Two points about the consequences of nuclear use
are worth underscoring. First, many of the political effects discussed in this chapter—for example, the possibility of conflict escalation—are straightforward, but
others are less obvious. The effects of nuclear use for
democracy and civil war, in particular, have received
relatively little attention in the literature. These things
might seem trivial when compared to the loss of hundreds of thousands of civilians. At the same time, we
risk underestimating the effects of nuclear use by neglecting the political costs of an atomic attack. This
chapter represents a modest attempt to discuss some
of the main political consequences; there are no doubt
others that I have not identified.
Second, there is important variation in the political costs of nuclear use. All uses of atomic bombs are
not created equal, even if they produce similar human
costs. Both a Pakistani tactical nuclear attack against
advancing Indian conventional forces in a future war,
and a North Korean nuclear attack on Seoul launched
in response to a mistaken false warning of an incoming American missile attack, for example, would produce horrific consequences, but they would likely affect world politics in different ways. The “five W’s” of
nuclear use discussed in this chapter offers a framework for understanding how the political costs might
vary.
More generally, the analysis in this chapter speaks
to the tradition of nuclear nonuse.29 Everyone understands that a nuclear attack would be devastating for the target. However, my analysis reaffirms
that the third use of nuclear weapons would also be
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quite costly for the attacker. A state that launched a
nuclear attack would probably suffer enormous political blowback, and would do great damage to the
nonproliferation regime (which is damaging to the extent that the attacker cares about limiting the spread
of nuclear weapons). These costs help explain why
countries have refrained from using nuclear weapons
in war since 1945, although moral considerations also
play an important role.
In addition, this chapter has implications for the
benefits that states derive (and do not gain) from
possessing a nuclear arsenal. Some have argued that
atomic arsenals are useful tools of coercion and intimidation.30 Nuclear weapons, according to this line of
thinking, have benefits that extend well beyond deterrence. States can extract concessions more effectively
or impose their will on others simply by raising the
possibility of a nuclear attack. Others have challenged
this view, arguing that nuclear weapons have little
utility beyond deterring military conflict.31 The reason
is simple: It is difficult to make nuclear threats credible when the potential attacker’s aims are compellent
in nature (as opposed to deterrent). Recognizing that
there is variation in the costs of nuclear use for the
challenger helps us understand why nuclear weapons
may be useful for some political purposes and not
others. Consider a hypothetical scenario where China
decides to attack Japan’s third largest city, Osaka,
after escalating conventional engagements over the
Senkaku Islands. The costs for the attacker are greatest in this case because nuclear use occurred for offensive purposes during a crisis in which the attacker’s
national survival was not at stake. This is partially
why this scenario is quite unlikely to occur. China is
unlikely to carry out a strike that harms its strategic

208

interests to such a degree. Japan and the United States
would recognize this at the outset, and they are likely
to dismiss Beijing’s coercive nuclear threat as incredible. China thus will have a hard time wresting away
the Senkakus from Japan by practicing nuclear coercion. In cases like this, then, states are unlikely to derive much political utility from their nuclear arsenals.
By contrast, in deterrence, the costs of nuclear use
for the challenger are smaller, and the stakes may be
higher. A state’s threat to launch a nuclear attack if it
is invaded, therefore, may be deemed credible. Again,
nuclear weapons may deter, but they generally do not
compel.32
Given the possible political costs of nuclear use
detailed above, states would do well to take further
measures to avoid the possibility of third use.
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